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The past two decades have seen a surge of research publications in the 
psychology of religion, with most studies affirming the salutary effects afforded by 
religious functioning.  However, current mental health researchers have advocated for 
more nuanced examinations of religious constructs and more careful analysis of 
potentially harmful aspects of religiosity.  Particularly absent from the psychological 
literature are the mental health effects religious beliefs may exert on parishioners.  
Researchers note that this is surprising given the general psychological tenet that beliefs 
are inextricably bound-up with affective states and general mental health.  Responding to 
the admonition of researchers in the field, this study proposes and tests an initial model of 
psycho-spiritual abuse. 
The proposed model of psycho-spiritual abuse hypothesizes that religious beliefs 
such as the theological doctrine of original sin, fundamentalist ideology, lack of self-
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forgiveness, and negative God-representations, in addition to familial upbringing, may 
negatively impact an individual’s view of self, thus fostering psychological distress.  In 
particular, this study considers scrupulosity disorder, depression, and shame to be the 
primary psychiatric maladies engendered by psycho-spiritual abuse.   
Two hundred thirty five parishioners from 18 Christian faith groups across the 
United States participated in an online survey consisting of standardized measures of 
original sin, fundamentalism, self-forgiveness, god image, perceived parental rearing, 
scrupulosity, depression, and shame.  A canonical correlation analysis was conducted 
because it allows for the simultaneously testing of the relationship between the criterion 
variables (i.e., scrupulosity, depression, and shame) and predictor variables (i.e., original 
sin, religious fundamentalism, self-forgiveness, parental rearing perceived as rejecting, 
emotionally warm, and overprotective, as well as accepting, presence, and challenging 
God-representations) of interest.   
Results reveal that greater degrees of belief in the theological doctrine of original 
sin as well as greater adherence to religious fundamentalist ideologies are directly and 
indirectly associated with scrupulous and depressive symptomatology as well as with 
shame-prone feelings and actions in unhealthy ways.  Results also indicate that God-
representations also play an essential role in scrupulosity, depression, and shame in 
hypothesized ways.  Hence, such results further implicate the centrality of religious 
ideologies in the expression of psychopathology.  Additionally, results seem to suggest 
that the direct familial contribution to the expression of psychopathology among 
parishioners appears to be weaker (i.e., secondary) than that of religious beliefs; this 
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statement is based on the fact that perceived parental rearing practices were secondary 
contributors to the synthetic variable of psycho-spiritual beliefs in both Function 1 and 2.   
Finally, these results suggest that the primary mechanism through which religious 
beliefs as well as familial upbringing impact parishioner psychological well-being is the 
resulting view of the self they engender.  Therefore, results suggest that the proposed 
model of psycho-spiritual abuse is sound.  
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A review of the literature concerning religion and health, and religion and mental 
health over the past two decades reveals a concerted effort by researchers to primarily 
investigate the salutary aspects and effects of religion (see Levin, 2002; Smith, 
McCullough, & Poll, 2003).  However, current mental health researchers have advocated 
for more nuanced examinations of religious constructs and analysis of potentially harmful 
aspects of religiosity (Bergin, 1992; Exline, 2002; Exline, Yali, and Sanderson, 2000; 
Harris, Erbes, Engdahl, Olson, Winskowski, and McMahill, 2008; Smith et al., 2003; also 
see Pargament, 2002).  Particularly absent from the psychological literature are the 
mental health effects religious beliefs may exert on parishioners (Flannelly, Galek, 
Ellison, & Koenig, 2009; Heise & Steitz, 1991; Miller & Hedges, 2008; Patrick & 
Kinney, 2003).  As Flannelly and colleagues state: “The neglect of religious beliefs in 
mental health research is all the more surprising, since cognitive psychotherapists have 
long held the position that beliefs about the world underlie many psychiatric disorders” 
(p.1).  In addition, social psychologists (Markus, 1977), psychoanalysts (H.B. Lewis, 
1971), schema therapists (Young, 1999), existential practitioners (Spinelli, 2007), 
cognitive behavioral clinicians (Beck, 1967), and researchers in the field of self-
forgiveness (Exline et al., 2000) have especially recognized the importance of beliefs 
about the self as major contributors to intrapersonal mental health.  William James’ 
(1902/2002) qualitative investigation into people’s experience of religious phenomena 
provides an unsurpassed line of sight into the confluence of religious beliefs and their 
implicit meaning about the self.  While James does not go beyond the descriptive scope 
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of his project, current clinical and experimental need requires us to.  Therefore, this study 
seeks to contribute to the psychological literature in a significant way by addressing the 
psychological effects potentially harmful religious beliefs may have on parishioners.  In 
so doing, this study looks to propose and test an initial model of psycho-spiritual model 
abuse.  However, due to the scantiness, and in some cases absence, of empirical research 
concerning the purported relationship between predictors and outcome variables, 
hypotheses must be deduced from theoretical dialogues in addition to various types of 
research.  In short, this author defines psycho-spiritual abuse: The misuse of ecclesial 
doctrine(s) via coercive or overtly forceful tactics such as fear, overly strict punishment, 
ridicule, perfectionism, and humiliation in order to instill in a person a sense of “right 
religion,” which results in a diminished sense of self, thus leading to psychiatric 
difficulties including, but not limited to, anxiety, depression, and shame. 
The model of psycho-spiritual abuse presented in this study requires the 
elucidation of various types of religious beliefs and their relationship to the psychological 
outcomes of anxiety, particularly scrupulosity disorder, depression, and shame 
respectively.  As aforementioned, beliefs about the self are the building blocks of 
psychological health.  Such beliefs are fostered, in part, through: (1) early relationships 
with primary caregivers (i.e., parents); and (2) later interactions with authority figures 
and religious institutions, such as the local church (Beck, 1967; Freud, 1923); note that 
the phrase authority figures henceforth denotes religious intuitions such as the church or 
parish as well as clergy.  Consequently, the fusion of parental and/or religious authority 
with demeaning messages about the self—both religious and non-religious—possess 
herculean potential for the formation and expression of psychopathology.  For example, 
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Watson, Morris, and Hood (1988) state: “Writers sympathetic to the orthodox tradition 
admit [italics added] that sin-related beliefs can lead to pathology, particularly when the 
emphasis is on emotional guilt and personal worthlessness [italics added] aspects of 
confessing sin” (pp. 349-350).  Indeed, it may be that diminished feelings about oneself 
are engendered or reinforced by particular doctrinal teachings such as the theological 
doctrine of original sin.  However, they may also be mitigated by the psychological 
benefits inherent in many social groups, such as churches, via social support (Ellison, 
Boardman, Williams, & Jackson, 2001; Ellison, Finch, Ryan, & Salinas, 2009; Ellison & 
Levin, 1998; George, Ellison, & Larson, 2002; Vandervoort, 1999) thereby making 
detection of psycho-spiritual abuse difficult.  However, research suggests that there may 
be one religious group in which the harmful effects of self-deprecating messages may be 
more salient and therefore more conducive to quantitative examination—Fundamentalist 
Christians (see Spring, Moosbrugger, Zwingmann, & Frank, 1993).  The denotation 
“fundamentalist Christians” throughout this dissertation refers to Catholic, Protestant, and 
Sectarian Christians who strongly believe that their religious outlook contains the most 
“fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth” (Altmeyer & Hunsberger, 2004, p. 
50).      
Regarding one’s early relationships with primary caregivers and later authority 
figures, not only do these objects or figures represent differing developmental periods, 
they also represent two distinct levels of possible analysis.  The first level of analysis 
corresponds to the individual and his/her personal characteristics, while the second level 
refers to a person’s larger contextual grouping and its characteristics (Bickel, 2007).  In 
this case, the individual level is the focus of attention and is composed of the parishioner 
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and his/her defining characteristics; that is, those characteristics that contribute to a 
healthy or unhealthy sense of self.  Since this study explores the associations between 
religious beliefs that influence the self and psychological well-being, theory and research 
suggest that some of these individual characteristics may be: (1) degree of belief in the 
theological doctrine of original sin; (2) degree of religious fundamentalism; (3) God-
representations; and (4) ability to self-forgive. In addition, familial upbringing will also 
be treated as an individual variable as it may also help to explain some of the variance in 
the final models.   
Part and parcel of proposing and testing a model of psycho-spiritual abuse 
requires careful review of the psychological literature in seven areas.  The first three can 
be described as foundational in nature as they combine detailed theoretical accounts with 
pertinent research serving to ground the primary mechanisms by which the psycho-
spiritual abuse may operate.  The first area pertains to the place of religion in the field of 
experimental psychology and what has typically been referred to as its “rise, fall, and 
resurgence” (Nielsen, 2000, p. 1).  This specific review of the literature is essential in that 
it provides a context within the general history of the field within which to situate this 
study.  In addition, it reviews several key theoretical constructs of import when thinking 
about the dark side of religion (see Bjorck, 2007).  Moreover, it also situates the role 
fundamentalist christianity and its tenets have played in relation to the history of the field.  
Finally, it legitimizes the present study by linking it to a mainstay in the psychological 
research tradition and significantly expanding upon it.  The second area addresses the 
theological construct of original sin and its potential relationship to psychopathology via 
its anthropological message of inherent taint and worthlessness.  Due to its notable 
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absence in the psychological literature as well as its varied interpretation across Christian 
faiths, a relative degree of description and nuance is imperative for the appropriate 
operationalization of the construct.  The third area focuses on the influence of authority 
figures from the ground up employing an object relations vantage point.  The section 
begins with a detailed discussion of God-representation formation followed by an 
explanation of the super-ego’s function vis-à-vis God-representations and authority 
figures.  Finally, the segment discusses the influence of clergy on parishioners.  
Subsequently, the fourth section focuses on anxiety, particularly scrupulosity disorder, 
and its relation to detrimental religious beliefs concerning the self.  The fifth area briefly 
explores the relationship between depressive symptomatology and psychopathology as it 
relates to potentially harmful aspects of religiosity.  The sixth section deals with the 
phenomenology of shame and its plausible relationship to the self-diminutive tenets of 
fundamentalist theology. Finally, the seventh area concerns self-forgiveness as a potential 
protective factor against a melancholic self.  However, due to the fact that self-
forgiveness is neither a fundamental tenet nor explicit religious teaching of the Christian 
faith this section explores the psychological impact its absence may have on parishioners. 
The synthesis of this review of the literature will ultimately serve as the comprehensive 
blue print for the construction, maintenance, and inner workings of the proposed model 













REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
Psychology and Religion 
 
 Definitions.     It is difficult, if not impossible and certainly incomplete, to speak 
properly about the discipline of psychology without speaking about religion (Rank,).  
This assertion, however, requires the definition and distinction of two key terms: (1) 
religion; and (2) spirituality.  Over the course of the twentieth century psychology 
typically subsumed the multidimensionality of religiousness and spirituality under the all-
encompassing construct of religion (Zinnbauer & Pargament, 2005).  It was only a few 
years prior to the turn of the century that researchers began to differentiate between the 
institutional and personal aspects of religious practice (Paloutzian & Park, 2005).  This 
shift has resulted in the unfortunate dichotomization of a “substantive, static, institutional, 
objective, belief-based, ‘bad’ religiousness” and “a functional, dynamic, personal, 
subjective, experience-based, ‘good’ spirituality” (Zinnbauer & Pargament, 2005, p. 24).   
In an attempt to distinguish the religious person from the spiritual person for 
research purposes, Koenig, McCullough, and Larson (2001) have proposed distinct 
definitions for “religion” and “spirituality” that parcel out the functional aspects of 
religiosity.  In doing so, however, they legitimize, even if unwittingly, this divisive 
dichotomy.  According to Koenig et al. religion: 
…is an organized system of beliefs, practices, rituals, and symbols designed (a) to 
facilitate closeness to the sacred  or transcendent (God, higher power, or ultimate 
truth/reality) and (b) to foster an understanding of one’s relationship and 
responsibility to others in living together in a community (p. 18); 
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while spirituality: 
…is the personal quest for understanding answers to ultimate questions about life, 
about meaning, and about relationship to the sacred or transcendent, which may 
(or may not) lead to or arise from the development of religious rituals and the 
formation of community (Ibid).  
The difficulty with this and similar definitions of religion and spirituality is that: 
(a) they imply that religious people are not active, meaning-making persons who pursue 
their raison d’être apart from cultic rituals; and (b) that spiritual individuals are devoid of 
any organized systems of belief, practices or symbols that inform their relationship to the 
sacred.  Moreover, research has shown that most people self identify as both religious and 
spiritual and that for many, spiritual development occurs within the context of a healthy 
religious setting (Zinnbauer & Pargament, 2005).  Consequently, the term “religion” as 
employed by this author is defined much more broadly in an attempt to not minimize 
spirituality while at the same time avoiding unnecessary dichotomizations and remaining 
consistent with the century long language of the psychology of religion.  Henceforth, this 
author adopts and employs the following definitions of spirituality and religion when 
speaking of religion: “Spirituality is a search for the sacred.  Religiousness refers to a 
search for significance in ways related to the sacred” (Zinnbauer & Pargament, 2005, p. 
36).  Under this set of definitions spirituality is understood to be the modus operandi of 
religion while religion represents a more inclusive set of experiences; under such 
conditions spirituality is subsumed in the term “religion” (Ibid.; Pargament, 2002; also 
see Pargament, 1997).                                
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A forgotten history.     In today’s conversations concerning the field of 
psychology, religion and all things religious are among the least addressed (Haque, 
2001).  In the words of Paloutzian and Park (2005), “…the psychology of religion as a 
field of endeavor has a pulse—albeit a weak pulse!—always coursing, but beyond the 
awareness of most psychologists” (p. 15).  However true this may be it was not always 
the case.  Prior to Wundt’s establishment of psychology’s first experimental laboratory in 
1879 Germany, to learn psychology was to learn theology (Hergenhahn, 2001).   Given 
St. Anselm of Canterbury’s enduring definition of theology as fides quaerens intellectum 
(faith seeking understanding) in the context of moral, mental, and intellectual philosophy, 
psychology and religion were not diametrically opposed fields of study; rather, they were 
viewed as epistemological mediums employed to approximate truths concerning the 
human mind and by extension truths concerning its presupposed Creator (McGrath, 
2001).  In fact the Latin term psychologia, first coined in 1524 as a subdivision of 
pneumatology, literally denotes the study of the soul (Haque, 2001).   
In the early decades of the 19th century mental illness was considered a 
“disruption of the mind and the spirit” (Koenig & Larson, 2001, p.  68).  In response, 
William Tuke, a pious Quaker, developed a therapeutic intervention based on the 
Christian values of work and self-control as well as the ethical treatment of the patient; 
this intervention came to be known as moral treatment.  Tuke’s claim was that a purely 
medical approach to mental illness was both insufficient and ineffective when dealing 
with such disruptions.  Moral treatment made its way to U.S. hospitals by 1817 with 
remarkable results.  Invariably, “moral treatment was the first established form of 
psychiatric care in the U.S.” (Ibid).  In the mid 19th century Sir Frances Galton, the 
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English scientist who would become the founder of the psychology of individual 
differences, was the first to employ the statistical method of correlation.  His most well 
known studies include the verifiable effects of penitentiary prayer, the psychological 
process by which religious icons come to be venerated, as well as examining the 
relationship between the clerical vocation and well-being (Wulff, 1997).  Wundt himself 
looked to reconstruct the evolutionary origins of religion postulating that religion is an 
outgrowth of the evolution of myth.  Albeit the case, religion, claimed Wundt, retains 
mythic characteristics and is infused with a greater sense of wholeness and connectedness 
with the world and the supernatural (Ibid.).  Wundt’s slightly younger contemporary 
William James (1902/2002), with the publication of his Gillford Lectures on Natural 
Religion—The Varieties of Religious Experience— made the “single most important 
contribution” to the “psychology of religion” (Vande Kemp, 1992, p. 290).  In his 
opening lecture James (1902/2002) asserted that though he was neither a theologian, nor 
a scholar of religions, nor an anthropologist, nonetheless he believed: 
To the psychologist the religious propensities of man [sic] must be at least [italics 
added] as interesting as any other of the facts pertaining to his mental constitution.  
It would seem, therefore, as a psychologist, the natural thing [italics added] for 
me would be to invite you to a descriptive survey of those religious propensities 
(p. 5). 
James (1902/2002) makes a particular distinction among religious individuals that 
is of theoretical import for this study.  His research led him to distinguish between the 
religion of healthy-mindedness and the sick soul.  According to James, the religion of 
healthy-mindedness allows a person to minimize evil, and in the language of 
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contemporary religious coping fosters benevolent religious reframing, while the sick soul 
maximizes evil, thus fostering negative religious reframing (Pargament, 1997).  An 
example of healthy-minded religiousness is found in Molinos’ (as cited in James, 
1902/2002) benevolent religious reframing of the doctrine of Original Sin in a more self-
compassionate (Neff, 2004) manner:   
When thou fallest into a fault, in what matter soever it be, do not trouble nor 
afflict thyself for it.  For they are effects of our frail Nature, stained by Original 
Sin.  The common enemy will make thee believe, as soon as thou fallest into any 
fault, that thou walkest in error, and therefore art out of God and his favor… O 
blessed Soul, open thine eyes; and shut the gate against these diabolical 
suggestions, knowing thy misery, and trusting in the mercy divine (p. 147). 
 On the other hand, persons fitting the description of the sick soul, also referred to 
by James (1902/2002) as those who need to be “twice-born to be happy,” are typified by 
a burdensome awareness of personal evil.  Such persons regard this evil as an essential 
feature of human essence.  This evil is sin “with a capital S… something ineradicably 
ingrained in our natural subjectivity” (p. 152).  While James admits that these two 
religious poles are abstract, extreme versions of the religious experience, with most 
persons varying between them, he does note: “there is something almost obscene about 
these children of wrath and cravers of a second birth” (p. 182).  As will be elucidated in 
the ensuing pages of this study, central to it is James’ conceptual continuum along which 
parishioners find themselves and their subsequent relationship to psychological well-
being.         
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As important as James’ (1902/2002) work is to the psychology of religion it is 
important to note, however, that James understood his contribution to be a contribution to 
psychology proper and not to a specific subdivision; indeed, to employ such a distinction 
during the beginnings of psychology would be somewhat anachronistic—although it is 
important to note that by the time James’ Varieties was published the extraction of 
religion and philosophy from psychology had taken place (Hergenhahn, 2001).  In the 
Varieties of the Religious Experience James acknowledges the work of two luminaries 
from the Clark School of Religious Psychology, J. H. Leuba and E. D. Starbuck—
successors of G. Stanley Hall, founder of the Clark School (Maier, 2004; Vande Kemp, 
1992; Wulff, 1997).     
Hall understood religion in its more classical sense of rebinding or reconnecting, 
from the Latin ligare.  As such, he perceived the psychological study of religion as 
describing the rebinding of conduct with conscience, mind with truth, and affect with the 
utmost love object (i.e., God).  The end result was the individual’s health or wholeness 
(Vande Kemp, 1992).  Hall notwithstanding, it was Leuba, who attempted to explicate 
the mystical experience in terms of biopsychological processes, and Starbuck, who 
explored the phenomenon of religious conversion, who represent the “first Americans to 
attempt the scientific study of religion” (Ibid., p. 296; Wulff, 1997).  In early 20th century 
Germany, Rudolf Otto and Friedrich Heiler produced major qualitative descriptive works 
concerning the religious experience similar to that of James’.  Otto explored the 
experience of the numinous and concluded that its nature was two-fold: extremely 
overwhelming on the one hand, yet captivating on the other.  Heiler studied prayer as a 
means to understand piety in all of its manifestations.  He concluded that in all such 
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expressions of piety one is seeking to establish and abide in an I-Thou (Buber, 1970) 
relationship with God (Wulff, 1997). While Wundt was establishing his laboratory in 
Germany Charcot and Janet, among others, were exploring what were considered 
psychopathological religious states.   
Charcot, a neurologist by training, concluded that demon possession was but 
another manifestation of hysteria and that the phenomenon of faith healing could be 
explained by the mechanism of autosuggestion.  His student Janet is well known for his 
study of the case of “Madeleine,” a patient at the Parisian neurological clinic Salpêtrière.  
Madeleine’s symptoms included walking on her toes, unions with God that would 
immobilize her in the position of a cross, stigmata, and subjective states of levitation.  
After 14 years Janet concluded that Madeleine’s states of mystical consciousness were 
attributable to psychasthenia or modern day obsessive-compulsive disorder (Ibid.).  In 
fact, it may be that Madeleine was suffering from a particular subtype of obsessive-
compulsive disorder known as scrupulosity disorder in which religious obsessions and 
fears dominate.  While space and scope do not allow a more comprehensive survey of the 
entire corpus of research that early psychologists conducted on religious phenomena one 
thing is for certain, the enterprises of psychology and religion owe much to each other. 
Decline.      During the decade known as The United States’ Renaissance, 1886-
1896, psychology in the U.S. gained the status of an empirical science.  In doing so, it 
sought to rid itself of its theological and philosophical roots (Hergenhahn, 2001).  
Consequently, by the turn of the century “references to God and religion had all but 
dropped out of the new psychology’s literature” (Maier, 2004, p. 323).  Indeed, the 
epistemological modi operandi that in centuries past had been inextricably bound-to-
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psychology were effaced by positivism.  In essence, positivism displaced metaphysics 
from science (Haque, 2001).  In the years leading up to this schism some religious 
psychologists, such as Princeton University president James McCosh, stressed the 
scientific imperative: psychological experiments should solely be conducted by 
psychologists, not theologians.  McCosh, among others, was convinced that only good 
could come from this bifurcation. At the Presbyterian General Council conference of 
1880 McCosh (as cited in Maier, 2004) stated:  
Our first inquiry, when an asserted discovery in science is announced, should be, 
not is it consistent with Scripture, but is it true?  If it be true, all who have an 
implicit faith in the Bible are sure that it cannot be unfavorable to religion (p. 
332).  
Another contributing factor to the eventual decline of the intersecting of  
psychology and religion was the Darwinian influence inherent in schools of thought such 
as behaviorism, which flourished in the 1920s (Hergenhahn, 2001; Nielsen, 2000).  Chief 
among its founders was the notable Russian scientist I. P. Pavlov.  Pavlov purported that 
religious persons are constitutionally weaker than their non-religious counterparts.  
According to Pavlov (as cited in Windholz, 1986), it is those that are phylogenetically 
weak that are dependent upon religion:  
There are many people who cannot live without religion.  There are weak people 
over whom religion has power.  The strong ones—yes, the strong ones—can 
become thorough rationalists, relying only upon knowledge, but the weak ones 
are unable to do this” (p. 325).     
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In essence, Pavlov argued religiosity was a matter of biology, of natural selection (Ibid.).  
The deterministic qualities of Darwinism also influenced Freud’s understanding of 
human behavior; instinct not reason, argued Freud, governs behavior (Hergenhahn, 2001; 
Haque, 2001).  Ultimately, Freud relegated religious practice and experience to the realm 
of psychopathology.  In particular, Freud believed that religiosity in its varied forms was 
an extension of infantile obsessive neurosis, an idea he formally published in the 1907 
inaugural issue of Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie, a short lived eclectic journal that 
dealt with psychiatry and the care of the soul  (Meissner, 1984, 2009; Wulff, 1997).  Its 
editors were a pastor and a psychiatrist; Freud himself had agreed to serve on its editorial 
board, a commitment he never kept (Wulff, 1997).  Concerning Freud’s understanding of 
religion Meissner states: “In religion we are all children, related in our trusting infantile 
dependence on a powerful god who replaced the oedipal parents” (p. 14).  It was Freud’s 
hope that science (i.e., psychoanalysis) would mitigate, if not abate, the regressive 
symptoms of religious belief and adherence.  The psychoanalyst Fenichel (as cited in 
Koenig & Larson, 2001) echoed Freud’s sentiment when he penned:  
It has been said that religious people in analysis remain uninfluenced in their 
religious philosophies since analysis itself is supposed to be philosophically 
neutral.  I consider this not to be correct.  Repeatedly I have seen that with the 
analysis of the sexual anxieties and with maturing of the personality, the 
attachment to religion has ended (p. 67). 
Ironically, Darwinian influence in the U.S. had two major effects in the development of 
the Protestant Fundamentalist movement.  Firstly, to paraphrase Mardsen (2006), it 
reinforced the notion that sin is linked with animality.  In other words, if there was any 
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hint of truth concerning Darwin’s claims, which the fundamentalist movement did not 
believe there was, by analogy it was the Christian ideal of  “overcoming the original, 
lower, animal nature” (p. 26).  In addition, most Christian fundamentalists place great 
emphasis on holiness or sanctification as a second act of grace.  According to Hood, Hill, 
and Williamson (2005), sanctification is “a process through which a believer is 
supernaturally cleansed from innate sinfulness (italics added) and enabled to live a godly 
life unencumbered by ‘desires of the flesh” (p. 94).  In short, Darwinian influence 
reinvigorated, by analogy, the belief in the theological doctrine of original sin by 
throwing light upon the Christian truth that God’s requirement of humanity is perfection, 
through the second act of grace, which eradicates the roots of humanity’s sinful nature.  
Secondly, Darwinian influence was one of the factors, along with higher criticism, that 
radically challenged sources of knowledge and “truth” with a capital “T.”  The 
consequences were a systematic intensification of a dispensational premillennial 
approach to Scripture and human history— a division of salvation history into seven 
dispensations, the last of which is considered to be the millennium where Christ will rule 
the earth as king for 1,000 years ensued by the culmination of time; however, prior to the 
millennium the true Church will be raptured and humanity will experience the emergence 
of the Anti-Christ and the great tribulation presumed to be described in the biblical books 
of Revelation and Daniel.  Consequently, the bible became a book of facts that were to be 
interpreted literally wherever literal interpretation was possible.  As such, prior claims of 
inerrancy were significantly intensified and solidified in the minds of fundamentalists 
(Mardsen, 2006, also see Cox, 2008; and Sandeen, 1970).               
   
  16 
By 1923 it was clear that the influence of these and other factors were greatly 
threatening the survival of a once robust enterprise.  Perhaps the greatest among these 
“other” contributing factors was the theological response to World War I (Wulff, 1997).  
Prior to the war certain optimism and theological liberalism concerning religious 
epistemology was pervasive, in large part due to the theological work of Friedrich 
Schleirmacher.  Influenced by Romanticism’s embrace of both the Enlightenment and 
naturalism, Schleirmacher developed a theology of divine immanence as he “sought to 
base theology on human experience (Grenz & Olson, 1992, p. 43).  In other words, God 
could be known by understanding humanity and humanity could be known by 
understanding God.  Within this context it is not difficult to see why the formal 
beginnings of psychology were not inimical to religion and vice versa.  However, the war 
marked a turning point in theological optimism that had reigned for the better part of two 
centuries and a new theological movement termed neo-orthodoxy was born.   
The main proponent of neo-orthodoxy, and truly its founder, was the Swiss 
theologian Karl Barth.  “The neo-orthodox movement was characterized by the attempt 
of theologians to rediscover the significance for the modern world of certain of the 
doctrines that had been central to the older Christian orthodoxy” say Grenz and Olson (p. 
63).  Barth, along with others, sought to re-establish God’s transcendence by emphasizing 
the ontological disparity between the Divine and the human.  Barth in particular was 
critical of liberal theology claiming that it employed the Scripture to divinize humanity in 
turn creating an anthropocentric theology instead of treating it as “God’s Word,” as 
divine revelation (Ibid.).  A result of this theological shift was the distancing of God from 
fields of human study such as psychology.  This can be seen, for instance, in Piaget’s 
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assertion that the transcendent God was little more than the representation of “the 
mythological and infantile imagination” (Wulff, 1997).   
Within the U.S. fundamentalist reaction to the war was similar yet more militant.  
Interpreting Germany’s role in the war as a consequence of social-moral degradation, 
thought to be engendered through liberal [German] theology, fundamentalists 
experienced it as a cosmic war between the forces of good and evil, civilization and 
barbarism, God and Satan.  Consequently, they reached the conclusion that such social-
moral degradation could also infect the U.S. if liberal theology was propagated within 
churches, seminaries, bible colleges, and universities.  “As premilennialists they had to 
say that there was not hope for culture,” says Madsen (2006), “but at the same time they 
were traditional American evangelicals who urged a return to Christian principles as the 
only cultural hope” (p. 149).  Such sentiments were reified with each additional war and 
with the cultural revolution(s) of the 1960s and 1970s; the only difference being that the 
latter resulted in political activism (Ibid.).              
Consequently, undergraduate courses in the intersection of psychology and 
religion, which had previously enjoyed significant success, began to decline and by 1933 
they had all but disappeared.  Moreover, research concerning religious phenomena came 
close to vanishing as journals such as Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie and the 
American Journal of Psychology dissipated along with the Psychological Bulletin’s loss 
of Leuba as editor in the late 1920s (Hood, 2000; Nielsen, 2000; Wulff, 1997).  Though 
theorizing and experimentation concerning religious phenomena has never become 
extinct, especially in psychoanalytic circles, in approximately 1930 the academic study of 
the psychology of religion in the U.S. took a 20-year hiatus (Hood, 2000).  Paralleling 
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and reacting to this sequence of events in the U.S. was the formation of fundamentalist 
Protestantism.    
Resurgence.      In 1949 J. P. Williams and W. H. Clark established the 
Committee for the Scientific Study of Religion (CSSR) (Hood, 2000).  By the mid 1950s 
the CSSR had become the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion (SSSR) and on 
June 10, 1960 the SSSR forged its Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion (JSSR).  
Though other research societies interested in the psychology of religion were burgeoning, 
such as the Religious Research Association, the Christian Association for Psychological 
Studies, the National Academy of Religion and Mental Health, and the American 
Foundation of Religion and Psychiatry, groups such as the SSSR took great care not to 
“pollute” academicians with unscientific religiosity (Haque, 2001; Ibid.).  It was within 
this context and via the SSSR and JSSR that Gordon Allport was given a platform from 
which to conduct and publish his research (Hood, 2000).   
In 1950 Gordon Allport published The Individual and His Religion in which he 
distinguished between mature and immature religious sentiments or “systems of beliefs” 
(p. 54).  According to Allport, what distinguishes the two religious sentiments is that 
individuals with a mature religious sentiment are firstly able to think critically about each 
strand of their religious heritage and weave them together into a cohesive whole.  They 
realize that there are unflattering and perhaps even harmful aspects of religious belief yet 
they are able to make informed decisions concerning their beliefs.  In contradistinction, 
the immature religious sentiment accepts doctrines, beliefs, etc. with “a kind of uncritical 
abandon.  They may say, ‘I don’t know enough about it to be rational; I’m accepting my 
religion on purely emotional grounds,’ or ‘I believe what I was taught, and that’s good 
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enough for me” (p. 58).  Secondly, persons of a mature religious sentiment exercise their 
religiosity because it is an end in and of itself.  Allport suggested that the origins of 
religious life are in part rooted in “the reservoir of organic drives,” that is fears, appetites, 
and corporeal desires (p. 63).  Whereas immature religion engages in the religious life in 
order to satisfy these drives, mature religion evolves to become a driving force of its own.  
As such, magical thinking, fanaticism, and compulsive religion do not belong to the 
latter.     
Thirdly, the mature sentiment is morally consistent, thus transforming the 
person’s moral character.  “While an immature sentiment is very likely to raise moral 
storms, and sporadically alter conduct, it lacks the steady, persistent influence of the 
seasoned religious outlook” (p. 65).  Fourthly, the mature sentiment requires perspective 
taking and the humility to be tolerant and accepting.  Allport put it this way: “The 
religion of maturity makes the affirmation ‘God is,’ but only the religion of immaturity 
will insist, ‘God is precisely what I say He [sic] is” (p. 69).  Fifthly, persons of a mature 
religious sentiment engage in a lifetime of wrestling with the complexity of life, the 
existence of evil, and the limitations of human will to form a cohesive or “integral 
nature” (p. 70).  Finally, Allport purported that mature religion constantly reforms itself.  
In other words, it holds its tenets flexibly knowing that new and additional information 
may be useful to better approximate religious truths.  Subsequently, one may act 
“wholeheartedly even without absolute certainty;” one may “be sure without being 
cocksure” (p. 72).  Though Allport, influenced by Adorno and colleagues’ research 
concerning the authoritarian personality, later renamed the religious sentiments (i.e., 
“immature” became “extrinsic” and “mature” became “intrinsic”) at their core they 
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remained unchanged (Wulff, 1997).  This distinction, along with the development of the 
Religious Orientation Scale (Allport & Ross, 1967) have been among the most widely 
used conceptual and research tools of the past half-century (Ryan, Rigby, & King, 1993; 
Wulff, 1997).  
Allport’s work marked the beginnings of the resurgence in the psychological 
study of religion.  However, it was not until the 1970s that the rebirth had been fully 
realized (Belzen, 2005; Haque, 2001; Nielsen, 2000).  This reawakening signified that the 
role and place of religious values within the therapy room had to be addressed, which 
sparked a decade long debate beginning in the early 1980s (O’Connor, 1998).   Though 
few, American Psychological Association (APA) accredited doctoral programs 
emphasizing the study of the intersection of psychology and religion also began to appear 
in the late 80s, the first being at Fuller Theological Seminary.  Moreover, at the end of the 
20th century more than half of the U.S.’ medical schools offered courses on religion, 
spirituality and medicine (Koenig et al., 2001).  Haque (2001) also mentions that the 
“inclusion of religious beliefs in therapies” began to emerge “especially in the cognitive-
behavioural [sic] approaches where religious themes are used to encourage religiously 
oriented clients to monitor their thoughts and overcome resistance” (p. 249).  An example 
of this may be espied from research suggesting that guided imagery has proven a 
successful coping strategy in perioperative religious individuals (Tusek, Chuch, & Fazio, 
1997).  Along similar lines, the application of mainstream psychological theories such as 
coping, attachment, human development, motivation, personality, emotion, and cognition 
to things religious since the early 90s has proven beneficial (Hill, 2005).   
A monumental milestone, however, was the addition of Division 36 (Psychology 
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of Religion) within the APA in 1976 because it lent institutional credibility to the 
enterprise of the psychological study of religion.  Division 36 officially traces its 
inception to 1946 and the American Catholic Psychological Association (ACPA), 
subsequently named Psychologists Interested in Religious Issues (PIRI) who in 1993 
metamorphosed into Psychology of Religion (Haque, 2001; Nielsen, 2000; Reuder, 
1999).  In addition, Division 36 launched its own APA journal, Psychology of Religion 
and Spirituality, in January 2009 thus taking its place alongside the prominent 
International Journal for the Psychology of Religion.  Despite this renewed interest in the 
intersection of psychology and religion, Nielsen (2000) points out that when taking into 
account the APA’s membership total as well as the memberships of the respective APA 
divisions, Division 36 remains quite small and minimal in force.   
It is within this larger history of the intersection of the psychological with the 
religious that this study is situated and finds meaning as it seeks to contribute in a 
significant manner to the growing corpus of such literature.  Finally, both Allport (1950) 
and James’ (1902/2002) distinctions and descriptions of a person’s religious functioning 
are instructive at this point of the analysis because they aid in providing a point of 
reference as we begin to consider the plausible relationship(s) between religious 
fundamentalism, degree of belief in the theological construct of original sin, God-
representations, level of self-forgiveness, and familial upbringing in relation to 
psychological well-being.  While this study does not aim to label anyone as “having a 
sick soul” or being “religiously immature,” it stands to reason that keeping these 
constructs in the periphery of our consciousness will aid us in providing a theoretical 
framework from which to better understand the mechanisms at work in psycho-spiritual 
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abuse.  Attention is now turned to a relatively unexamined theological construct that lies 
at the foundation of fundamentalist Christianity’s view of human anthropology, original 
sin.       
Original Sin 
 
 Distinctions and Definitions.        McMinn, Ruiz, Marx, Wright, and Gilbert 
(2006) state: “One relatively unexplored area in psychology has to do with the Christian 
construct of sin.  This doctrine—foundational in Christian anthropology—suggests that 
all humans are tainted and wounded by their own misconduct and the misconduct of 
others” (p. 296).  St. Augustine (trans. 2005) expresses the finality of the human 
condition employing a paraphrase of Romans 3:23: “…all have sinned, whether in Adam 
or in themselves, and have fallen short of the glory of God” (p. 398).  A distinction that 
must be made when attempting to operationalize the construct of sin is sin qua state and 
sin qua act.  In the interest of operationalization clear distinction and definition of these 
theoretical constructs is imperative. 
As generally understood in the Christian tradition, sin-as-state refers to the 
universal and hereditary sinful essence of humanity due to Adam and Eve’s spiritual 
transgression (Taylor, 1983).  The a priori “sinful essence of humanity” concerns the 
will’s virtual inability to rightly obey God and rationally rule over one’s corporeal 
members as well as the corrosion of all admirable human qualities.  In essence it defines 
the quality of human nature as defective.  Augustine (as cited in Niebuhr, 1996) puts it 
this way:   
Man’s [sic] nature was indeed at first created faultless and without sin; but nature 
as man [sic] has it into which everyone who is born from Adam, wants the 
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Physician, being no longer in a healthy state.  All good qualities which it still 
possesses…it has from the most High God, its Creator and Maker.  But the flaw 
which darkens and weakens all these natural goods, it has not contracted from its 
blameless Creator…but from that original sin (emphasis in original) which it 
committed of its own free will (emphasis in original) (pp. 2421-242).  
It is this notion of sin-as-state that the first half of McMinn et al.’s (2006) definition 
alludes to, a state in which “humans are tainted and wounded” (p. 296).   
Sin as act, on the other hand, is denoted by McMinn and colleagues’ (2006) 
reference to one’s “own misconduct and the misconduct of others” (p. 296).  While the 
Christian doctrines of original sin and sin constrict human volition, many times 
nihilistically, they paradoxically place great emphasis on the execution of the debilitated 
will.  Therefore, while it was human will that perpetrated the original sin, which brought 
with it all of the aforementioned concomitants, it is the individual will that sins against 
God, self, and neighbor.  This individual sin is defined: “Conduct that violates [italics 
added] what the offender [italics added] believes to be supernaturally ordained moral 
code” (English and English, 1958, p. 503; also see Menninger, 1973).  Defining 
individual sin in this manner allows us to keep true to its Hebrew meaning of ht or 
missing the mark, which ultimately denotes a transgression, an offense (Pargament, 
1997).  Another way to conceptualize these constructs and their psychological impact is 
as schemata.   
The schemata of sin-as-state and sin as act.     What we believe to be true about 
ourselves is an essential factor in personal mental health.  In fact, of all the information 
processed by the human mind a considerable amount regards information about the self 
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(Markus, 1977; also see Young, 1999).  The metabolizing of behaviors and cognitions 
vis-à-vis moral codes imposed by parents as well as other authority figures such as 
religious leaders, and the reward or punishment received for such thoughts and actions 
serve as the bedrock for self-schemata or self-representations (Ibid., Skinner, 1965).  The 
establishment of such self-representations, however, is contingent on the “repeated 
categorization and subsequent evaluation” of the phenomena by the subject (Markus, 
1977, p. 64).  Consequently,       
once established, these schemata function as selective mechanisms which 
determine whether information is attended to, how it is structured, how much 
importance is attached to it, and what happens to it subsequently.  As individuals 
accumulate repeated experiences of a certain type, their self-schemata becomes 
increasingly resistant to inconsistent or contradictory information… (Ibid.). 
McIntosh (1995) cogently argues that religion too can be understood in terms of 
schema.  Since schemas typically operate at both global and specific levels of cognition a 
self-schema (global) may contain a religion schema (specific) that bears great impact on 
self-definition.  If the religion schema is not aschematic for sin-as-state and sin as act 
constructs, then, it is more likely that the individual will come to define him/herself as 
inherently sinful.  Furthermore, any transgressions committed by the person will only 
serve to reinforce this self-representation (Ibid.).  Hence, it is imperative to unveil what 
the schemas of sin-as-state and sin as act impute to the self. 
 Imputing the self.     The Christian tradition bases its anthropology on the Adamic 
myth of Genesis 3: 
Now the serpent was more crafty than any other wild animal that the LORD God 
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had made.  He said to the woman, “Did God say, ‘You shall not eat from any tree 
in the garden’?”  The woman said to the serpent, “We may eat of the fruit of the 
trees in the garden; but God said, ‘You shall not eat of the fruit of the tree that is 
in the middle of the garden, nor shall you touch it, or you shall die.’  But the 
serpent said to the woman, “You will not die; for God knows that when you eat of 
it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil.”  
So when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight 
to the eyes, and that the tree was to be desired to make one wise she took of its 
fruit and ate; and she also gave some to her husband, who was with her, and he 
ate.  Then the eyes of both were opened, and they knew that they were 
naked…Therefore the LORD God sent him forth from the garden of Eden, to till 
the ground from which he was taken.  He drove out the man… (3:1-7a, 23-24a, 
New Revised Standard Version). 
It is within this biblical narrative popularly known as The Fall that the ontogenesis of sin-
as-state is purportedly explicated (Dubarle, 1958/1964; McMinn et al., 2006; Tennant, 
1903).  However, scholars have long noted that the Hebrew Scriptures (Old Testament) 
remain largely silent concerning the primordial parents, much less infusing their mythic 
account with hamartigeny— an explanation of the origin and ubiquity of sin (Noddings, 
1989; Ricoeur, 1967/1969; Schwarz, 1985; Tennant, 1903; Williams, 2001).  We may 
conclude, then, that while the Hebraic authors were aware of human potentiality for sin 
they understood it as “a voluntary act or a habit resulting from such acts” (Tennant, 1903, 
p. 98).  Moreover, it was later exegetically understood that God created humanity with 
such potentiality by instilling in them the yezer tob and the yezer hara or good and evil 
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inclinations/natures (Ibid.).    
With the evolution of Jewish theology, visible in the Midrashim—commentaries 
on the Hebrew Scriptures—and the Targum—the Aramaic translation of the Hebrew 
Scriptures— ensued the magnification of the first human being.  Adam became a 
demigod whose stature was such that he filled the earth, possessed unequaled beauty, 
wisdom, immortality, and physical radiance brighter than the sun itself (Tennant, 1903).  
The deuterocanonical book of Ecclesiasticus is part evidence of this tradition: 
He [God] endowed them with strength like his own, and made them in his own 
image.  He put fear of them in all living beings, and gave them dominion over 
beasts and birds.  Discretion and tongue and eyes, ears and a mind for thinking he 
gave them.  He filled them with knowledge and understanding, and showed them 
good and evil…He bestowed knowledge upon them, and allotted to them the law 
of life (17:3-7, 11, NRSV). 
From such a great height did humanity fall.  The consequences of such a catastrophe must 
be psychologically syntonic with the human experience.  The synthesis of Jewish thought  
with Greco-Roman philosophy gave the first Christian writer the tools necessary to forge 
an anthropology congruent with human suffering; his words would resound with 
Augustine at the time of his conversion as he read the Epistle to the Romans (Jacobs, 
2008).  The apostle Paul, referred to by Dubarle (1958/1964) as the “doctor of original 
sin” (p. 142), penned what has been deemed the most puissant argument for the existence 
of sin-as-state (Ibid.; Niebuhr, 1996; Ricoeur, 1967/1969; Williams, 2001): 
Therefore, just as sin came into the world through one man, and death came 
through sin, and so death spread to all because all have sinned… Therefore, just 
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as one man’s trespass led to condemnation for all, so one man’s act of 
righteousness leads to justification and life for all.  For just as by the one man’s 
disobedience the many were [italics added] made sinners, so by one man’s 
obedience the many will [italics added] be made righteous (Romans 5:12, 18-19, 
NRSV).   
 Paul’s tenet is that Adam’s trespass not only brought about a divine penalty, 
death, but it also created a sinful state in which all of humanity participates (Dubarle, 
1958/1964).  Moreover, an ontological problem arises concerning the “first Adam” and 
the “second Adam,” this second one being Christ.  The juxtaposition elevates the Adam 
of Genesis to the stature of Christ, the perfect God-man, while simultaneously degrading 
him along with the rest of humanity (Ricoeur, 1967/1969).  The mainstay of this Adam 
Christology is found in expressions such as Barth’s (1933/1968):  
As the old man, he is what he ‘is’, the man ‘we’ know, who is under the wrath of 
God: as the new man, he is what he is not, the man ‘we’ do not know, who is 
righteous before God… If a man be in Adam, he is an old, fallen, imprisoned 
creature… (pp. 164-165). 
Irenaeus (as cited in Tennant, 1903), the late second century Bishop of Lyons, held that 
all of humanity was and is “in Adam:” “We were all in Adam, and were Adam, when he 
sinned” (p. 290).  The fourth century Bishop of Alexandria Athanasius (as cited in Ibid.) 
believed similarly: “We all die in Adam…God has turned away from human nature 
because of its transgression of the law in Adam” (p. 314).  This spiritual determinism is 
only half of the equation, claims Paul, for while it contains a physical penalty its 
symptoms extend further into humanity’s corporeal experience.  Thus Paul continues: 
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…But I am of the flesh, sold into slavery under sin.  I do not understand my own 
actions.  For I do not do what I want, but I do everything I hate… But in fact it is 
no longer I that do it, but sin that dwells within me.  For I know that nothing good 
dwells within me, that is, in my flesh.  I can will what is right, but I cannot do it… 
Now if I do what I do not want, it is no longer I that do it, but sin that dwells 
within me.  So I find it to be a law that when I want to do what is good, evil lies 
close at hand.  For I delight in the law of God in my inmost self, but I see in my 
members another law at work at war within the law of my mind, making me 
captive to the law of sin that dwells in my members.  Wretched man that I am!  
Who will rescue me from this body of death? (Romans 7:14b-15, 17-18, 20-24, 
NRSV). 
What results is a portrait of humanity utterly devastated, buffeted, and enslaved to a 
powerful force, sin-as-state.  Humanity can escape it inasmuch as it can be freed from its 
corporeal condition.  Not only is sin-as-state a result of the will, but it perpetually endures 
on account of “the flesh.”  What developed as a result of patristic thought concerning the 
ecclesial polemics of their day was an indelible theology of original sin as genetic, as 
universal, as state.  The imputation of such theological tenets upon the self is part and 
parcel of our religious heritage operant in societal thought as well as liturgical practice.   
 For example, in the third century Origen spoke of sordes peccati (i.e., the stain of 
sin) in relation to infant baptism.  Origen argued that infants were in need of baptism to 
wash away their inborn taint, the sordes peccatti they possessed (Tennant, 1903).  He 
explained: 
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Everyone who enters the world may be said to be affected by a kind of 
contamination… By the very fact that humanity is placed in its mother’s womb, 
and that it takes the material of its body from the source of the father’s seed, it 
may be said to be contaminated in respect to both father and mother…Thus 
everyone is polluted in father and mother (as cited in McGrath, 2005, p. 390).     
The ontogenetic belief in sordes peccatti was also expounded by two of the Cappadocian 
fathers, Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa (Tennant, 1903).  The early 
Christian apologist Tertullian reasoned that at the creation of the soul, of which all of 
humanity is an offshoot of Adam’s soul, there too is the birth of hereditary sin: 
Our first parent contained within himself the undeveloped germ of all mankind 
[sic], and his soul was the fountain-head of all souls; all varieties of individual 
human nature are but different modifications of that one spiritual substance.  
Therefore the whole of nature became corrupt in the original father of the race, 
and sinfulness is propagated together with souls (as cited in Tennant, 1903, p. 
332). 
This brief survey of the imputation of the soul must include Ambrose, the fourth century 
Bishop of Milan under whom Augustine was converted to the Christian faith.  For in 
Ambrose we find the negation of the imago Dei in post-fall humanity, a teaching that 
greatly influenced Augustine as well as the Swiss Protestant Reformer John Calvin 
(Ibid.).  If in Augustine we find the coalescence of thought from Paul to Ambrose, in 
Calvin we find a coalesced Augustinian anthropology having undergone centuries of 
subsequent thought and reflection.  Calvin (1536/1845) states: 
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Adam was made the depository of the endowments which God was pleased to 
bestow on human nature, and that, therefore, when he lost what he had received, 
he lost not only for himself but for us all… Thus from a corrupt root corrupt 
branches proceeding, transmit their corruption to the saplings which spring from 
them.  The children being vitiated in their parents, conveyed the taint to the 
grandchildren; in other words, corruption commencing in Adam, is, by perpetual 
descent, conveyed from those proceedings to those coming after them… Children 
come not by spiritual regeneration but carnal descent.  Accordingly, as Augustine 
says, “Both the condemned unbeliever and the acquitted believer beget offspring 
not acquitted but condemned, because the nature which begets is 
corrupt.”…Original sin, then, may be defined a hereditary corruption and 
depravity of our nature, extending to all parts of the soul, which first makes us 
obnoxious to the wrath of God, and then produces in us works which in Scripture 
are termed works of the flesh… Hence even infants bringing their condemnation 
with them from their mother’s womb, suffer not for another’s, but for their own 
defect.  For although they have not yet produced the fruits of their own 
unrighteousness, they have the seed implanted in them.  Nay, their whole nature 
is, as it were, a seed-bed of sin, and therefore cannot but be odious and 
abominable to God (Bk. 2, Ch. 1, Sec. 7-8).     
This is the imputation of the self; this is what many Christian parishioners attend 
to both explicitly and implicitly sermon after sermon.  To paraphrase Barth (1933/1968), 
humanity is defined by sin.  In other words, it is to say, “I am sin.”  In relation to 
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fundamentalist Christianity it is of import to note that its beginnings are rooted in John 
Calvin’s theology (Mardsen, 2006), which stresses five main theo-anthropological tenets:  
1. Total [italics added] depravity of sinful human nature; 
2. Unconditional election, in that humans are not predestined on the basis of any 
foreseen merit, quality or, or achievement; 
3. Limited atonement, in that Christ died only for the elect; 
4. Irresistible grace, by which the elect are infallibly called and redeemed; 
5. Perseverance of the saints, in that those who are truly predestined by God 
cannot in any way defect from the calling (McGrath, 2001, p. 469).      
Intuitively, one cannot help but suspect that such tenets cannot be psychologically or 
theologically healthy. Albee (1982) in his discussion of preventative measures 
concerning psychopathology discusses Calvinistic theology as a significant road-block 
toward this end:   
Another major source of opposition to prevention comes from those who see the 
unfortunates, the disturbed, and the failures of humankind as sinful and doomed 
(Calvinism).  This theology stresses rigid determinism and obviously reduces 
opportunities for human freedom and effective social change to near zero.  The 
doctrine of predestination leads to stigmatic labels (the good-elect and the 
wicked-damned) and the position that human beings are unchangeable.  In the 
Calvinistic tradition, no human intervention can save a person… (p. 1048). 
Data from a study by McMinn et al. (2006) concerning what Christian leaders wish 
psychologists knew about sin and grace reveals a reification of sin-as-state.  Data yielded 
four broad categories: the nature of sin, consequences of sin, grace and sin, the 
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importance of sin and grace for the work of professional psychologists.  One hundred 
sixteen respondents stressed the importance of psychologists knowing about the nature of 
sin, 43% of which spoke specifically of sin-as-state; 10% highlighted the weightiness of 
the consequences of sin; 22% underscored the value of grace and sin; and 25% espoused 
the importance of sin in psychotherapy.  The overwhelming message Christian leaders 
desire psychologists, and this author argues humanity at large, knew is: “I wish 
psychologists understood that sin is inextricably interwoven into the fabric of human 
existence.  We are all born with it” (Ibid., p. 298).  And again, “Sin is comprehensive 
(affecting the whole person), universal (affecting every individual), inherited (coming 
from our shared humanity), a condition (a status, not a series of choices)” (Ibid.).  What 
Paul is to early Christianity Freud is to psychology and in a round about manner even 
Freud weighed in on original sin.  However, as will be discussed later, perhaps Freud’s 
assertions about human nature may provide a slightly different lens through which human 
experience may be spoken about. 
Freud and original sin. After considering the notion that humanity is 
essentially good-natured Freud (as cited in Meissner, 1984), in New Introductory 
Lectures on Psycho-analysis, asserted: 
Unfortunately, what history tells us and what we ourselves have experienced does 
not speak in this sense but rather justifies a judgment that belief in the ‘goodness’ 
of human nature is one of those evil illusions by which mankind [sic] expects 
their lives to be beautiful and made easier while in reality they only cause damage 
(p. 160). 
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In a similar vein, Freud (1963) shared his skepticism concerning humanity’s “goodness” 
with his colleague the Reverend Oskar Pfister: “I do not break my head very much about 
good and evil,” said Freud, “but I have found little that is ‘good’ about human beings on 
the whole.  In my experience most of them are trash, no matter they publically subscribe 
to this or that ethical doctrine or to none at all” (pp. 61-62).  In addition, Freud (trans. 
1961) in Civilization and Its Discontents when speaking of the death instinct echoes the 
words of the plethora of Western theologians who have conceived original sin in the 
aforementioned manner when he says: “For ‘little children do not like it’ when there is 
talk of the inborn human inclination to ‘badness’, to aggressiveness and destructiveness, 
and so to cruelty” (p. 79).  A few paragraphs later Freud asserts, “In all that follows I 
adopt the standpoint, therefore, that the inclination to aggression is an original, self-
subsisting instinctual disposition in man…” (p. 81).   
In the first of these contexts Freud is attempting to make salient the juxtaposition 
between a perfect God who creates humanity in its image and the presence of an 
undeniable, in Freud’s mind, death instinct. And in the latter, Freud is simply describing 
the ontogenic nature of the death instinct.    Interestingly enough, Freud completely 
bypasses the Christian creation myth yet still manages to yield the same basic results of 
the proponents of original sin: there is something inherently dark, corrupt, and destructive 
about human nature.  Freud called it the death instinct and theologians call it original sin; 
nonetheless, it is plausible that they are speaking to the same human phenomenon from 
differing vantage points (for a detailed examination concerning Freud and original sin see 
MacIsaac, 1974)?       
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 Original sin and psychopathology.     There has been little to no research 
conducted on the relationship between original sin and psychopathology and theorizing 
on the matter has faired no better.  Theorizing in the psychological literature stems form a 
debate concerning sin and religious values and their place in therapy that spanned the 
better part of three decades between O. H. Mowrer, Albert Ellis, and A. E. Bergin.  In 
September 1959 at the APA convention in Cincinnati, OH Mowrer and Ellis participated 
in a symposium organized by the SSSR in which Mowrer (1960a) presented a paper 
entitled “Constructive aspects of the concept of sin [in psychotherapy]” to which Ellis 
(1960a) responded. 
 Mowrer (1960a) argued that psychoanalytic theory absolved individuals of their 
contribution to personal psychopathology.  In essence he believed that the patient had 
become “too good:”  “We find that not only have we disavowed the connection between 
manifest misconduct and psychopathology; we have, also, very largely abandoned belief 
in right and wrong, virtue and sin, in general” (Ibid., pp. 185-186).  Moreover, he 
questioned the medicalization of mental illness perceiving it to be a relativizing of 
morality, thus believing that choosing the “concept of sin” over “that of sickness” was 
“indeed the lesser of two evils” (1960a, 1960b, p. 302).  Menninger (1973) has voiced a 
similar concern and sentiment: 
…Does this mean that no sin is involved in all our troubles—sin with and “I” in 
the middle?  Is no one any longer guilty of anything?  Guilty perhaps of a sin that 
could be repented and repaired or atoned for?  Is it only that someone may be 
stupid or sick or criminal—or asleep?  Wrong things are being done, we know; 
tares are being sown in the wheat field at night.  But is no one responsible, no one 
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answerable for these acts?  Anxiety and depression we all acknowledge, and even 
vague guilt feelings; but has no one committed any sins? (p. 13). 
Sometime later Bergin (1980) also commented that religion, and by extension religious 
values, “should be at the center” of the therapeutic enterprise rather than at the periphery 
(p. 103).  Though Bergin (1991) did not explicitly employ the language of sin he 
emphasized the importance of moral points of reference on grounds that these references 
are rooted in theories of human nature.  By vying for the implementation of a theistic 
value system in psychotherapy, by extension Bergin was advocating for a conception of 
human nature as inherently sinful.  Furthermore, he also engaged in a false dichotomy 
reminiscent of the classical ontological problem whereby God and human beings are 
defined in contradistinction to one another rather than unique and worthy Thous (Buber, 
1970).  Bergin (1980) began his list of theistic values: “God is supreme.  Humility, 
acceptance of (divine) authority, and obedience (to the will of God) are virtues” (p. 100).  
He contrasted this value with the sine qua non “clinical-humanistic” value credited with 
the deterioration of society: “Humanity is supreme.  The self is aggrandized.  Autonomy 
and rejection of external authority are virtues” (Ibid.).  Watson, Morris, and Hood (1987, 
1988a, b, c, 1989a, b) in their attempt to empirically weigh in on this issue of sin, 
psychopathology, and antireligious values embarked on a five-part study similarly 
arguing that humanistic ideology, which they view as antagonistic toward Christian 
values, may bias research results when employing certain measures.            
 Ellis’ (1960a) response to Mowrer was forceful: “…there is no place whatever for 
the concept of sin in psychotherapy and…to introduce this concept in any manner, shape, 
or form is highly pernicious and antitherapeutic” (p. 189).  Ellis did not dismiss Mowrer’s 
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concern regarding morality in psychotherapy.  The polemic, as seen by Ellis, is Mowrer’s 
underestimation of the psychological baggage inherent in the adjective “sin.”  
Consequently, it is not ownership of a wrongdoing that is harmful, but the logical 
insinuation and generalization that follows when the psychologist labels “the neurotic” a 
“sinner,” (Ibid.) which is what Mowrer (1960a) was advocating: “Our attitudes, as 
would-be therapists or helping persons, toward the neurotic (sinner) are apparently less 
important than his attitude toward himself (p. 303).  For Ellis (1960a), such imputation 
leads to self-blame and cognitions such as: “I am a blackguard, a sinner, a no-good-nik, a 
valueless person, a louse for having done this wrong deed” (p. 189); this self-deprecating 
tendency is what Ellis calls self-downing (Macavei, 2005).  Branden (as cited in Watson 
et al., 1988b) appears to agree with Ellis: “…the religious doctrine of Original Sin…is 
disastrously harmful psychologically…fostering hopelessness, deterministic feelings” (p. 
270).  Elsewhere Branden (1994) asserts:  
If, in any culture, children were taught, ‘We are all equally unworthy in the sight 
of God’— 
If, in any culture children are taught, ‘You were born in sin and are sinful by 
nature [italics added]— 
…then consider what will be the likely consequences for the practice of living 
consciously, or the practice of self-assertiveness, or any of the other pillars of 
healthy self-esteem (pp. 291-292).  
Such sentiments are also echoed by Heise and Steitz (1991): “…it has been found that the 
majority of children taught and being taught from this perspective [fundamentalism] are 
still being negatively affected by the ‘hell, fire, and damnation’ conception of God’s 
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moral laws” (p. 18).  Ellis (1960a) agrees that perhaps such cognitions may shame 
individuals into being more moral at the expense of psychological dis-ease and illness.  
His clinical experience brought him face to face with persons who following Mowrer’s 
logic would disclose in therapy: “Oh, what a terrible sinner, I will be (or already am); Oh, 
what a terrible person!  Oh, how I deserve to be punished” (Ibid., p. 190).  Moreover, 
Ellis purported that adherence to such logical fallacies would produce: (1) feelings of 
worthlessness; (2) rumination; and (3) denial or repression concerning personal 
responsibility for the wrongdoing (Ibid.; also see Ellis, 1960b).  It is of utter import to 
reiterate Ellis’ (1960b) subtle thesis: in psychotherapy, to label symptomatology “sin,” or 
a derivative of sin for which one must be held accountable, labels the self constitutionally 
worthless and sick.  
 Ellis (1980, 1992) responded to Bergin in much the same way cogently arguing 
that rigidly held beliefs, including religious shoulds, oughts, and musts, are the wellspring 
of pathology:  
Devout, orthodox, or dogmatic religion…is significantly correlated with 
emotional disturbance.  People largely disturb themselves by believing strongly in 
absolutistic shoulds, oughts, and musts, and most people who dogmatically 
believe in some religion believe in these health-sabotaging absolutes.  The 
emotionally healthy individual is flexible, open, tolerant, and changing, and the 
devoutly religious person tends to be inflexible, closed, intolerant, and 
unchanging (1980, p. 637).    
It is not religiosity per se that contributes to mental disturbance, argues Ellis (2000), but 
rigidly held beliefs; the content of which magnifies the intensity of psychological 
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disturbance. Following Ellis’ thought, Watters (1992) notes that years of Christian 
indoctrination in the matters of sin may act as a risk factor in the development of 
schizophrenic and affective disorders.  It is also interesting to note that Freud (1923) 
described the “double aspect” of the super-ego in term of “oughts” and “may nots” (pp. 
32, 34).  According to Freud, the super-ego, which contains the impetus from which 
religious desire springs forth, impinges upon the ego two negations: (1) “You ought to be 
like this;” and (2) “You may not be like this” (p. 34).  What does the research show? 
 To date only two studies, both unpublished dissertations, have been conducted in 
which the effects of original sin on mental health have been analyzed—it is important to 
note that in both of the studies the reference to the theological construct is not the main 
focus of the study.  In order to directly test Ellis’ hypothesis concerning religion and 
psychopathology Poland (1996) measured the relationship between differing levels of 
religiosity and emotional disturbance among Church of Christ and Church of Religious 
Science parishioners.  Poland reports a significant relationship between belief in original 
sin among Church of Christ parishioners and: (a) awfulizing, i.e., the tendency to 
catastrophize or negatively aggrandize cognitions and events; (b) other-directed shoulds; 
(c) tough-mindedness; these last two outcomes are indicative of the belief that others 
should adopt one’s point of view due to the veracity of one’s claims; and (d) 
submissiveness.  Poland explains that submissiveness is vital for social approval and 
maintenance of high self-image within a community that values strict adherence to 
religious codes; this is what Fromm (1969) refers to as masochistic submission to 
authoritarianism.  A recent study by Macavei (2005) links awfulizing and self-downing to 
depressive symptoms of both clinical and subclinical intensity thus providing a critical 
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link between Ellis’ theorizing, Poland’s findings and psychopathology.   
Schecterle (1999) examined the relationship between theologies of sin present in 
Conservative Judaism, Roman Catholicism, Evangelical Lutherans, and Black Baptists 
and shame and guilt proneness.  As relates to original sin, Schecterle reports Evangelical 
Lutherans to be substantially more shame and guilt-prone than their religious 
counterparts.  He interprets these data in light of the doctrine of original sin and the 
antithesis doctrine of justification concluding that the latter might not be “experienced as 
strongly as the former perspective” (p. 185).  While the research concerning the effects of 
belief in original sin on psychological outcomes is thin it suggests that belief in the 
doctrine of original sin may have negative mental health outcomes especially in regards 
to shame and depression.    
 While not relating directly to original sin there exists one additional study that 
commands review.  As mentioned earlier, Watson and colleagues (1998c) conducted a 
series of studies to investigate the relationship between sin and self-functioning.  In part 
three of their five-part series they specifically turn their attention to Ellis’ assertions in 
two studies.  Results suggest that when Grace is not accounted for, Self-Guilt (i.e., sin) is 
positively associated with Depression.  However, the relationship turns negative when 
Grace is taken into consideration thus implying the mediating role of Grace.   
 Original sin and religious strain.     A review of the literature suggests that 
religious individuals are less likely to divorce, abuse alcohol and illegal drugs, experience 
less cardiovascular difficulties as well as greater positive affect, pro social behavior, 
hope, and life satisfaction (Harris et al., 2008; Johnson and Hayes, 2003; Koenig et al., 
2001; Koenig & Larson, 2001).  In addition, the theological construct of grace may 
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nullify any possible associations between the construct of sin as act and depression 
(Watson et al., 1998c).  If this is the case, why propose a psycho-spiritual model of abuse 
which posits that certain religious beliefs may be associated with unhealthy psychological 
outcomes such as shame, depression and anxiety?  After all prominent researchers such 
as Koenig and colleagues (2001) explain away such a possibility: 
…the claims of religious abuse and negative effects of religion on health rest 
largely on isolated case reports and highly selected case series, rather than on 
population-based systematic research studies.  There is no doubt that some 
systematic research does show either no relationship between religion and health 
or a negative relationship.  Many of these reports, however, are older studies of 
college students and adolescents without mature religious faith, utilize samples 
that were brought together by convenience, involve cross-sectional study designs, 
or fail to control for other relevant variables in analysis (p. 77). 
In part the problem lies in the global analysis of the religious experience, which 
tends to be over simplistic.  For example, in the study by Poland (1996) described above, 
though there was significant evidence that persons who believe in original sin engage in 
psychological processes that have been linked to depression and diminished states of 
mental health, nonetheless Poland concluded that Ellis’ hypothesis “was not fully [italics 
added] confirmed” (p. 58): “This is evident in that no religious variables were associated 
with the more psychopathological [italics added] forms of emotional disturbance” (Ibid.).  
The reason, in part, for such an outcome is that the total score for all of the irrational 
beliefs measured, which of course were not endorsed by everyone who believes in 
original sin, was not significantly related to variables such as religious orientation, 
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affiliation, or identification.  In addition, the difference between “slight,” “moderate,” and 
“severe” psychopathology does not eliminate pathology, it simply qualifies it.  On a 
macro level, then, the former allows the researcher to treat the finding as insignificant and 
inconsequential without acknowledging the latter.  Consequently, global analyses such as 
these may overlook nuanced findings that are if not statistically significant perhaps they 
are clinically significant.  
 Concerning Watson et al.’s (1998c) findings regarding the mediating role of 
grace in the link between sin and depression there are several factors that must be 
addressed.  Firstly, the conceptualization and operationalization of sin as guilt may be 
misguided.  As this author elucidates above, sin as act belongs to the realm of 
transgression.  Such is its proper categorization in the biblical text as well as in most 
Christian faiths.  Guilt on the other hand, may be a concomitant of the transgression, but 
it is not the transgression itself.  Therefore one may experience self-guilt, but this is not 
akin to sin.  This is why a person may transgress and feel guilt or remorse for an action 
and have it serve a healthy purpose.  This is due to the fact that research on guilt and 
shame consistently shows that guilt is less toxic than shame because it can be remedied 
by fairly “simple” action(s) (Tangney & Dearing, 2002).  In a related vein, Watson and 
colleagues’ (1988a) constructed scales of “self-guilt” and “other-guilt” contain items that 
do not properly distinguish between sin as state and sin as act when these constructs are 
tactually addressed in the scales; often they contain both constructs within the same scale.  
Perhaps this is why they report low levels of internal reliability for the guilt scales— .48 
to .66.  Secondly, the authors’ conceptualization of grace may also be misinformed in that 
they treat it monolithically as if it is experienced and defined identically across 
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denominational lines and Christian faiths.  For example, theologically speaking some 
denominations believe in the more agent restricting triad of grace known as prevenient, 
operative, and cooperative grace; others believe in what is known as actual and habitual 
grace and to complicate matters further there is the question of how congruous and 
condign forms of merit work in relation to grace.  Moreover, additional doctrinal issues 
such as whether one is perpetually in a state of grace after having received forgiveness 
for one’s trespasses or whether that grace is temporal and conditional and possibly 
“renewable” after backsliding are all thorny theological considerations.  Therefore, it is 
difficult to treat grace monolithically.  Perhaps such issues explain why sometimes 
significant positive relationships between grace and social anxiety among religious 
persons arose (Watson et al., 1998a).  Taking these potentially misguided factors into 
consideration may help address some of the contradictory evidence between Schecterle’s 
(1999) and Watson and colleagues’ (1988a, b, c, 1989a, b) research regarding the effects 
of grace.  Perhaps Schecterle’s findings are more representative of fundamentalist 
Christians’ experience of sin as state, psychopathology, and grace.  This seems to be 
supported by Strozier’s (1994) comments: 
…no matter how conversion is experienced, an overlay of human evil from deep 
within Christian tradition always permeates the fundamentalist sense of their 
stories.  Humans are born bad, in this view, and even the saved remain open to the 
workings of the devil.  It is a constant struggle.  Even if you were saved at five, 
you were born an evil person.  Most of mainstream Christianity has found ways to 
soften this harsh, Manichean view of human nature, but contemporary 
fundamentalists keep the notion very much alive (p. 44). 
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Finally, research suggests that perhaps the debate concerning religion and mental health 
has centered about the wrong question, “Does religiosity promote mental health or mental 
illness?” (Bergin, 1991; Exline et al., 2000; Harris et al., 2008).  While apologists exist 
on both sides of the issue there is an explicit bias on behalf of some researchers to 
“prove” that religiosity produces positive health outcomes:  
The current trend in the research literature is to explore predominantly positive 
aspects of religiousness… For example, well over 100 measures of religiousness 
have been published in the professional literature, with the vast majority of these 
assessing only [italics added] positive effects of religiousness (Smith et al., 2003, 
p. 627).   
To paraphrase Harris and colleagues (2008), it appears that the more appropriate question 
is,  “Which factors organic to religiousness have positive or negative relationships with 
which factors of mental health?”     
 Research conducted by Exline et al. (2000) has shown that regardless of degree of 
religiousness and/or personal comfort found in religion one may still experience religious 
strain.  Religious strain refers to personal psychological discomfort and distress 
attributable to intrapsychic, interpersonal, and institutional religious conflicts.  The 
implication is that religious strains and comforts operate independently of each other 
(Harris et al., 2008).  Consequently, one may be pious and still experience psychological 
dis-ease on account of a deeply held but dystonic doctrine (Exline, 2002).  This study 
considers the theological construct of original sin or sin-as-state to be a source of 
religious strain for some parishioners.  For instance, a female parishioner may believe 
that human nature by default is inherently base, but refuse her church’s teaching on the 
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complete submission of women to their husbands and the church, a biblical teaching 
based on the consequences of original sin.  Denouncing the latter may cause significant 
strain as it calls into question the inerrancy of scripture, and by consequence God who 
inspired it.  If she voices such concerns she may be shunned, ecclesialy punished or cast 
as spiritually weak and immature, which may conceivably lead to feelings of 
worthlessness, powerlessness, and isolation.  In such a case, religion may be comforting 
and an integral part of her daily life as well as a source of psychological strain.         
Original sin and depression.     One of the byproducts of religious strain is 
depression.  The research literature shows that feelings of alienation from God, produced 
by unfavorable appraisals of self, world, and others, is a major predictor of depression 
(Exline, 2002; Exline et al., 2000).  This phenomenological experience of separation from 
God largely revolves around the schemata of sin-as-state and sin as act since both 
separate the individual from God.  Therefore, while sin separates in an expulsing manner 
holiness separates in an inclusive manner; for the verb to sanctify literally denotes 
separation to or for God.  When exacerbated, these feelings of expulsion may become 
sources of strain and the striving for holiness itself may become the exacerbating factor.  
Exline (2002) explains: “With increased devotion and commitment to a religious system, 
people are likely to find more and more areas of their lives that are imperfect.  Depending 
on how such failures are attributed, they might prompt negative outcomes such as self-
condemnation, hopelessness…” (p. 188).  
 An example of this is case studies that indicate that some religious individuals 
who believe in original sin self-judge and self-punish more so than others leading to 
higher rates of depressive symptoms (Sexton and Maddock, 1984).  Moreover, the 
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perceived estrangement between oneself and God is primarily carried out by what was 
referred to above as engagement in the ontological problem or what Pargament (1997) 
calls a one-sided solution (p. 320).  A one-sided solution is an aspect of negative religious 
coping that involves negative religious framing.  In an attempt to maintain the 
benevolence of God religious persons may impute wrongdoing to the self by highlighting 
their sinful state and sinful acts.  This is consistent with findings that religious individuals 
tend to consider positive self-attitudes incongruous with true piety (Branden, 1994; 
Watson, Hood, Morris, and Hall, 1985).  The findings of MacDonald and Luckett (1983) 
who examined the relationship between religious affiliation and psychiatric diagnoses in 
7,050 psychiatric outpatients is suggestive of the issue at hand.  These researches found 
that patients belonging to fundamentalist churches (i.e., Church of the Brethren, Amish, 
Mennonite, Assembly of God, Bible Church, Missionary Church, Church of God, 
Pentecostals, Church of the Nazarene, Free Methodist, Salvation Army, Brethren in 
Christ, Wesleyan Methodist, Baptist, A.M.E., Faith Mission, Faith Tabernacle) led all 
other groups in depression diagnoses.  Again, such findings are not indicative of religion 
as pathology; rather they suggest that undiscovered relationships exist between specific 
religious variables and depression.  Theory and research intimates that a rigid belief 
concerning original sin may be one of these variables.    
The Influence of Authority Figures 
 
 Initial distinctions. Perhaps no greater mediation of God’s perceived 
acceptance, rejection, benevolence, and malevolence exists in the believer’s life than 
what is conveyed by parents, clergy, and religious institutions.  The psychological 
mechanisms by which these authority figures inform and sustain a person’s God-
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representation are of great import for this analysis—note that I employ the term God-
representation rather than God-concept due to Meissner’s (2009) recent elucidation that 
the former refers “specifically to the intrapsychic object representation” whereas the 
latter is a generalized term that embraces “all conceptualizations” of the meaning of 
divinity (p. 216).  
Another distinction of import when dealing with God-representations concerns 
theorizing derived from attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969; also see Ainsworth, 1969).  
While there is some lapping in thematic material with object relations theory, such as the 
importance of the parent-child relationship, the formation of internal representations and 
internal working models, and separation anxiety, Ainsworth (1969) and others (also see 
Granqvist & Kirkpatrick, 2008) agree: “Although they overlap somewhat in their 
connotations, these terms are not synonymous” (p. 969).  Subsequently, this complicates 
interpretation of research conducted in the area of attachment and God-concepts vis-à-vis 
object relations theory.  Nonetheless, there are two theoretical attachment theory 
constructs that may prove useful when thinking about God-representations from an object 
relations vantage point: compensation and correspondence (Granqvist & Kirkpatrick, 
2008).  The compensation hypothesis postulates: “God may provide a kind of attachment 
relationship one never had with one’s parents” (Ibid., p. 915).  This is akin to saying that 
a person’s God-representation has been invested with the counter-characteristics of a 
negligent parental figure whose presence, protection, and unconditional love is deeply 
desired and wished for such that the representation is that of an omnipresent, omnipotent, 
and all loving God.  The correspondence hypothesis, on the other hand, posits: 
Individuals who possess positive or “secure” generalized working models of 
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themselves and their attachment figures may be expected to view God and other 
deities in similar terms.  Likewise, an “avoidant” attachment may be expected to 
manifest itself in the religious realm as agnosticism or atheism, or in a view of 
God as remote and inaccessible.  Finally, an “anxious” or “ambivalent” 
attachment may find expression in a deeply emotional, all-consuming, and 
“clingy” relationship to God (Ibid., p. 916). 
This is comparable to the object relational thought that one’s God-representation 
corresponds with those of the parental objects’, which are always experienced within the 
context of relationship.  Due to their overlap with classical psychoanalytic thought as 
well as object relations theory, this author will employ these terms where deemed 
appropriate with the caveat that they are used loosely.                 
Ontogenesis of god-representations: An object relations approach     The very 
thought and utterance of the word “God” invokes a myriad of visceral associations.  
Indeed, it can be cogently argued that these associations are as numerous and diverse as 
the individuals who possess them.  The German philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach 
(1841/1989) stated: “Our positive, essential qualities, our realities, are therefore the 
realities of God, but in us they exist with, in God without, limits” (p. 38).  On a pun of 
Genesis 1:27— “So God created humankind in his image, in the image of God he created 
them…” (NRSV)— Freud (n.d.), in Psychopathology of Everyday Life, similarly 
asserted: “…man created God in his own image” (p. 21).  The common thread being that 
each individual unconsciously projects onto his/her personal God the very things s/he is 
not, a sort of compensation approach.  In doing so one creates a God according to one’s 
needs, desires, and wishes (Meissner, 2009).  Moreover, one invests this God with the 
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personal qualities of the primary objects that one experienced as a child (Rizzuto, 1979).    
The emergence of the God-representation has been posited as belonging to the 
transitional space in which the internalized parental imagos come to serve as the bedrock 
for this illusory transitional object (Rizzuto, 1979; Winnicott, 1953). D. W. Winnicott 
(1953) posited that it is not enough to describe the human experience in terms of the 
duality of an inner and outer life.  In fact, Winnicott compellingly argued that the 
existence of an intermediate, unquestioned space of experiencing “to which inner reality 
and external life both contribute” (p. 90).  In addition, he described this transitional space 
as a place of psychological respite (Ibid.), a region in which “illusory experiences” are 
allowed to take place.  In their adult form these illusory experiences are “inherent in art 
and religion…” (Ibid).  Similarly, Meissner (1984) argues that the experience of faith is 
also an intermediate space not pertaining concretely to the objective or subjective realms 
of human experience; rather faith is influenced by both of these realms, which surround 
and exert themselves upon it.  In addition, Winnicott (1953) indicated that these illusory 
experiences, which can take on the form of transitional objects themselves, serve to 
mitigate anxiety, “…especially anxiety of [the] depressive type” (p. 91).  Furthermore, he 
stated that the transitional object “continues to be absolutely necessary…at times of 
loneliness or when a depressed mood threatens” (Ibid.).  Therefore, there is an 
intermediate space that humanity comes to inhabit when it is psychologically taxed.  This 
space is value and judgment free and the phenomena that occur within it are perceived as 
comforting.  Notwithstanding, the cogency of the psychological mechanisms by which 
the God-representation comes to inhabit the transitional space is argued to be secondary 
to a more primal experience.  
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The evolution of the God-representation is presupposed to originate primarily in 
the symbiotic phase of child-development, in the experiences of existential 
transformations described by Bollas (1993): “This is a primary transformation: 
emptiness, agony, rage, become fullness and connectedness.  The aesthetics of this 
experience is the particular way the mother meets the infant’s needs, the manner in which 
she transforms his internal and external realities” (p. 42).  According to Meissner’s 
(1984) developmental schema of the religious experience, the infant’s mirroring phase, in 
which it experiences “mother as a loving and caring presence” through her ministrations, 
positively affects the infant’s future “relationship to God” (pp. 138-139).  However, if the 
infant is deprived of admiration, recognition, and physical embrace it may feel 
disconnected, abandoned, and utterly lost in later development.  Consequently, its God-
representation may bear these same characteristics.  Meissner further elucidates this point 
via Eriksonian theory: 
To the extent that the child’s early experience with the mother has tipped the 
balance in the direction of more positive and gratifying experiences, a basic sense 
of trust is laid down that provides a foundation for the later development of a 
sense of trusting faith in the relationship to God.  Where early infantile experience 
is discolored with insecurity, uncertainty, or anxiety, the foundation is laid for a 
basic mistrust that can contaminate and distort the later experience of God (p. 
140). 
Such is a prime example of the correspondence hypothesis.  Research by Justice 
and Lambert (1986) with 162 inpatient, non-psychiatric patients and 34 Sunday School 
attendees suggests that persons with neglectful and abusive parents “tend to have a more 
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negative concept of the personality of God” (p. 170).  Balthazar’s (2007) research 
amongst Caribbean religious suggests persons whose fathers have been absent, 
inconsistent or abusive tend to have feelings of “mistrust, confusion, deprivation, neglect, 
alienation,” as well as despair in relation to referring to God as “Father” (p. 549).  More 
recently, Reinert and Edwards (2009) found that conceptions of God as aloof, regulating, 
and unloving were associated with parental verbal, physical, and sexual abuse among 
college students.  In addition, Goodman and Manierre (2008) tell the story of a patient 
with borderline personality disorder enrolled in their psychoanalytically oriented 
spirituality group:  
One of the group leaders asked whether Jasmine had created God in her parents’ 
image.  She answered that maybe she had, since it was hard to trust God and 
others when all the people in her life had been untrustworthy (p. 8).   
Rizzuto (1979) also comments on the importance of a person’s experiences of 
transformational experiences, or lack thereof, in infancy as these imbue our God-
representation in healthy and unhealthy ways: 
The child’s and the adult’s sense of self is affected by the representational traits of 
the individual’s private God.  Consciously, preconsciously, or unconsciously, 
God, our own creation, like a piece of art, a painting, a melody…will, in 
reflecting what we have done, affect our sense of ourselves (p. 179).      
Shafranske (1992) adds:   
The presentation of the transformational object as a model for certain aspects of 
God-representational processes does not discount or supplant the role of 
transitional phenomena in God-representations but rather suggests constituents of 
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religious experience that have their origin in psychological events prior to the 
transitional period, prior to the child’s more comprehensive grasp of the parents 
as psychological objects (p. 62). 
Perhaps some elucidation of the developmental workings of the transformational object 
in regards to the forming of God-representations would be instructive.  
Mahler (1975) contends that normal symbiosis begins at about the postnatal two-
month mark when the infant becomes dimly aware of its mother.  However, due to the 
primitive nature of the nascent child’s ego the mother operates as its extension.  In doing 
so she exercises the ego’s regulatory function transforming the inner and outer reality of 
the infant; mother is the “other’ self” (Bollas, 1987, p. 13).  Consequently, the infant does 
not know its mother as a reified object whose ministrations are providentially iterative, 
“but as a recurrent experience of being—a more existential as opposed to representational 
knowing” (Bollas, 1987, p. 14; also see Bollas, 1993).  According to Shafranske (1992), 
there exist salient moments within the emerging infant’s consciousness that inform its 
existential knowing.  These moments, called vitality affects, are what the infant 
experiences as transformative occurrences:  
Out of the circumstances of distress comes comfort, out of arousal comes calm, 
out of disquiet comes quiet, out of physical discomfort comes soothing, out of 
cold comes warm, out of wet comes dry, out of hard comes soft, out of empty 
comes full, out of hungry comes satiation (p. 64). 
Experientially, these processes are the transformational phenomena that facilitate the 
“metamorphoses of the self” (Bollas, 1987, p. 14); they are that which signify the true  
transformational object—the parental dyad.    
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It appears that Mahler (1975) intimates the importance of the transformational 
when she states: “The infant’s inner sensations form the core of the self.  They seem to 
remain the central crystallization point of the ‘feeling of self,’ around which a ‘sense of 
identity’ will become established” (p. 17).  Hence, mnemic traces of both early positive 
and negative visceral experiences inform the infant’s psychic organization concerning the 
self and others.  In a related vein, Mahler also emphasizes the importance of total body 
experiences— such as holding and playing-with as well as the degree of tension applied 
to the muscles when engaging in such activities— as moderators of the degree, strength, 
and quality of symbiosis.  What Mahler seems to be saying, in Bollasian terms, is that 
mother qua process of transformation plays a crucial role in the quality of the infant’s 
burgeoning pre-verbal memory.  According to Shafranske (1992), prior to differentiation 
and movement into the transitional space the child transforms these pre-verbal memories 
into representational objects that reflect its primitive understanding of what it means to 
be-in-the-world.   
Following, the acquisition of language, even rudimentary language (e.g., 
babbling), marks a significant advance in the manipulation of a new transformational 
object and its migration into the transitional space.  Bollas (1987) states: 
With the infant’s creation of the transitional object, the transformational process is 
displaced from the mother-environment (where it originated) into countless 
subjective-objects, so that the transitional phase is heir to the transformational 
period, as the infant evolves from experience of the process to articulation of the 
experience (p. 15). 
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In other words, it is at this point in human development where the purely experiential is 
conjoined with more sophisticated cognition.  Yet it is also with the advent of language 
that the omnipotent system is loosed, thus allowing the infant to project itself out further 
into the world of objects (Bollas, 1993; Mahler, 1975).  The infant now possesses words 
as tools by which it may transform its affective states (Bollas, 1993).  Finally, it must be 
recognized that developmentally, the transformational object has no “half-life.”  
Therefore, “object-seeking in adult life…manifests itself in the person’s search for an 
object (a person, place, event, ideology) that promises to transform the self” (Ibid., p. 14), 
something known as the aesthetic experience (Bollas, 1993). 
Bollas (1993) describes the aesthetic experience occurring “as moment” (p. 40).  
Meaning, it is apprehended outside the typical time-space referent we often mindlessly 
inhabit.  This moment is not so much cognitively known as it is existentially known; it is 
truly the unthought known (Ibid.).  It seizes and posits the self reverentially and 
symbiotically with-the-Other.  Moreover, the aesthetic moment is the amalgamation of 
pre-verbal memories that: hold as mother held, sooth as mother soothed, and transform as 
mother transformed.  “The aesthetic experience is not something learned by the adult,” 
says Bollas (Ibid.), “but is an existential recollection of an experience where being 
handled by the maternal aesthetic made thinking irrelevant to survival” (p. 43).   
Milner (1993) states:  
I have often noticed, when in contact with children playing, that there occurs now 
and then a particular type of absorption in what they are doing, which gives the 
impression that something of great importance is going on… I used to wonder 
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what a child, if he or she had sufficient power of expression, would say about 
these moods, how the child would describe them from inside (p. 17).   
The “absorption” that Milner reflects upon is the rapture of the aesthetic moment.  Milner 
posits that in this moment the individual unconsciously mobilizes the illusion that the 
novel experience is the primal experience, consequently fusing both experiences.  Hence, 
when “finding” the lost [transformational] object occurs, ecstasy occurs.  Therefore, one 
searches for the aesthetic of transformation, among other things, by seeking “faith in a 
deity” (Bollas, 1987, p. 17).  Erikson (as cited in Meissner, 1984) describes the 
transformational object when speaking of regression and partial regression: “At their 
creative best, religion retraces our earliest inner experiences, giving tangible form to 
vague evils, and reaching back to the earliest individual sources of trust” (p. 264).   
It is in the rapture of the religious moment that one seeks to be ecstatically transformed. 
As stated earlier, the God-representation of the individuated child is the 
evolutionary product of its displaced transformational object (Shafranske, 1992).  
However, one essential piece of the psychic puzzle is still missing—the formation of the 
super-ego. 
 The super-ego and god-representations.  The role of the super-ego in the 
formation of God-representations requires consideration due to its subsequent 
involvement in informing the role authority figures, such as clergy and religious 
institutions play in a person’s life.  Freud (1923) placed great emphasis on the early 
identifications between the child and its parents stating that they would be “general and 
lasting” (p. 31).  For example, Dickie, Eshleman, Merasco, Shepard, Vander Wilt, and 
Johnson’s (1997) studies with children ages 4-11, regarding parent-child relationships 
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and God-representations, suggests that parental identification greatly influences 
“perception’s of God’s nurturance” (p. 40).  Specifically, a child’s identification with its 
nurturing same-sex parent (i.e., boys with their fathers and girls with their mothers) was 
the best predictor of God’s perceived nurturance (Ibid.).  According to Freud (1923), 
what is central to the child’s identification with the parental objects is the resolution of 
the Oedipus complex.  While it may seem passé to speak about the oedipal complex, it is 
indeed theoretically necessary to do so in order to more fully understand the mechanisms 
by which the super-ego comes into being and its relation to the analysis at hand.   
Freud (1923) theorized that the oedipus complex is preceded by the child’s 
cathexis, or libidinal (i.e., psychic energy) investment, to its opposite sex parent (English 
& English, 1958).  This libidinal investment represents “an object-choice” that is present 
due to the child’s dependency on the parent (Freud, 1923, p. 31).  However, the parent to 
which the child does not cathect is usually the object the child identifies with.  In other 
words, the child seeks to become like its parent by identifying with him/her (Eglish & 
English, 1958).  Therefore, if an infant male cathects to his mother he typically identifies 
with his father and vice-versa.  However, Freud asserted that as the child’s cathexis to its 
parent intensifies its identification with the remaining parent at first becomes pugnacious 
and ultimately ambivalent; this is the pivotal juncture of the oedipal complex.  In order 
for the complex to be resolved the child’s “object cathexis…must be given up” (p. 32).  
In its stead Freud posited that the child intensifies its identification with the identified 
parent, which allows “the affectionate relation” to its decathected parent to be partially 
preserved (p. 32).   
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According to Freud (1923), the resolution of the oedipus complex causes a 
splitting off of the ego into a structure that contains the intensified identification with the 
parental object as well as the decathected parental object.  This structure is the ego ideal 
or super-ego.  Recent research by Birky and Ball (2001) concerning the role parental 
representations play in the formation of the God-representation suggest that “a parental 
composite” [God-representation] more closely resembles the individual’s God-
representation than “singular parent representations” (p. 134):  “Given that the parental 
composite was assumed to incorporate the salient attributes of both the idealized and (to a 
lesser degree) the nonidealized parent, the composite representation was…more closely 
correlated with the God representation than was either parent separately” (p. 134).  While 
not addressing the issue of the internalization of parental representations via the 
formation of the super-ego, such research seems to find some parallels with Freud’s 
theory.  Freud makes it clear that in addition to this process there is an “energetic reaction 
formation” that occurs within the super-ego to guard against previous libidinal 
investments (p. 34).  Due to Freud’s assertion that the super-ego’s main task during early 
childhood is to repress the oedipus complex, the strength and speediness with which this 
occurs determines the harshness of the super-ego over the ego in later life.  Specifically, 
“the more powerful the Oedipus complex was and the more rapidly it succumbed to 
repression…the stricter will be the domination…” (pp. 34-35).  In addition, Freud 
identifies authority figures, “religious teaching, schooling and reading” as mechanisms of 
influence that facilitate such repression (p. 34).  Subsequently this process reveals several 
consequences of theoretical import.   
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Firstly, the super-ego has now become the “representative of the internal world, of 
the id,” thus representing the psychical (p. 36).  Secondly, the foregoing also makes 
possible the “taking in” of the representation of the child’s relationship to its parents.  
Freud pinpoints the “higher, moral, supra-personal side of human nature” within this 
process because of the parental attributes that the child reverentially admired, feared, and 
quite literally looked up to (p. 35).  This is why Freud (as cited in Rizzuto, 1979) 
asserted: “God himself is after all only an exaltation of this picture of a father as he is 
represented in the mind of early childhood” (p. 31).  Rizzuto comments: “This, the 
oedipal complex, the formation of the superego, and the formation of the inner world 
eventuate in a final psychological process, namely, the transmutation of the paternal 
imago into the God image” (pp. 30-31).  What this entire process also posits is that as a 
child matures other authority figures, such as clergy, take on the parental role and “their 
injunctions and prohibitions remain powerful in the ego ideal and continue, in the form of 
conscience, to exercise the moral censorship” (Freud, 1923, p. 37).  
 Influence of clergy on parishioners.             A review of the psychological 
literature concerning the influence “ordinary” clergy have on the attitudes and beliefs of 
“ordinary” parishioners is virtually non-existent.  This is not to say, however, that such 
influence cannot be intimated via research in peripheral areas of study.  Over the past 
thirty years clergy have been considered “frontline community health workers” as 
parishioners have often chosen to see their pastor over a mental health professional for 
psychiatric concerns such as major depressive disorder, dysthymia, bipolar disorder, 
schizophrenia, obsessive-compulsive disorder, phobias, as well as various personality 
disorders (Weaver, 1995, p. 129).  In fact research by Schindler, Berren, Hannah, Beigel, 
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and Santiago (1987) suggests that clergy rank higher than non-psychiatric physicians 
(i.e., primary care physicians) in treating mental health disorders among parishioners—
third only to psychologists and psychiatrists.  In addition, clergy were perceived as being 
more warm, caring, stable, and professional than psychiatrists, psychologists and non-
psychiatric physicians (Ibid.).  Perhaps, then, it is not surprising that past research has 
shown that as many as 40% of Americans seek pastoral counseling in times of 
psychological distress (Weaver, 1995).  In the words of Weaver (1998), clergy “are 
among the most trusted professionals in society” (p. 349).  While cost, availability, and 
religious beliefs about secular psychology may account for some of the variability in the 
relationship between parishioners with mental health concerns and the large numbers of 
them that seek counseling services from clergy, it stands to reason that there may be at 
least one other factor at play: clergy, as trusted authority figures, exert a considerable 
amount of influence and power over their respective flocks.   
 The relationship between clergy and parishioners has been described intra and 
extra-biblically as one between a shepherd and his flock.  Foucault‘s (2000b) analysis of 
pastorship is of theoretical import in considering the influence of clergy on parishioners.  
He states: “If the state is the political form of a centralized and centralizing power, let us 
call pastorship the individualizing power” (p. 300). Foucault‘s classification of pastorship 
as “individualizing power” refers to the pastor’s depth of knowledge concerning the 
flock.  No longer is it enough for the pastor to know the general status of the flock, he 
must know about the public and private sins of each member of the flock.  In order to do 
so, self-examination and awareness of one’s conscience have become the tools of pastoral 
influence or power:  
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On one hand, conscience-guiding constituted a constant bind [italics added]: the 
sheep didn’t let itself be led only to come through any rough passage victoriously, 
it let itself be led every second [italics added].  Being guided was a state and you 
were fatally lost [italics added] if you tried to escape it… As for self-examination, 
its aim was [to]… enable it to open up entirely [italics added] to its director—to 
unveil to him the depths of the soul (Ibid., p. 310).   
Or as Foucault (2000c) also put it: “…this form of power cannot be exercised without 
knowing the inside of people’s minds, without exploring their souls, without making 
them reveal their innermost secrets” (p. 333).  According to Foucault (2000b), self-
examination and conscience have as their end the individual’s daily mortification.  
 Certainly, the pastor, the priest, the shepherd exerts influence in his/her stead of 
the Divine (Bjarnason & Welch, 2004).  Milgram (1974) describes how persons “allow” 
themselves to be led in the presence of such an authority figure:   
The most common adjustment of thought in the obedient subject is for him [sic] to 
see himself as not responsible for his own actions.  He divests himself of 
responsibility by attributing all initiative to the… legitimate authority.  He sees 
himself… as the agent of external authority (pp. 8-9). 
In their work on fundamentalism and authoritarianism Altemeyer and Hunsberger (2005) 
show that religious fundamentalists have a high propensity of being right-wing 
authoritarians.  Research suggests that this is due to familial upbringing where the child is 
taught “authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism” (p. 
390).  Consequently, such persons learn that religious rules, codes, and forms of 
governing behavior are not to be questioned for God has instituted them.  In addition, 
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God’s representatives are to be fully obeyed.  If the parishioner questions ecclesial 
authority, the infallibility of scripture or any pre-established rules of spiritual governance 
they are in danger of the flames of hell.  Case and point is made by one of Goodman and 
Manierre’s (2008) participants in their psychoanalytically oriented spiritual group for 
person’s with borderline personality disorder:  
Jasmine explained that…her parents and the Catholic Church told her how to 
think, act, and feel and what she should believe about God.  She thought she 
would be going to hell for all the mortal sins she had committed…  Jasmine 
explained that she would like to stop believing in the Catholic religion but would 
first need permission from her priest (pp. 7-8).             
It may be argued that Jasmine’s perceptions of her familial and religious 
upbringing are distorted due to her psychological difficulties.  The question then becomes 
whether or not clergy influence can be found at more mundane levels of human activity 
and in persons who do not have psychiatric disorders.  Additional research suggests that 
as authority figures clergy indeed influence the political beliefs of their parishioners.  For 
example, Bjarnason and Welch’s (2004) multilevel analysis of parishes, priests, and 
parishioners’ attitudes regarding capital punishment suggests: “…the priest appears to 
influence the death penalty attitudes of parishioners both through his structural position 
as the mediator between the church hierarchy and lay parishioners and in his capacity as 
an individual spiritual leader of the community” (p. 115).  Similarly, Smith (2005) 
concludes that clergy may indeed influence parishioners’ political attitudes.  He argues 
that the mechanism by which such influence is effective lies with the ideology the clergy 
person chooses to emphasize.    
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What the foregoing sections intimate is that upbringing or familial environment 
plays a significant role in psychological well-being.  In addition, they also suggest that 
personal God-representations are influenced primarily by one’s parents.  However, 
authority figures, such as clergy and religious institutions, also have the ability, as 
surrogate parents, to re-enforce or alter existing God-representations during later life.  
Furthermore, it also stands to reason that a person’s God-representation influences 
psychological well-being through super-ego function.  In other words, the harsher the 
person’s God-concept the harsher the person’s super-ego and the greater the likelihood 
that the person’s psychological well-being may be adversely affected.   
Anxiety and Scrupulosity 
 
 Definitions and distinctions.     Anxiety is rooted in fear (Loewenthal, 2007); 
specifically, “fear in the absence of obvious danger” (PDM Task Force, 2006, p. 96).  
Therefore, according to the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) the 
nosology of anxiety disorders includes: panic attack, agoraphobia, panic disorder 
with/out agoraphobia, agoraphobia without history of panic disorder, specific phobia, 
social phobia, obsessive-compulsive disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, acute stress 
disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, anxiety disorder due to a medical condition, 
substance induced anxiety disorder, and anxiety disorder not otherwise specified.  When 
grouped together it is relatively easily to see that fear imbues the phenomenological 
presentation of the aforementioned states or conditions.  Of interest to scholars in the 
psychology of religion is how religion influences anxiety as research suggests that 
analogous to any cultural force religion has the potential to ameliorate or intensify 
anxiety (Pressman, Lyons, Larson, & Gartner, 1992; Steketee, Quay, & White, 1991).   
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A review of the literature highlights the special attention Obsessive-Compulsive 
Disorder (OCD) has received over the past century, though it is acknowledged that fields 
such as philosophy, theology, and pastoral care have long studied this phenomenon.  
More specifically, what has intrigued researchers since the time of Freud is the saliency 
religious themes, particularly those of sin and punishment, occupy in OCD.  Indeed, 
religious obsessions ranked in the top five most common obsession motifs in the DSM-
IV field trial for OCD (Foa, Kozak, Goodman, Hollander, Jenike, & Rasmussen, 1995).  
The persevering preoccupation regarding fear of sinful thoughts and behaviors that may 
engender severe punishment from God, as well as the subsequent urge to neutralize such 
anxiety by engaging in religious rituals or in extensions of typical religious expressions is 
a subtype of OCD known as scrupulosity disorder (Abramowitz, 2008; Abramowitz, 
Huppert, Cohen, Tolin, & Cahill, 2002; Miller & Hedges, 2008).  Epidemiological 
research suggests that approximately 2 to 3 million American adults struggle with OCD 
(Kessler, Chiu, Demler, & Walters, 2005; Williams, Powers, Yun, & Foa, 2010).  In 
addition, the lifetime prevalence of OCD is estimated at 2.5% with symptom formation in 
adolescence or early adulthood (American Psychiatric Association, 2000; Rasmussen & 
Tsuang, 1986).  Furthermore, research suggests that approximately 5% -33% of the 2 to 3 
million Americans that suffer from OCD “actually or simultaneously” struggle with 
scrupulosity disorder (Miller & Hedges, 2008, p. 1043).  Therefore, we can estimate that 
approximately 100,000 up to 990,000 American adults suffer from scrupulosity disorder, 
though researchers and clinicians alike argue that persons who struggle with religious 
obsessions and compulsions may be more common than what research suggests 
(Abramowitz et al., 2002).        
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OCD and scrupulosity. The distinguishing features of OCD are obsessions 
(i.e., intrusive thoughts) that cause significant anxiety and engender subsequent 
neutralizing rituals that are intended to assuage the person’s anxiety (Steketee et al., 
1991).  To be clear, intrusive thoughts is the stuff or substance of obsessions; therefore, 
obsessions may be defined: “…intrusive, repetitive thoughts, images or impulses that are 
unacceptable and/or unwanted and give rise to subjective resistance…” (Rachman, 1997, 
p. 793).  In addition, research suggests that while approximately 53% of persons with 
OCD report both obsessions and compulsions, roughly 32% only report obsessions and 
only 14 % report engaging in neutralizing behavior (Rachman & De Silva, 1978).  In fact, 
current research lends supports to these findings among persons with scrupulosity 
disorder (Miller & Hedges, 2008).  Consequently, much attention has been paid to the 
nature and phenomenology of intrusive thoughts in OCD and scrupulosity.     
Research suggests that the vast majority of “normal” individuals experience 
obsessions or intrusive thoughts.  In addition, such cognitions do not significantly differ 
in content or form from those experienced by persons with OCD (Abramowitz, 2008; 
Rachman & De Silva, 1978; Sica, Novara, & Sanavio, 2002).  Indeed, research suggests 
that even seasoned clinicians cannot readily discern between clinical and non-clinical 
obsessions (Rachman, 1977).  Primary obsession themes include: sex, aggression, and 
blasphemy or doubts concerning religious beliefs (Abramowitz, 2008; Osborn, 2008; 
Rachman, 1997).  In addition to differing in frequency, intensity, distress, and length, 
everyday obsessions become tenacious and clinically significant when they are invested 
with personal meaning that is based upon “catastrophic misinterpretations” (Rachman, 
1997, p. 793; Abramowitz, 2008; Rachman & De Silva, 1978).  The Obsessive 
   
  64 
Compulsive Cognitions Working Group (1997) has identified six prominent obsessive-
compulsive belief domains that fall under the rubric of catastrophic misinterpretations: 
(1) inflated responsibility—e.g., “I often think I am responsible for things that go wrong” 
(p. 678); (2) overimportance [sic] of thoughts—e.g., “My intrusive thoughts reflect my 
true nature” (ibid.); (3) excessive concern about the importance of controlling one’s 
thoughts—e.g., “I would be a better person if I gained control over my thoughts” (Ibid.); 
(4) overestimation of threat—e.g., “I believe that the world is a dangerous place” (Ibid.); 
(5) intolerance of uncertainty—e.g., “If I’m not absolutely sure of something, I’m bound 
to make a mistake (Ibid.); and (6) perfectionism—e.g., “For me, failing partly is as bad as 
failing completely” (Ibid.).  For persons struggling with scrupulosity, obsessions and 
catastrophic misinterpretations play a primary role in the maintenance of the anxiety 
disorder.  Common religious obsessions include: committing sins, blasphemy, hell, God’s 
punishment, sex, and aggression (Abramowitz, 2008; Abramowitz et al., 2002; Miller & 
Hedges, 2008; Steketee et al., 1991).  Yet perhaps the most pernicious cognitive 
distortion that fosters obsessions in both OCD and scrupulosity is thought-action fusion 
(TAF). 
According to Rachman  (1997), TAF is a “cognitive bias” that may take on two 
forms (p. 795).  The first is akin to magical thinking where “the belief that having an 
unacceptable thought may actually influence the probability that the adverse event will 
occur,” and the second is akin to “as-if thinking” where “the belief that having a 
repugnant unacceptable thought is morally equivalent to carrying out the relevant action” 
(pp. 795-796).  The former aspect of TAF has been termed TAF-Likelihood by Muris, 
Meesters, Rassin, Mercklenback, and Campbell (2001) and has been expanded to 
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describe two variant types of TAF: (1) TAF-Likelihood Self—the likelihood that one will 
experience a particular occurrence due to one’s unacceptable thoughts; and TAF-
Likelihood Others—the likelihood that others will experience a particular occurrence due 
to one’s unacceptable thoughts.  In addition, Muris and colleagues termed the latter type 
of TAF, TAF-Morality.  In essence TAF-Morality retains Rachman’s (1997) sentiment in 
that it “pertains to the belief that unacceptable thoughts are morally equivalent to overt 
actions” (Muris et al., 2001, p. 844).  Rasmussen and Tsuang (1986) report that subjects 
in their study with sexual and aggressive obsessions were unable to clearly distinguish 
between having a scurrilous thought and enacting it.  In addition, research concerning 
TAF, OCD and religiosity suggests that fundamentalist Christianity may foster TAF, 
therefore these parishioners may be at greater risk for developing scrupulosity disorder 
(Rassin & Koster, 2003).        
 In their validation of the Penn Inventory of Scrupulosity (PIOS) in a non-
psychiatric sample of college students, Abramowitz and colleagues (2002) report that 
protestant Christians of both high and low religiosity scored higher than Catholic 
Christians, Jews and persons of other religious faiths on both PIOS subscales respectively 
(i.e., fear of sin and fear of God).  However, they registered higher scores on the fear of 
sin subscale.  The authors conclude that such findings may be the result of the high 
premium protestant Christians place on the morality of their thoughts.  Similarly, Cohen 
and Rozin (2001) conducted a series of four studies investigating the importance Jewish 
and protestant persons attribute to the morality of their thoughts.  They correctly observe: 
“Christian dogma holds that mental events related to actions are in some sense equivalent 
[italics added] to the action itself” (p. 698).  The main results of their studies are 
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instructive: (1) Protestants lent significantly more import to thoughts when making moral 
judgments; (2) Protestants believed that thoughts concerning unacceptable actions are 
more governable; and (3) Protestants believed that immoral thoughts are more likely to 
be enacted.  More recently Rassin and Koster (2003) set out to measure the association 
between TAF and religiosity among a non-psychiatric sample of Dutch and Belgian 
undergraduates.  Results indicated that protestant Christians scored higher on measures of 
religiosity and the TAF-Morality scale than Catholic Christians and atheists.  Rassin and 
Koster conclude: “By and large, these findings confirm the idea that religion embraces 
certain cognitions that are, in clinical literature, considered to be associated with 
obsessional complaints” (p. 366).  In their study of Italian Catholics with high, moderate, 
and low levels of religiosity Sica et al. (2002) also replicated earlier studies that suggest a 
positive relationship between religiosity and OCD.  More specifically, they found that 
persons with medium and high levels of religiosity exhibited increased levels of 
obsessions vis-à-vis those with lower levels of religiosity.  Moreover, results suggest that 
discriminating factors between low religiosity and moderate and high religiosity is the 
latter’s emphasis on the controllability and importance of cognitions—these are the 
mechanisms by which Sica et al. measured TAF.  Therefore, “it is probable that only a 
few aspects of religious teaching (e.g., very high moral standards, inflexibility, 
prohibition, purity),” say the authors, “are linked to OC phenomena” (p. 821).  Being that 
fundamentalist Christians also endorse the primacy of high moral standards, rigidity, 
prohibition, and purity it stands to reason that these results may be replicated among such 
parishioners.  Indeed, research by Abramowitz, Deacon, Woods, and Tolin (2004) lend 
merit to such an assertion and further replicate findings that purport an association 
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between high levels of religiosity and obsessions via TAF.  In an undergraduate non-
psychiatric sample composed of 74.8% Baptists and Methodists, 16.7% Catholics, and 
8.5% Atheists (14.3% indicated no religious affiliation), results suggest that highly 
devout protestant Christians possess more severe obsessions than other groups.  In 
addition, highly religious protestants expressed a high degree of belief in the importance 
and controllability of their thoughts as well as in their responsibility for such thoughts.  
The authors conclude that protestantism may foster and perpetuate obsessions due to the 
fact that some thoughts are considered sins.  For example, TAF may be cultivated by the 
literal interpretation of scriptural passages such as the following: “You heard that it was 
said, ‘You shall not commit adultery.’  But I say to you that everyone who looks at a 
woman with lust has already [italics added] committed adultery with her in his heart” 
(Matthew 5:27-28, NRSV).  The conservative biblical commentator Adam Clarke (n.d.) 
interprets the passage to mean: “…God…takes the will for deed” (p. 73).  In its context 
this passage is followed: “If your right eye causes you to sin, tear it out and throw it 
away; it is better for you to lose one of your members than for your whole body to be 
thrown into hell” (Matthew 5:29, NRSV).  The literal interpretation of this pericope falls 
along the following lines: Thoughts are equivalent to overt actions.  As such, God not 
only judges your actions, but your thoughts as well.  Therefore, it would be better for you 
to take action and sever yourself from whatever causes these thoughts lest you should 
commit the action and sin or be thrown into hell by God for your sinful thoughts.  Thus it 
is understandable how persons suffering from scrupulosity and OCD in general can feel 
“immoral, sinful, disgusting, dangerous, threatening…and criminal,” thereupon 
attempting to neutralize their unbearable anxiety in various forms (Rachman, 1997, p. 
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794).  It is to these neutralizing phenomena that we now turn our attention.                  
The type of obsessions that have been addressed above are of the repugnant 
taxonomy (Purdon, 2008).  According to Purdon, the rituals that tend to emanate from 
repugnant or unacceptable obsessions involve: (1) cognitions of goodness and safety; (2) 
engaging in inordinate amounts of prayer; (3) varying forms of checking, including 
“checking-by-proxy” (i.e., asking someone else to validate one’s worth or moral 
standing) (p. 62); and (4) avoidant behavior including thought suppression.  The literature 
on scrupulosity reveals striking similarities to the aforementioned compulsions.  For 
example, checking-by-proxy is often exhibited through rituals of confession.  Under such 
circumstances the parishioner typically attends confession or seeks clergy advice, 
counsel, and reassurance in such a manner that is typically seen as disproportionate vis-à-
vis the “sin” that is being confessed (Miller & Hedges, 2008; Sica et al., 2002).  Another 
variant of this type of compulsion is that the parishioner may seek reassurance from loved 
ones and family members concerning matters of religion (Abramowitz et al., 2002; 
Steketee et al., 1991).  In addition, parishioners with scrupulosity may engage in 
inordinate amounts of prayer often reciting particular phrases or petitions in an iterative 
fashion (Abramowitz et al., 2002; Miller & Hedges, 2008; Sica et al., 2002).  Moreover, 
persons with scrupulosity may also become perfectionists regarding certain aspects of 
their religious tradition (Abramowitz, 2008).   
Based on available research and the diagnostic method of the DSM-IV (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000), Miller and Hedges (2008) have proposed a set of 
diagnostic criteria for scrupulosity: 
(A) One or more of the following symptoms: 
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(1) Excessive or inappropriate guilt or worry regarding moral or religious 
issues. 
(2) Excessive or inappropriate confusion or doubt regarding moral or 
religious issues. 
(3) Excessive or inappropriate rumination regarding moral or religious 
issues. 
(4) Excessive or inappropriate observance of moral or religious practices. 
(B) Symptom(s) cause clinically significant distress or impairment in religious, 
academic, work, or social functioning. 
(C) Symptom(s) do not occur exclusively during a mood, psychotic, or 
developmental disorder and are not better accounted for by another Axis I or 
II disorder. 
(D) Symptom(s) are unresponsive to authoritative guidance and reassurance when 
obtained (e.g., from parents or religious authorities). 
(E) Symptom(s) are not due to culturally accepted consequences of immoral 
behavior or are disproportionately excessive or enduring, as defined by the 
patient’s cultural or religious group (pp. 1052-1053).                           
Scrupulosity, original sin, god-representations, familial upbringing, self-
forgiveness, and authority figures. Is there research that suggests an association  
between scrupulosity disorder and the theological construct of original sin?  Not directly 
and the likelihood that one factor alone could account for the varieties of scrupulosity is 
unlikely.  In fact, scrupulosity has received comparatively little empirical research in 
comparison to other more well defined psychological phenomena (Miller & Hedges, 
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2008).  However, since the phenomenological evidence suggests that preoccupation with 
sin is a defining characteristic of the disorder it stands to reason that religious teachings 
concerning sin may account for some of the variance in its complex equation 
(Abramowitz, 2008; Abramowitz et al., 2002; Miller & Hedges, 2008).  Indeed, Miller 
and Hedges (2008) encourage future research to focus “on specific religious beliefs or 
thought-patterns rather than religiosity and religious affiliation…” (p. 1044).  Moreover, 
Abramowitz and colleagues (2004), in their research on protestant religiosity and OCD, 
address the role that sin-as-state may play in OCD symptomatology: “Protestant doctrine 
encourages believers to view themselves as inherently sinful [italics added] and to pray 
for forgiveness of their sins, including sinful thoughts” (p. 75).  Furthermore, research by 
Galek, Flannelly, and Porter (as cited in Flannelly et al., 2009) suggests that persons who 
hold the belief that human nature is inherently evil experience greater levels of anxiety 
than their counterparts who view human nature in a positive light.  Lastly, Rachman’s 
(1997) cognitive theory of obsessions posits that persons who are “taught, or learn, that 
all of their value-laden thoughts are of significance will be more prone to obsessions—as 
in particular types of religious beliefs and instructions” (p. 798).  This study posits that 
the theological construct of original sin is one of such religious beliefs when it is held 
rigidly and taught punitively.  According to Ciarrocchi (1995): “Religion may contribute 
[to scrupulosity] when its content is presented in an overly harsh, punitive manner.  
Students of such presentations are likely to associate the content of the religious message 
with fear and anxiety” (pp. 8-9).   
Ciarrocchi (1995) suggests that at minimum three distinct types of scrupulous 
behavior are distinguishable: (1) Developmental Scrupulosity; (2) Milieu-Influenced 
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Scruples; and (3) Clinical Scrupulosity.  Milieu-influenced scruples is especially relevant 
for this analysis in that it provides a conceptual map for understanding how scrupulosity 
may be associated to degree of belief in original sin, God-representations, self-
forgiveness, relationship to authority figures (i.e., clergy), and familial upbringing.  In 
fact, familial upbringing and authority figures are the essential impetuses behind milieu-
influenced scruples.  According to Carrocchi, scrupulosity is pedagogical in nature.  As 
such, scruples may be learned from our primary pedagogues: parents, clergy, and 
religious institutions.  Since scrupulosity is engendered through fear those prominent 
authority figures whose teachings are steeped in fear may provoke strong fear responses.  
Subsequently, these fear responses may generalize “to the broader category of moral 
decision-making itself” (p. 121).  Thus, it stands to reason that such a process may lead to 
inept views of the self, harsh and punitive God-representations, and difficulty forgiving 
oneself marked by ambivalent feelings toward parents and clergy—parents for not 
meeting the person’s early childhood needs and clergy for perpetuating and/or reinforcing 
the person’s fears and sense of psycho-spiritual neglect.  Van Ornum’s (1997) research 
provides insightful qualitative data that speaks to these plausible associations.  For 
example, a nurse being treated for scrupulosity speaks about her familial upbringing, 
God-representation, and clergy influence:  
I grew up in a dysfunctional family.  My father was probably alcoholic.  My 
mother was unable to communicate love due to a deprived childhood.  Both 
parents were honest and hardworking.  When I was about fourteen I went to 
confession.  The old priest picked on me and made me feel worse.  He lectured 
me severely on avoiding scrupulous behavior.  He told me not to repeat prayers… 
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When I was in my early twenties and had five children in five years, I went to a 
priest in confession.  I requested permission to practice rhythm.  The priest 
lectured me.  He told me that God would provide and the school would remove 
the children daily from my care.  He said I would create an occasion of sin for my 
husband.  ‘Men are like boys and they masturbate.  Then it will be your fault,’ the 
priest said… In recent years I have sorted out my relationship with God… I used 
to think he was an ogre, waiting to pounce on me and condemn me (p. 74). 
Another female parishioner commented about the influence authority figures had on her 
life: 
… I’ve suffered with scrupulosity for about thirty years now… My father was 
very rigid and he beat my mother.  My mother was kind, compassionate, and 
loving—but she was not affectionate.  There was no affection from my father.  
My sisters and I are close. One of them had scruples… Before two and one half 
years of psychiatric counseling for obsessive compulsive neurosis I had what I’d 
call a breakdown.  I couldn’t function normally.  I could not get my work here at 
home done.  I’d go to bed at two or four in the morning.  I washed my hands, 
arms, and legs.  I feared germs or chemicals in the soap.  The thought of fire 
terrified me… There may have been an underlying fear of dying and going to hell.  
I had a rigid priest for catechism class.  I was a tender, emotional child and adult 
(p. 94).  
A college teacher concerning the influence of clergy on his life stated: “I have never 
really been able to trust in the love of God.  I am afraid that God will pull the carpet out 
from under me.  This stems from being taught as a child, ‘God is watching you” (p. 65).  
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He goes on to say:  
The clergy stressed hell and damnation.  My only rest from a tortured mind was 
 sleep.  I felt filthy and dirty and different.  I believe that God had done his duty to 
 punish me.  Not once did a priest utter a kind word.  I became bitter toward the  
clergy yet in complete awe of them  (Ibid.). 
Yet another female parishioner with scrupulosity said: 
I’m always worrying about my relationship with God.  Sometimes I trust him, 
sometimes not.  Does he get angry when I don’t?  Trust is hard.  A relative 
molested me when I was a child.  My first husband beat me for twenty-two years.  
I broke every commandment.  I remarried.  I worry if the church approved my 
marriage.  Some Christians say annulments don’t count.  Catholics say they do.  
What does God say?  This confuses me.  I cannot receive the sacraments.  I’m 
always wrong.  The Church forgives other sins, even adultery or murder.  If you 
dare remarry, the church blacklists you.  She denies the sacraments and 
Communion.  You’re always outside, looking in (p. 87). 
And like these there exist countless examples of the implicit as well as explicit plausible 
associations between scrupulosity and the influence of authority figures (i.e., parents, 
clergy, and religious institutions) concerning doctrinal teachings that affect views of the 
self (i.e., original sin and self-forgiveness), and God-representations.  Lastly, it is 
important to note, as in many of the aforementioned examples, that persons suffering 
from scrupulosity lead successful, productive lives (Abramowitz et al., 2002; Van 
Ornum, 1997).  While this does not mitigate the seriousness of the disorder it aids in 
positing how certain religious persons may experience the phenomenon with relative 
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anonymity.       
Depression 
 
 Definition. Depression in its clinical manifestation seems to need no definition 
or further clarification due to its familiarity.  In addition, its long role as the subject of 
extensive research has familiarized us with its “basic properties.”  Nonetheless, for the 
sake of operationalization a brief review of the symptom criteria seems appropriate.  
According to Beck (1967), depression may defined along the following characteristics: 
1. A specific alteration in mood: sadness, loneliness, apathy. 
2. A negative self-concept associated with self-reproaches and self-blame. 
3. Regressive and self-punitive wishes: desires to escape, hide, or die. 
4. Vegetative changes: anorexia, insomnia, loss of libido. 
5. Change in activity level: retardation or agitation (p. 6).  
The only substantive difference between Beck’s conceptualization of depression and the 
DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) nosology is its caveat concerning 
symptom duration.   
Despite the wealth of information that extensive research concerning depression 
has yielded, one finds substantial dearth of inquiry concerning the relationship between 
depression and religious variables (Loewenthal, 2007).  One of the primary reasons for 
this paucity is that many researchers are not specifically investigating depression; rather, 
they are studying religiosity and well-being.  Therefore, general practice in the field has 
been to employ “a range of measures of mental health, mental illness and distress” to 
provide them with very broad information instead of employing single construct 
measures of depression (Ibid., p. 60).  Nonetheless, there is quality research available (see 
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Smith et al., 2003) that allows for some discussion concerning the plausible relationship 
between depression, original sin, religious fundamentalism, God-representations, familial 
upbringing, self-forgiveness, and authority figures. 
 Depression, original sin, god-representations, familial upbringing, self- 
forgiveness, and authority figures.  As discussed previously in the section on 
original sin and depression, depression is a byproduct of religious strain or religious 
struggle (Exline, 2002; Exline et al., 2000).  Part of what may contribute to depressive 
symptomatology in relation to the doctrine of original sin is self-reproach.  Since 
cognitive factors that perpetuate a negative view of the self perpetuate depression (Beck, 
1967; Loewenthal, 2007), it stands to reason that theological doctrines that undermine a 
person’s self-worth may foster and in some persons exacerbate such views.  For example, 
research by Schaap-Jonker, Eurelings-Bontekow, Verhagen, and Zock (2002), regarding 
God-representations and personality disorders, suggests that orthodox psychiatric 
inpatients with a diagnosable Axis II disorder are at more risk for becoming depressed 
“by religion” (p. 67).  In this case it seems that persons with an existing psychiatric 
condition may have their current symptoms aggravated or new symptomatology may 
arise as a result of religious doctrine.  However, due to the study’s inpatient sample and 
the authors’ final conclusion that their findings were a result of the patients’ personality 
disorder(s), they conducted a similar study with a non-clinical sample (Eurelings-
Bontekoe, Van Steeg, & Verschuur, 2005).  In the follow up study, Eurelings-Bontekoe 
and colleagues concluded that “independent of personality…and psychological distress” 
(p. 151): (1) orthodox parishioners perceived God as more punitive and judge-like; and 
(2) depressive symptoms may result in “state-dependent negative feelings towards God” 
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(p. 152).  Additionally, research by Baker and Terpstra (1986) may lend support to the 
notion that particular cultural factors, such as religious teachings, may account for more 
of the variance concerning attitudes and beliefs than pure personality factors.   
Longitudinal data by Braam, Schaap-Jonker, Mooi, De Ritter, Beekman, and 
Deeg (2008) collected from non-psychiatric seniors over the span of thirteen years 
revealed that persons with negative God-representations exhibited greater depressive 
symptoms.  In addition, the vast majority of the sample consisted of Calvinist Protestants, 
a cultural factor deemed important by the authors:  
According to the Calvinist doctrine of predestination, salvation by God cannot be 
influenced by the individual.  When someone feels abandoned or remote from 
God, the original Calvinist doctrine may trigger pessimistic expectations about the 
future, leading to hopelessness and depressive mood (p. 233).   
Similar results concerning negative God-representations and increased depressive 
symptomatology have been reported by Greenway, Milne, and Clarke (2003).  In a 
similar vein, Levin (2002) reports “a strong, statistically significant inverse association 
between a self-reported loving relationship with God and the presence of depressed 
affect” (p. 388).   
 Moreover, as will be discussed in a later section on self-forgiveness and 
psychological well-being, research consistently shows that lower levels of self-
forgiveness are associated with increased levels of depression (Mauger, Perry, Freeman, 
Grove, McBride, & McKinney, 1992; Ross, Kendall, Matters, Wrobel, & Rye, 2004).  
Furthermore, regarding the relationship between depression and familial upbringing 
research suggests warm, nurturing parenting that leads to secure attachment in early 
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childhood is considered a protective factor against depressive symptomatology (see 
Ingram & Ritter, 2000).  Finally, Malony (1998) commenting on fundamentalist 
protestants and mental health states:  
The only other type of health worth considering, for this group, is physical health, 
which has nothing to do with spiritual health.  There is no such entity as mental 
health, which is not synonymous with spiritual health.  Those who are depressed 
or disturbed are disobedient to God’s demands as gleaned from the Bible (pp. 
205-206).    
While research concerning the plausible associations between depression and original sin, 
God-representations, self-forgiveness, familial upbringing, and relation to authority 
figures may seem unconnected, to the contrary, they continue to lend theoretical evidence 
for a model of psycho-spiritual abuse.  When considered separately they are simply 
pieces of “this” or “that” study or important factors that need to be taken into account 
when investigating depression, anxiety, etc.  However, when examined as a whole there 
is an intuitive cohesiveness to them that suggests further study is both needed and 
warranted.  Briefly, this may be espied from considering that both familial upbringing 
and religious affiliation are essential in identity formation, formation of God-
representations, and of import in considering whether self-forgiveness is an acceptable 
practice based on issues if worth.  In addition, theological constructs such as original sin 
are influenced by religious authorities, whose authority is an extension of parental 
authority, which in turn influences self-constructs and fosters or mitigates depressive 
symptoms.  In one fashion or another, all of these variables are inextricably connected.    
 




 Definition.     Pattison (2000) begins his treatise on the ecology of shame with 
quotes gathered from everyday persons attempting to define this phenomenon.  They 
include: “A feeling of being dirty, defiled, unwanted; Feeling demeaned and put on 
view;” and “Not being good enough” (p. 70).  These lay descriptions embody the 
definitions provided by experts in the field who have defined shame.  For example, M. 
Lewis (1995) defines shame: “…simply as the feeling we have when we evaluate our 
actions, feelings, or behavior, and conclude that we have done wrong.  It encompasses the 
whole of ourselves” (p. 2).  In addition, Kaufman (1996) characterizes shame as feeling 
“alienated and defeated, never quite good enough to belong.  And secretly the self feels to 
blame; the deficiency lies within.  Shame is without parallel a sickness of the soul” (p. 
24).  Furthermore, Tangney and Dearing (2002) distinguish shame from other constructs 
such as self-esteem by defining it as such: “Shame… is an emotion—an affective state.  
The feeling of shame involves a negative evaluation of the global self…” (p. 57).  In 
short, shame may be defined as a painful emotion that arises from the subjective 
evaluation of the self by the self in relation to the self’s perceived failure(s)-in-the-world.     
The phenomenology of shame.     The aforementioned definitions afford several 
verities concerning shame and its phenomenology.  The first verity concerns shame as an 
emotion.  One of the difficulties in the scientific study of shame has been its confluence 
with the affect of guilt.  According to Tangney and Dearing (2002) most persons never 
speak in terms of personal shame, rather in terms of guilt.  For example, a person might 
express him/herself saying, “I felt so guilty when I realized what an inconsiderate person 
I’ve been,” when in fact s/he means that s/he feels ashamed (p. 11).  In part this has much 
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to do with the parlance of popular culture, which confuses the constructs of shame and 
guilt and employs them interchangeably, as much as it has to do with the self-defense 
mechanism of denial (H. B. Lewis, 1971).  Consequently, when persons speak about their 
disavowed shame they may use other affective adjectives to express what the self feels is 
incommunicable.  These include feeling: lousy, tense, blank, fearful, enraged, sad, 
isolated, and/or being in a state of despair (H.B. Lewis, 1971; Kaufman, 1996; M. Lewis, 
1995; Pattison, 2000).  Many of these affective adjectives express a sort of paralyzing 
quality.  This is not surprising given that one of the physiological symptoms of shame, 
intended to mask itself from gaze of others, is muscular paralysis (Kaufman, 1996; 
Pattison, 2000).  Kaufman describes such paralysis as an interruption of the self that 
impedes speech and other corporeal movements.  In addition, he pays special attention to 
the face describing three types of facial interruptions: (1) the “frozen face;” (2) the “head-
back look,” which is a posture opposite of the typical “head hung in shame;” and (3) the 
“look of contempt,” which is meant to invoke fear of being shamed in the shamer (p. 20).  
This category of shame has been termed overt, unidentified or overt, unacknowledged 
shame by H. B. Lewis (1971, 1987a) and has been found to be prevalent among 
depressed individuals (Ibid.; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992).      
The intense pain that accompanies the affective state of shame is due yet to 
another verity, that of self-judgment and criticism.  This experience of shame is what H. 
B. Lewis (1971) calls overt shame.  In overt shame the recognized object of attention is 
the global self.  A useful way of conceptualizing the psychological dynamics of the 
shameful self is M. Lewis’ (1995) cognitive attributional theory or model.  According to 
M. Lewis, shame is dependent on three criteria: (a) norms, standards, and goals; (b) the 
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evaluation of one’s failure in meeting such norms, standards, and goals; and (c) the self’s 
attribution in light of its failures and trespasses.  Societal, familial, and institutional codes 
function as “internalized judges” (H. B. Lewis, 1987, p. 15; M. Lewis, 1995).  When 
trespassed against the self experiences the critical gaze of these judges and feels exposed.  
In some instances the critical gaze may be experienced as the diminutive gaze of the 
other.  Nonetheless, the fact that the painful experience is registered in the self by the self 
denotes the all encompassing devaluating experience of the self as both subject and 
object (Berecz & Helm, 1998; Kaufman, 1996; H. B. Lewis, 1987; M. Lewis, 1995; 
Pattison, 2000; Tangney & Dearing, 2002).   
The subjective feeling of being seen is one of the primary characteristics of the 
shame experience (Pattison, 2000).  Kaufman (1996) states: “To feel shame is to feel seen 
in a painfully diminished sense.  Shame reveals the inner self, exposing it to view.  The 
self feels exposed both to itself and to anyone else present” (p. 17).  Such metaphorical 
nakedness autonomically produces blushing, increased perspiration, and tachycardia—
indications that the self is threatened because it is on display (H. B. Lewis, 1987).  Other 
phenomena of the exposed self include a bowed head, closed eyes, and the physical 
shrinking of the body through a drawing inward of the limbs (Ibid.).  Shame-prone 
individuals have also described this latter phenomenon as the internal desire to hide, 
shrink, disappear, and even die (Tangney & Dearing, 2002).  Consequently, it is not 
difficult to see how the subjective experience of exposure invokes self-criticism.  The self 
interprets its transgressions as evidence of its inherent defectiveness, incompetence, 
deficiency, moral sickness, and unworthiness (Kaufman, 1996; Pattison, 2000; Tangney 
& Dearing, 2002).  For the shame-prone individual these evaluative statements are not 
   
  81 
merely descriptors of the human condition and its tendency to err; rather they are, or 
become, global, stable, internal self- attributions (M. Lewis, 1995; Tangney & Dearing, 
2002).  The self now says to itself, “I am no good; I am disgusting; I am inadequate; I am 
a failure” (Baldwin, Baldwin, & Ewald, 2006; M. Lewis, 1995). 
 Shame, original sin, god-representations, familial upbringing, self-forgiveness,  
and authority figures.     While no experimental or observational studies exist 
addressing the direct relationships between shame and degree of belief in original sin, 
God-representations, and self-forgiveness there is psychological literature that posits an 
unhealthy relationship between these factors, albeit sparse.  In the case of familial 
upbringing and authority figures, consensus seems to suggest that rearing in 
fundamentalist traditions whose inculcation of religious practices are overly 
introspective, punitive, and harsh may predispose children toward developing shame-
prone selves (M. Lewis, 1995; Pattison, 2000).  Consequently, the following attempt to 
link these predictors with shame is more representative of an amalgamation of research 
into a narrative of abuse than a circumscribed treatment of each particular predictor. 
  In more fundamentalist circles of Christianity there is a concept of God as 
monarchical, characteristically male yet disembodied, holy and pure in essence, rational 
and unemotional, and authoritarian who ultimately demands obedience and perfection 
from sinful humanity; or as Pattison (2000) puts it: “A shame-generating monster” (p. 
241).  This representation of God centers around the tenet that from the beginning 
humanity has failed to meet God’s standards.  In its attempt to produce more religiously 
pious persons and aid humanity in closing the chasm between their real and ideal “Christ-
like” selves, Christian dogma has highlighted the self’s shortcomings, failures, and 
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trespasses (Berecz & Helm, 1998; Pattison, 2000).  Therefore, it stands to reason that 
such painful evaluations of the self may lead to self-attributions of inherent taint, 
worthlessness, and powerlessness (Ibid.).  This occurs in two fundamental ways: (1) 
through an interpretation of the Adamic myth that degrades the body; and (2) through an 
understanding of the myth that regards God as the supreme panoptic (Foucault, 2000a) 
despot.    
Philosophers, religionists, and psychologists alike have correctly noted that the 
Genesis account of humanity’s trespass against God results in the literary account of a 
shameful self, in a shame-prone humanity (M. Lewis, 1995; Pattison, 2000; Ricoeur, 
1967/1969).  According to the Pauline-Augustinian theologian, shame is a symptom of 
the sinful state of humanity.  The “proof” for such assertions resides in human 
corporeality.   
…she [Eve] took of its fruit and ate; and she also gave some to her husband, who 
was with her, and he ate.  Then the eyes of both were opened, and they knew that 
they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together and made loincloths for 
themselves (Gen. 3:6b-7, NRSV). 
And so they stood face to face naked before the other’s gaze.  The passage is filled with 
shame-imagery (Lewis, 1995).  For the first time man and woman are self-conscious 
seeing themselves, in the other, for what they are.  According to the biblical authors, this 
self-consciousness produces an immediate experience of shame such that who and what 
humanity is requires covering.  The body with its reproductive organs, secretions of 
semen and blood, and excretions of urine and feces becomes the repository of shame 
(Pattison, 2000).  The Lacanian, Marxist philosopher Zizek (Wright, Director) 
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underscores this point when discussing the imaginary virtual: 
…there are things too embarrassing to be kept in mind all of the time.  Like, I talk 
to you, of course rationally I know you are defecating, you are sweating, not to 
mention other things, but quite literally when I interact with you this is not part of 
the image I have of you.  So when I deal with you I am basically not dealing with 
the real you.  I am dealing with a virtual image of you… 
Another way in which Fundamentalist Christian theology degrades aspects of the 
body regards sex (i.e., “male” versus “female”) and sexuality (see Hood et al., 2005).  
Dating back to the earliest decades of nascent Christianity the rabbinical literature 
promulgated an idea that continues to be voiced from pulpits worldwide: Sex engendered 
original sin and women are to blame (Noddings, 1989; Pagels, 1988; Tennant, 1903).  
This is noted in the psychological literature by Horney (1967) who begins her 
examination of the distrust between the sexes with the Genesis account of the fall: 
First of all, woman’s capacity to give birth is partly denied and partly devaluated: 
Eve was made from Adam’s rib and a curse was put on her to bear children in 
sorrow.  In the second place, by interpreting her tempting Adam to eat of the tree 
of knowledge as a sexual temptation, woman appears as the sexual temptress, who 
plunges man into misery.  I believe that these two elements, one born out of 
resentment, the other out of anxiety, have damaged the relationship between the 
sexes from the earliest times to the present (p. 112). 
The second century apologist Tertullian (as cited in Noddings, 1989) exclaimed:  
Do you not know that each of you is Eve? The sentence of God on this sex of 
yours lives in this age: the guilt must of necessity live too.  You are the Devil’s 
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gateway.  You are the unsealer of that forbidden tree.  You are the first deserter of 
the divine Law.  You are she who persuaded him whom the Devil was not valiant 
enough to attack.  You destroyed so easily God’s image in man [sic].  On account 
of your desert, that is death, even the Son of God had to die (p. 52). 
While the railings of the patristics may not be echoed as vociferously in most Sunday 
school classes or sermons, scriptural passages that equate women with sin have taken 
their place due to the fact that fundamentalists organize their ideologies, meaning 
systems, and moral standards around sacred text (Hood, Hill, & Williamson, 2005; 
Pagels, 1988).  For example, it would not be at all uncommon to hear a sermon preached 
or even a denomination forge the manner in which men and women are able to participate 
in religious services or establish a social hierarchy based on the following scriptural text: 
Let a woman learn in silence with full submission.  I permit no woman to teach or 
to have authority over a man; she is to keep silent.  For Adam was formed first, 
then Eve; and Adam was not deceived, but the woman was deceived and became 
a transgressor.  Yet she will be saved through childbearing, provided [italics 
added] they continue in faith and love and holiness, with modesty (1 Timothy 
2:11-15, NRSV). 
Indeed, fundamentalist Christianity has a history of employing the Adam and Eve myth 
to insinuate that women are second class citizens (Heise & Steitz, 1991). 
While childbearing is admonished in marriage as the symbolic undoing of original 
sin, outside of marriage it is the sexual ideal of celibacy that allows a woman to undo 
Eve’s transgression (Pagels, 1988); the inheritance of Augustinian theology. Within a 
largely religious society, however, failure to live up to these ideals may be extremely 
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shame provoking serving as source of religious strain.  For example, a study of 5,427 
college students seeking mental health services were assessed for presenting problems 
related to considerable religious distress (Johnson & Hayes, 2003).  Twenty-six percent 
of the sample reported psychological disturbances due to religious distress.  However, of 
this 26%, 25% reported clinically significant levels of psychological distress related to 
sexual concerns.  The authors conclude: “The finding that concerns of a general sexual 
nature were prevalent among clients with religious and spiritual problems makes sense in 
light of the prohibitions that many religious institutions have toward sexual activity 
before marriage…” (p. 417).  These findings are not necessarily novel as Allport’s (1950) 
research shows: “Occasionally the storm arises not because of intellectual doubts, but 
because of a gnawing sense of guilt and shame, due perhaps to sex conflicts” (p. 33). The 
sex-shame experience for men and women focuses on different aspects respectively; for 
men performance is key and for women the ideals of chastity and seductiveness are 
stressed (Tangney & Dearing, 2002).  However, for the religiously inclined these societal 
sexual ideals are further complicated by religious imposed oughts, shoulds, and musts 
concerning sexual behavior.  Nonetheless, the onus of sexual integrity remains largely on 
women: “…shame in men of the Western civilized world is usually reserved only for 
Friday, Saturday, or Sunday religious services.  For women, it is their silent lot on these 
and all other days” (H. B. Lewis, 1987, p. 4).              
 For as painful as the other’s gaze is it appears that the most painful of critical 
gazes is felt to be God’s:  
They heard the sound of the LORD God walking in the garden…and the man and 
his wife hid themselves from the presence of the LORD God…But the LORD God 
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called to the man, and said to him, “Where are you?”  He said, “I heard the sound 
of you in the garden, and I was afraid, because I was naked; and I hid myself 
(Gen. 3:8-10, NRSV).    
God’s gaze is not mythical or even metaphoric.  For fundamentalist Christians God’s 
gaze is part of God’s omnipresent nature.  Nietzsche’s (trans. 1969) “Ugliest Man” 
describes the maddening eyes of God: 
But he—had to die; he looked with eyes that saw everything—he saw the depths 
and abysses of man, all man’s hidden disgrace and ugliness.  His pity knew no 
shame: he crept into my dirtiest corners… He always saw me… The god who saw 
everything, even man: this god had to die!  Man could not endure that such a 
witness should live… How poor is man! (he thought in his heart) how ugly, how 
croaking, how full of secret shame (pp. 278-279).   
Consider the following statement of a defected fundamentalist Christian: “The fear of 
God was put into me.  I always felt like I was being watched” (Brent, 1994, p. 207).  The 
sentiments evoked by Nietzsche and the anonymous subject are akin to Foucault’s 
(2000a) panopticon and panopticism, which allows the Observer to supervise every 
action, thought, and movement of the captive subject.  Indeed, the origin of the 
panopticon has its roots in the prison system with the all seeing eye of the Guard in the 
watchtower exposing the prisoner’s every action.  In a similar manner, God’s perceived 
gaze or presence has been empirically shown to affect people’s behavior.  For example, 
Shariff and Norenzayan (2007) across two studies conclude: “God concepts, activated 
implicitly, increased pro-social behavior even when the behavior was anonymous and 
directed toward strangers” (p. 807).  Though the critical gaze of God may be a subjective 
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reality in the lives of many religious persons it also has a component of objective reality.  
For the most part God ‘s interaction with humanity is understood to be mediated.  For 
example, the bible, the sacraments, prayer, the clergy, and the larger institutional 
governing body of the church each mediate God to the parishioner.  Therefore, the 
interpretation given to scripture, the sacraments, etc. by the ecclesial community who in 
turn exhorts, punishes, warns, and rebukes is the ever-present gaze of God in the life of 
the parishioner.  It stands to reason that chronic exposure to messages of inherent taint, 
worthlessness, and utter depravity may contribute to a shameful self (Pattison, 2000).  
While it appears that religion in itself does not cause shame, Tangney and Dearing (2002) 
suggest that systematic studies of religious constructs are necessary to unearth intuitively 
potential shame producing dogmas (J. Tangney, personal communication, June 20, 2007). 
Self-Forgiveness 
 
 Definition.     Researchers have noted that self-forgiveness as a topic of 
psychological study is in its nascent stage and has received little empirical attention in 
contrast to forgiveness of others (Tangney, Boone, & Dearing, 2005; Romero, Kalidas, 
Elledge, Chang, Liscum, & Friedman; 2006; Ross et al., 2004).  Hence, defining the 
construct has proven to be a difficult task (Macaskill, Maltby, & Day, 2002).  
Nonetheless, Enright and the Human Development Study Group’s (1996) definition of 
self-forgiveness is generally regarded as the standard in the self-forgiveness literature 
(Hall & Fincham, 2005).  In their conceptualization of self-forgiveness Enright and 
colleagues stress: (a) the abandonment of self-resentment; (b) acknowledgment of 
wrongdoing; and (c) cultivation of self-compassion, self-generosity, and self-love.  Self-
forgiveness, then, is an arduous process of reconciliation with the self that involves 
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accepting one’s shortcomings, transgressions, and failures while taking responsibility for 
one’s actions.  
Self-forgiveness and the Christian religion.     Forgiveness is an inextricable part 
of religiosity and it is a central component of the Christian faith (Exline, Worthington, 
Hill, & McCullough, 2003; Rye, Pargament, Ali, Beck, Dorff, Hallisey, Narayana, & 
Williams, 2000).  While not inimical to Christianity, self-forgiveness is not an explicit 
religious teaching or tenet.  In the review of the psychological literature conducted by this 
author little to no mention of self-forgiveness vis-à-vis religiosity was found with the 
exception of two sources.  Research by Tangney et al. (2005) suggests that self-
forgiveness is not associated with religious affiliation regardless of degree of personal 
religiousness or piety.  In addition, a qualitative study conducted by Ingersoll-Dayton and 
Krause (2005) among religious elderly suggests that belief in God’s forgiveness does not 
necessarily facilitate self-forgiveness.  In fact, persons who asked for and believed in 
God’s forgiveness were among the most ambivalent about forgiving themselves.   
Self-forgiveness and psychological well-being.     To date, research on 
intrapersonal forgiveness suggests that lack of self-forgiveness is significantly predicted 
by neuroticism (Mullet, Neto, & Rivière, 2005; Ross, Hertenstein, & Wrobel, 2007; Ross 
et al., 2004).  In other words, self-forgiveness is most difficult for persons who are 
emotionally unstable.  In a study by Ross et al. (2004) that examined self and other-
forgiveness in relation to the Five-Factor Model found that “the Neuroticism domain was 
the only significant predictor” of self-forgiveness accounting for 40% of the variance (p. 
212).  In addition, a more recent study by Ross and colleagues (2007) has replicated this 
prior finding.  Similar results are reported by Mullet at al. (2005) who conducted a meta-
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analysis of personality and intrapersonal forgiveness studies.  Again, neuroticism was 
found to be the sole predictive personality factor of self-forgiveness revealing a strong, 
negative linear relationship.  All three of these studies have also found high correlations 
between lack of emotional stability and depression, anxiety, and anger.  In particular, low 
levels of depression have been found to be the best predictors of self-forgiveness (Ross et 
al., 2004).  These results reinforce early findings on self-forgiveness by Mauger and 
colleagues (1992) in a sample of 237 Christian psychotherapy clients that experienced 
greater depression, anxiety, and anger as a result of difficulty forgiving themselves.   
Given these data it is not difficult to see how lack of intrapersonal forgiveness has 
also been linked with rumination (Ingersoll-Dayton & Krause, 2005), shame, guilt, fear 
of negative evaluation, and perfectionism (Tangney et al., 2005).  Consequently, 
researchers have concluded that persons who do not forgive themselves possess an 
intropunitive style (Mauger et al., 1992, Ross et al., 2004).  To paraphrase Ross and 
colleagues (2004), an intropunitive style is one in which the individual more often than 
not perceives the self as blemished, unworthy of acceptance, with a propensity to 
internalize blame.  On the other hand, research suggests that the presence of self-
forgiveness is positively associated with self-esteem, life-satisfaction (Hall & Fincham, 
2005; Fisher & Exline, 2006), psychological adjustment in the midst of serious illness 
(Romero et al., 2006), fewer depressive symptoms and thought disorder as well as lower 
levels of anxiety, shame and neuroticism (Mauger et al., 1992; Mullet et al., 2005; Ross 
et al., 2004; Tangney et al., 2005).   
At first glance, it appears that symptoms of psychological disturbances 
hypothesized to be associated with psycho-spiritual abuse are either further fostered or 
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mitigated by the person’s level of self-forgiveness. Due to the fact that self-forgiveness is 
not an explicit tenet of fundamentalist Christianity its study seems warranted. 
Toward A Model of Psycho-Spiritual Abuse 
 
Definition. Defining psycho-spiritual abuse is an onerous task for a variety of 
reasons.  Firstly, the psychological literature does not address it.  In fact, it marginally 
treats the association(s) between religion and child abuse, sexual abuse, and medical 
neglect.  Secondly, it seems that at times researchers mitigate the seriousness of abuse as 
well.  For example, Donahue and Nielsen (2005) when discussing the sexual abuse of 
minors by Catholic priests state: 
Some 80% of the priests engaged in sexual contact with postpubertal boys, an act 
technically known as ephebophilia, rather than pedophilia.  Research indicates 
that the clinical profiles of ephebophiles and pedophiles differ markedly, and the 
two terms should not be interchanged (p. 281).  
It cannot be ignored that the logic behind employing the words “post-pubertal boys” in 
conjunction with a term, ephebophilia, that distances it from pedophilia, and the 
consequent demand (sanctioned) by research not to employ the terms interchangeably is 
meant to de-stigmatize and mitigate the seriousness of the abuse—the Greek terms 
employed are simply markers of chronological age, but they both refer to minors.  
Thirdly, it is difficult to conceptualize the psychological effects of a psycho-spiritual 
model of abuse vis-à-vis current models of trauma whose symptomatology is severe.  
After all, isn’t religion supposed to be “good” for you?  Finally, it may also stand to 
reason that the psychology of religion may perceive the study of the dark side of religion 
as vintage as the current trend is to primarily explore the salutary effects of religion upon 
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the psyche.  Despite these difficulties is seems that based on theory and research a 
psycho-spiritual model of abuse is needed in order to aid clinicians in understanding: (a) 
the developmental aspects of the abuse; (b) the role that familial upbringing plays in the 
predisposition and exacerbation of the abuse; (c) the powerful role fundamentalist 
theology plays in the abuse; (d) the psychological mechanisms at work at the individual 
level; and (e) the symptoms associated with the abuse that make it difficult to distinguish 
from other psychiatric disorders.                      
 Employing the standard definition of abuse—“to use wrongly or inappropriately” 
in turn hurting or injuring “by maltreatment” (Pickett, 2002, p. 6)— as a point of 
reference, this author defines psycho-spiritual abuse: The misuse of ecclesial doctrine(s) 
via coercive or overtly forceful tactics such as fear, overly strict punishment, ridicule, 
perfectionism, and humiliation in order to instill in a person a sense of “right religion,” 
which results in a diminished sense of self, thus leading to psychiatric difficulties 
including, but not limited to, anxiety, depression, and shame. 
 Conceptualizing psycho-spiritual abuse. In an attempt to further clarify the 
proposed model of psycho-spiritual abuse, this author has created a visual representation 
of the psychic processes hypothesized to be operant in psycho-spiritual abuse (see figure 
1).  The cylindrical nature of the model is meant to represent the fluidity as well as 
profundity between those stages and processes labeled psychically latent and the most 
manifest psychic state, that of psychological health or pathology.  In other words, the 
depth of the cylindrical rungs are meant to visually represent the psychological 
consciousness of each stage vis-à-vis each other.    
 

















The lowest rung in the cylindrical model refers to the individual and his/her 
parental objects.  As discussed in the above sections, a person’s most important early 
relationship is the one experienced with his/her primary caretaker(s).  This relationship 
paves the way for ensuing ways of relating to the world, self, and others through the 
creation of internal representations of the parental objects as well as the person’s initial or 
primitive God-representation.  Not only are we born into a family, said family may 
belong to an organized religion that informs, through dogma, the manner in which 
parental objects interact with their child.  Consequently, the child may be born into a 
family system that is predisposed to foster or mitigate psychological health.  Very early 
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on children may be exposed to teachings having to do with right religion, inherent 
sinfulness, taint, and stories about how “we’ve let God down.”  In addition, implicit as 
well as explicit messages concerning how acceptable it is for one to forgive oneself for a 
trespass or transgression may also be present.  For example, in families where strict 
adherence to religious orthodoxy is practiced a child’s transgressive behavior towards a 
sibling may be punished by forcing the child to kneel in a corner and pray or contemplate 
how their actions have “hurt God” as well as their sibling.  These teachings, however, are 
not unique to the family unit.  They may also be learned or reinforced through the child’s 
church environment.  The same process may also be operant for those who come to 
religious devotion in adolescence or adulthood.  The person’s introduction to organized 
religion also serves to further develop their God-representation via the religious systems 
of belief; this description represents the second cylindrical rung.  Undoubtedly, rearing 
practices and the development of self-orienting religious beliefs via organized religious 
institutions have a direct effect on the parishioner’s view of the self.  Alone or in concert 
with familial rearing practices such teachings may reinforce or foster diminished views of 
the self; the third cylindrical rung.  Consequently, life stressors, including spiritual strains 
or struggles, may facilitate the expression of psychopathology or distressing subclinical 
symptomatology such as increased anxiety, depression, or shame; the top cylindrical 
rung.   
The question of whether church teachings aid in mitigating or exacerbating such 
symptoms in large part has to do with the mediating role of one’s super-ego (not in the 
statistical sense), which finds an extension of itself in parental and ecclesial authority. 
Research by Hansen (1998) suggests that the means by which a belief is emphasized may 
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affect psychological well-being in adulthood.  Hansen specifically focuses on the long-
term effects of rigidity and fear in religious upbringing and concludes: “…individuals 
with histories of rigidity may be reluctant to become members of a religion that differs 
from that of the parent, while those with histories of fear may be more likely to join a 
different religion” (p. 105).  The implication being that rigidity perpetuates “unalterable,” 
legalistic obedience to a priori moral codes, including orthodox gender roles, while fear 
engenders “unreal expectations of perfection” (p. 92).  Therefore, while rigidity and fear 
may both be part and parcel of the fundamentalist Christian worldview, Hansen’s (1998) 
research suggests that such rigidity may perpetuate psycho-spiritual abuse by maintaining 
a closed religious circuit.  In addition, Whipple’s (1987) clinical work with battered 
women from fundamentalist congregations lends support to the rigidity of such family 
and religious systems.  Moreover, research suggests that fundamentalist families, 
compared to non-fundamentalist families, appear to be characterized by more rigidity, 
less emotionally closeness, and higher levels of enmeshment with the church community 
as well as with the church hierarchy (Denton & Denton, 1992).  In a national sample of 
8,165 adolescents and 10,467 of their parents across thirteen Christian denominations, 
Forliti and Benson (1986) found that a “restricting religion” has deleterious effects on 
young people.  Adolescents who are reared in such religious environments tend to report 
higher levels of antisocial behavior, alcohol use, prejudice, and sexism.  Two plausible 
explanations for such results are “that a restricting religion sets high behavioral standards 
which conflict with a young adolescent’s inclination to grow in autonomy and 
independence,” say the authors (p. 223).  Another likely reason is that authority figures 
may employ “God as a ‘hammer” with young persons whose behavior is problematic 
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(Ibid.).  This may be consistent with existing data suggesting that young persons reared in 
restricting religions may experience “coercive forms of discipline at home” (p. 224).  
Additionally, Rigney and Hoffman (1993) conclude that fundamentalist protestants are 
less “intellectually oriented” than Catholics, non-fundamentalist protestants, Jews, and 
the non-religious (p. 220).  In fact, fundamentalist protestants scored significantly higher 
than the aforementioned groups concerning the value of obedience and significantly 
lower than these same groups on freedom of scientific inquiry, tolerance, and newspaper 
reading.  These results are suggestive of a religious structure that is authoritarian in 
nature.  In short, this author believes this conceptual model elucidates the psychological 








Understanding that different Christian traditions espouse differing views 
concerning right-religion (i.e., fundamentalism), the centrality of the theological doctrine 
of original sin, self-forgiveness, as well as the character and nature of God, this study 
employed snowball sampling in order to reach a diverse Christian population.  An 
additional reason for employing snowball sampling methodology is that certain 
fundamentalist subtypes of Protestant Christianity may be considered religiously “rare” 
or “hidden” populations on account of their impermeability, thus necessitating such a 
recruitment technique (Kalton & Anderson, 1986; Kline, 2005). 
The sample was composed of 235 parishioners (155 females, 80 males) from 18 
Christian faith groups across the United States (U. S.).  Most subjects indicated that they 
had spent the majority of their life in the Southern (34.1%) and Southwestern (27.7%) 
regions of the U. S. while others reported having principally resided in the Midwest 
(18.8%), West Coast (9.4%), Northeast (6%), and West (2.6%).  In addition, 2.2% of 
parishioners stated that they lived most of their lives outside the U. S.  Participants were 
mainly Christian Protestants (80.9%) followed by Christian Sectarians (i.e., Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints)  (13.1%) and Christian 
Catholics (6%) respectively, the majority of which had been affiliated with their religious 
faith more than 20 years (52.8%).  The remaining participants reported affiliations of less 
than 1 year (4.5%), 1-5 years (12.7%), 6-10 years (12.4%), 11-15 years (9.7%), and 16-
20 years (7.9%). 
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Consistent with Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, and John’s (2004) predictions 
regarding online research and ethnicity, subjects self-identified primarily as European 
American (75.7%) followed by Latino American (13.5%), Bi-Ethnic (4.5%), African 
American (3%), and Other (3.3%).  Participants ranged in age from 18 to 64 and were 
approximately equally represented— 18-24 (14.2%), 25-34 (22.1%), 35-44 (16.5%), 45-
54 (25.1%), and 55-64 (22.1%).  Additionally, most parishioners indicated that they 
attended religious services on a Weekly basis (68.2%) with all others reporting 
attendance Occasionally (11.5%), Monthly (7.5%), and on Special Occasions (12.7%).  
The vast majority of subjects completed some form of post-secondary education— 
Associate’s Degree (7.5%), Baccalaureate Degree (40.8%), Master’s Degree (24%), 
Doctoral Degree (4.5%)— with 1.9% indicating High School Graduate or Equivalent and 
21.3% reporting Some College.  Participant yearly household income ranged from less 
than $10,000 (8.2%), $10,000-$24,999 (10.1%), $25,000-$44,999 (17.2%), $45,000-
$74,999 (28.1%), $75,000-$99,999 (15%), and more than $100,000 (21.3%) respectively.  
Finally, 76% of parishioners reported no current or previous psychiatric diagnosis and 
24% indicated having been diagnosed with at least 1 psychiatric illness; 14.2% of 
participants with a diagnosed psychiatric disorder reported current use of psychotropic 
medication.           
Approval by Human Subjects Committee 
 
The study adhered to the guidelines of the Institutional Review Board for the 








Demographic questionnaire.     A demographic questionnaire developed for this 
study gathered information regarding the subject’s age, race, ethnicity, sex, relationship 
status, education, occupation, household size, income, denominational affiliation, length 
of denominational affiliation and practice, church attendance, and region within the 
United States where most of their life had been spent.  In addition, the questionnaire also 
asked subjects to identify if they had been diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder, how 
long ago the diagnosis was made, and if they were currently taking any psychotropic 
medication(s) (see Appendices C-K for all administered measures).                
 Original sin scale.     Due to the lack of an instrument that measures degree of 
belief in the theological construct of original sin this author created a new measure to 
meet such need.  The Original Sin Scale (OSS) is a 7-item, face valid, 7-point Likert 
scale designed to measure degree of belief in the theological construct of original sin.  It 
is a unidimensional measure that meets MacCallum, Widaman, Ahang, and Hong’s 
(1999) recommended 5:1 item-to-factor ratio for small number of factors.  It is anchored 
at 1 (strongly disagree) and 7 (strongly agree).  Sample statements include: “Human 
nature is sinful;” “People are born with a tendency to sin;” and “Only God can restore 
humanity to its original state of innocence.”  The subject’s score is obtained by summing 
the responses for all items yielding a minimum score of 7 and a maximum score of 49 
with a theoretical midpoint of 28.  Higher scores indicate stronger belief in the construct 
of original sin and vice-versa. The OSS has demonstrated good internal consistency (α= 
.926) in its factor analytic study as well as in this study (α= .956) (see Appendix B for 
the OSS’ factor analytic study).  
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 Revised religious fundamentalism scale. The Revised Religious 
Fundamentalism Scale (RRFS) (Altmeyer and Hunsberger, 2004) is a 12-item self-report 
instrument that measures the degree to which a person believes that his/her religious 
outlook contains the most “fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth” (p. 50).  
Subjects are instructed to respond to each item on a 9-point Likert scale anchored at -4 
(very strongly disagree) and +4 (very strongly agree) with 0 being an exact and precise 
neutral.  Sample statements include: “God has given humanity a complete, unfailing 
guide to happiness and salvation, which must be totally followed;” The basic cause of 
evil in the world is Satan, who is still constantly and ferociously fighting against God;” 
and “When you get right down to it, there are basically only two kinds of people in the 
world: the Righteous, who will be rewarded by God; and the rest, who will not.”    
One of the strengths of the RRFS is that it allows the participant to deal with what 
may be conflicting feelings about a statement by allowing him/her to weigh differing 
parts of it independently.  In turn the participant may numerically rate these troublesome 
ideas independently of each other and sum each part to obtain their score for that 
particular statement.  In order to avoid negative scores the subject’s total score is 
obtained by summing all 12 items on a converted 1 to 9 scale and adding a constant of 5 
to the summed score.  This yields a minimum score of 17 and a maximum score of 113 
with a theoretical mid-point of 65.  Higher scores indicate greater levels of 
fundamentalism and vice-versa.  The RRFS is reported to possess an alpha reliability 
coefficient of .91, which is equal to or greater than its parent scale (Altmeyer and 




Short egna minnen betraffande uppfostran.     The short Egna Minnen Betraffande 
Uppfostran (s-EMBU) is a 23-item English version of its 81-item Sweedish parent scale 
(Perris, Jacobsson, Lindström, von Knorring, & Perris, 1980) employed “for assessing 
memories of parental rearing behaviour [sic]” (Ross, Campbell, & Clayer, 1982, p. 
500).  The s-EMBU retains 3 of the original 14 subscales, affective (i.e., emotional 
warmth), rejecting, and overprotective, all of which were employed in the statistical 
analysis (Arrindell, Sanavio, Aguillar, Sica, Hatzichristou, Eisemann, Recinos, Gaszner, 
Peter, Battagliese, Kallai, and van der Ende, 1999). Subjects are instructed to respond to 
each item along a 4-point Likert scale anchored at 1 (never occurred) and 4 (always 
occurred) for father and mother respectively (i.e., separately).  Sample statements 
include: “It happened that my parents were sour or angry with me without letting me 
know the cause” (rejection); “My parents praised me” (emotional warmth); and “It 
happened that I wished my parents would worry less about what I was doing” 
(overprotection).  The subject’s score is obtained by summing the responses for all items 
in a respective subscale, which yield differing minimum and maximum scores.  Higher 
scores indicate greater levels of parental rejection, emotional warmth, and overprotection 
respectively and vice-versa. Subscale reliability coefficients range from .72 (rejecting) to 
.85 (emotional warmth) for fathers and from .74 (rejecting) to .82 (overprotective) for 
mothers across fours different international samples demonstrating adequate internal 
consistency.  Finally, the s-EMBU is appropriate for use with non-clinical populations.  
The god image scales.     The God Image Scales (GIS) refer to a 72-item and a 36-
item format scales derived from a 156-item parent scale, The God Image Inventory (GII) 
(Lawrence, 1991), for research purposes (Lawrence, 1997).  The 36-item GIS was 
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employed in this study because it retains the 3 most essential subscales of the GII: (1) 
presence (i.e.,  “Is God there for me?”); (2) challenge (i.e., “Does God want me to 
grow?”); and (3) acceptance (i.e., “Am I the sort of person God would want to love?”) 
(Ibid.).  Subjects are instructed to respond on a 4-point Likert scale anchored at 1 
(strongly agree) and 4 (strongly disagree) to each statement by indicating the response 
that closest describes their feelings (Hall & Sorenson, 1999).  Sample statements include: 
“God does not answer when I call” (presence); “God’s love for me has no strings 
attached” (acceptance); and “God takes pleasure in my achievements” (challenge).  The 
subject’s score is obtained by summing the responses for all items in a respective 
subscale, which yields a minimum score of 12 and maximum score of 48.  Higher scores 
indicate God representations imbued with less presence, challenge, and acceptance 
respectively.  Correlations between the GII and the GIS are reported to be between .95 
and .99.  Additionally, subscale reliability coefficients range from .81 (challenge) to .95 
(presence) demonstrating good internal consistency.  Moreover, further studies on the 
GIS have provided convergent and discriminant validity.  Finally, the GIS is appropriate 
for use with non-clinical populations (Lawrence, 1997). 
The state self-forgiveness scale.     The State Self-Forgiveness Scale (SSFS) is the 
only validated state self-forgiveness measure to date (Wohl, DeShea, & Wahkinney, 
2008).  Consisting of 17 six-point Likert type items anchored at 1 (strongly disagree) and 
6 (strongly agree) and a single validity check item anchored at 1 (not at all) and 4 
(completely), the SSFS is composed of two subscales: (1) the Self-Forgiving 
Feelings/Actions (SFFA) Scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .86, item reliability = .95); and (2) 
the Self-Forgiving Beliefs (SFB) Scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .91, item reliability = .99). 
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Only the SFFA subscale was employed in the data analysis because it better answers the 
research questions.  Subjects are instructed to think of a transgression and contemplate it 
while filling out the questionnaire.  Sample statements include: “As I consider what I did 
wrong, I feel …compassionate toward myself…rejecting of myself…accepting of 
myself…dislike toward myself.”  The subject’s score is obtained by summing the first 8 
items of the SSFS, which make up the SFFA subscale, in which negatively worded items 
are reversed scored.  A minimum score of 8 and a maximum score of 48 is possible.  The 
higher the subject’s score the more positive the subject’s self-forgiving feelings and 
actions.  The SSFS possesses high internal consistency and concurrent validity; this 
measure is also appropriate for use with non-clinical populations (Ibid.).               
Penn inventory of scrupulosity. The Penn Inventory of Scrupulosity (PIOS) 
is a 19-item self-report instrument designed to measure scrupulous obsessions and 
compulsions in a non-clinical population (Abramowitz et al., 2002).  It consists of two 
subscales: (1) fear of sin; and (2) fear of God.  Responses are measured on a 5-point 
Likert scale anchored at 0 (never) and 4 (constantly).  Subjects are instructed to rate how 
often they have the following experiences.  Sample statements include: “I worry that I 
might have dishonest thoughts;” “I am afraid my behavior is unacceptable to God;” and 
“I am afraid of having sexual thoughts.”  The subject’s score is obtained by summing all 
12 responses in the “fear of sin” subscale, with a minimum score of 0 and a maximum 
score of 48, and/or by summing all 7 responses to the “fear of God subscale which has a 
minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 35.  Alternatively a scale total score may be 
achieved by summing all of the items in which a minimum score of 0 and a maximum 
score of 76 is possible.  Higher scores in the subscales indicate greater levels of 
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obsessions and compulsive behavior with fear of sin and fear of God respectively, and 
higher scores on the total scale score indicate greater levels of scrupulosity.  Cronbach’s 
alphas of .90 (fear of sin) and .88 (fear of God) were reported for each of the measures’ 
respective subscales and a full-scale alpha coefficient of .93, indicating that the PIOS 
possesses good internal consistency.  
Beck depression inventory- 2.      The Beck Depression Inventory- 2 (BDI- 2) is a 
21-item self-report instrument that measures the cognitive and behavioral symptoms of 
depression (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996).  Symptom severity is measured on a 4-point 
scale ranging from 0 to 3, with higher numbers indicating greater distress.  Symptoms 
assessed include sadness, pessimism, past failure, loss of pleasure, interest in sex, general 
interest, and energy, feelings of guilt and punishment, self-dislike and criticalness, 
suicidal thoughts, agitation, indecisiveness, worthlessness, fatigue, changes in eating and 
sleeping patterns, concentration and irritability.  Moreover, the BDI-2 is designed to be 
employed with adults and adolescents over the age of 13 and can be used in diagnosing 
depressive disorder according to diagnostic criteria established by the DSM-IV 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000).   
The subject is instructed to read groups of statements and indicate the statement 
that best describes how s/he has been feeling over the past two weeks, including the 
present day.  Sample statements include: “(1) Sadness: 0 = I do not feel sad; 1 = I feel sad 
much of the time; 2 = I am sad all of the time; 3= I am so sad or unhappy that I can’t 
stand it;” and “(2) Pessimism: 0 = I am not discouraged about my future; 1 = I feel more 
discouraged about my future than I used to be; 2 = I do not expect things to work out for 
me; 3 = I feel my future is hopeless and will only get worse” (Beck et al., 1996).  The 
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subject’s score is obtained by summing the responses to all 21 items in which a 
maximum score of 63 is possible.  The BDI-2 is interpreted according to the following 
cut off scores: (1) 0-13 = minimal depression; (2) 14-19 = mild depression; (3) 20-28 = 
moderate depression; and (4) 29-63 = severe depression.  Reliability coefficients are 
acceptable yielding Cronbach’s alphas of .92 to .93.  Test-retest data at one week yield a 
coefficient of .93, which strongly demonstrates that the BDI-2 represents consistent 
measure over time.  Convergent as well as discriminant validity is also well established 
as is construct and predictive validity (Ibid.). 
Test of self-conscious affect - 3.     The Test of Self-Conscious Affect- 3 (TOSCA-
3) is a scenario based dispositional measure that consists of 16 hypothetical situations—
11 negative and 5 positive—which measure shame and guilt-proneness  (Tangney, 
Dearing, Wagner, and Gramzow, 2000).  More specifically, the scenarios yield “indices 
of Shame-Proneness, Guilt-Proneness, Externalization, Detachment/Unconcern, Alpha 
Pride, and Beta Pride” (Tangney & Dearing, 2002, p. 213).  This study employed an 
abbreviated version of the TOSCA-3 through the removal of all positive scenarios 
produces an 11-scenario instrument.  Additionally, only the shame subscale was 
employed in the statistical analysis.   
Participants are instructed to read each scenario and imagine themselves in each 
situation.  They are then asked to indicate how likely they would be to “react in each of 
the ways described” (Tangney & Dearing, 2002, p. 207).  Responses are measured on a 
5-point Likert scale anchored at 1 (not likely) and 5 (very likely).  Sample scenarios 
include: “You make plans to meet a friend for lunch.  At 5 o’clock, you realize you stood 
your friend up;” “You break something at work and then hide it;” and “At work, you wait 
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until the last minute to plan a project, and it turns out badly.”  The respective shame 
statements that require rating are: “You would think, “I’m inconsiderate;” “You would 
think about quitting;” and “You would feel incompetent.”  The subject’s score is obtained 
by summing the shame responses to all 11 items in which a minimum score of 11 and a 
maximum score of 55 is possible.  The higher the subject’s score the more shame-prone 
the subject.  Cronbach’s alphas of .88, .77, and .76 respectively are reported by Tangney 
and colleagues (2000) for the TOSCA-3’s shame subscale across 3 separate samples.  
The short version has also shown acceptable internal consistency.  This measure is 
appropriate for use with non-clinical populations (Tangney & Dearing, 2002).          
Procedure 
Initial electronic correspondence inviting lay persons to participate in the study 
were sent to acquaintances of this researcher across the U.S. in late January 2010.  Each 
e-mail contained the participation survey link provided by the data server SurveyMonkey 
as well as a request to forward the received e-mail to all acquaintances with similar 
religious beliefs.  Such a practice accomplished two aims: (1) to further involve other 
same faith parishioners who may otherwise not have had the opportunity to participate; 
and (2) expanding the study sample to other Christian faith parishioners who may not 
have been recruited due to restraints of time and money on the researcher’s part and trust 
on the participant’s end.    
Recipients were told that the purpose of the study was to better understand the 
relationship between religiosity and psychological well-being.  They were also told that 
their participation would require between 20-30 minutes of their time.  Willing 
participants were then instructed to follow the survey link where they were presented 
 
  106 
with the informed consent document.  Once participants read through the consent form 
they were prompted to either give or decline their consent.  Participants were also 
instructed to print the consent form page to keep for their records.  Those who declined 
their consent were redirected to the study’s debriefing page and instructions were given 
regarding how to close their browser.  Since this researcher did not collect written 
consent forms from participants it was explained that consent to participate was indicated 
through completion of the survey.  Participants were instructed to fill out the ensuing 
measures, paying close attention to follow their respective instructions.  Upon completion 
of all forms and measures subjects viewed a printable debriefing sheet that included: (a) 
the nature of the project; (b) findings of related studies; (c) identification of the predictor 
variables; (d) identification of the outcome variables; (e) and hypotheses (Heppner, 
Kivlighan, & Wampold, 1999).   
Due to the possibility of subject withdrawal and to ensure proper debriefing a 
“leave the study” icon was placed on each Internet page, which automatically took the 
subject to the debriefing page (Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002, p. 163).   In order to 
control for order effects the self-report measures were counterbalanced (Heppner et al., 
1999; Zechmeister, Zechmeister, & Shaughnessy, 2001).  Lastly, in order to prevent 
repeat entries by any one individual who may revisit the website, the subject’s computer 
Internet protocol (IP) address was recorded at the time of login.  When an IP address 
occurred more than once then demographic information as well as the collected data were 
compared to see how closely the entries resembled each other (Gosling et al., 2004; 
Nosek et al., 2002).  In all instances repeat entries were found to be employed by 
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participants who had not completed the survey on their first attempt; these first attempts 
were discarded.  
Questions and Hypotheses 
 Based on theory and previous research covered throughout this document the 
following questions and hypotheses were tested employing Canonical Correlation 
Analysis: 
1. To what degree is a parishioner’s psychological well-being (i.e., scrupulosity, 
depression, and shame) associated with his/her degree of belief in the 
theological construct of original sin?  
• Hypothesis 1:  Greater degrees of parishioner belief in the theological 
doctrine of original sin is positively associated with obsessions of sin 
and fear of God’s punishment along with neutralizing compulsive 
behavior (i.e., scrupulosity disorder). 
• Hypothesis 2:  Greater degrees of parishioner belief in original sin is 
positively associated with depression. 
• Hypothesis 3:  Greater degrees of parishioner belief in original sin is 
positively associated with shame. 
2. To what degree is a parishioner’s psychological well-being associated with 
religious rigidity (i.e., fundamentalism)? 
• Hypothesis 4:  Greater degrees of parishioner religious 
fundamentalism is positively associated with scrupulosity. 
• Hypothesis 5:  Greater degrees of parishioner religious 
fundamentalism is positively associated with depression. 
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• Hypothesis 6:  Greater degrees of parishioner religious 
fundamentalism is positively associated with shame. 
3. To what degree is a parishioner’s psychological well-being associated with 
his/her God-representation?  
• Hypothesis 7:  Non-accepting God-representations are positively 
associated with scrupulosity. 
• Hypothesis 8:  Non-accepting God-representations are positively 
associated with depression. 
• Hypothesis 9: Non-accepting God-representations are positively 
associated with shame. 
• Hypothesis 10:  Non-present God-representations are negatively 
associated with scrupulosity. 
• Hypothesis 11:  Non-present God-representations are positively 
associated with depression. 
• Hypothesis 12: Non-present God-representations are positively 
associated with shame. 
• Hypothesis 13:  Non-challenging God-representations are negatively 
associated with scrupulosity. 
• Hypothesis 14:  Non-challenging God-representations are positively 
associated with depression. 
• Hypothesis 15:  Non-challenging God-representations are negatively 
associated with shame. 
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4. To what degree is a parishioner’s psychological well-being associated with 
his/her ability to self-forgive?  
• Hypothesis 16:  Greater degree of parishioner self-forgiveness is 
negatively associated with scrupulosity. 
• Hypothesis 17:  Greater degree of parishioner self-forgiveness is 
negatively associated with depression. 
• Hypothesis 18:  Greater degree of parishioner self-forgiveness is 
negatively associated with shame. 
5. To what degree is a parishioner’s psychological well-being associated with 
his/her familial upbringing (i.e., perceived parental rearing)?  
• Hypothesis 19:  Parishioner parental rearing practices perceived as 
overprotective are positively associated with scrupulosity. 
• Hypothesis 20:  Parishioner parental rearing practices perceived as 
overprotective are positively associated with depression. 
• Hypothesis 21: Parishioner parental rearing practices perceived as 
overprotective are positively associated with shame. 
• Hypothesis 22:  Parishioner parental rearing practices perceived as 
rejecting are positively associated with depression. 
• Hypothesis 23: Parishioner parental rearing practices perceived as 
rejecting are positively associated with shame. 
• Hypothesis 24:  Parishioner parental rearing practices perceived as 
emotionally warm are negatively associated with scrupulosity. 
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• Hypothesis 25: Parishioner parental rearing practices perceived as 
emotionally warm are negatively associated with depression. 
• Hypothesis 26: Parishioner parental rearing practices perceived as 
emotionally warm are negatively associated with shame. 













































 This study tests a model of psycho-spiritual abuse involving the psychological 
well-being of Christian parishioners and the influence (i.e., predictive value) that 
theological beliefs as well as developmental factors (referred to as “psycho-spiritual 
beliefs”) exert upon their mental health.  The outcome or criterion variables are 
standardized measures of Scrupulosity Disorder (i.e., PIOS), Depression (i.e., BDI-2), 
and Shame (i.e., TOSCA-3) respectively.  Five parishioner psycho-spiritual belief 
predictor variables are considered.  The first predictor measures belief in the theological 
construct of original sin, OSS, which is a standardized measure of the degree of belief 
that a parishioner possesses about the ineptness of human nature.  The second predictor 
measures religious rigidity or strictness, RRFS, which is a standardized measured of the 
degree to which a person believes that his/her religious outlook contains the most 
“fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth” (Altmeyer & Hunsberger, 2004, p. 
50).   The third predictor measures familial upbringing, s-EMBU, which is a standardized 
measure of perceived rearing behavior that a parishioner has regarding his/her parents.  
The fourth predictor measures a parishioner’s intrapsychic God-representation, GIS, 
which is a standardized measure of the perceived presence, challenge, and acceptance 
that a parishioner holds regarding his/her personal God.  The fifth predictor measures 
state self-forgiveness, SSFS, which is a standardized measure of forgiving feelings and 









 Means, standard deviations, reliability coefficients, and correlations among 
predictor variables are presented in Table 2.  The following assumptions of Canonical 
Correlation Analysis (CCA) were tested and met.  A review of Table 2 shows that all 
significant correlations between predictor variables were below .80 with the exception of 
the correlation of OSS and RRFS (r = .82).  However, it is important to note that this 
correlation is not a perfect correlation, which is central to the assumption of 
multicollinearity in CCA.  In order to further test the assumption of multicollinearity, the 
collinearity diagnostics function was employed across three univariate multiple 
regressions, one for each criterion.  Because the VIF was not > 4.0 and Tolerance was not 
< .20 for any of the predictors, multicollinearity was deemed not to be problematic.  
Residual analyses for linearity indicated that each of the univariate models represent a 
linear model between the outcome variables and composites of the predictor variables.  
Since standardized residuals were not > 3 it may be assumed that heteroscedasticity is not 





influential outliers are present.   
Table 3 shows the results for the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality for the psycho-
spiritual belief variables and the psychological well-being variables respectively.  Only 
the variables of perceived parental rearing overprotective, self-forgiveness, scrupulosity, 
and shame met the assumption of normality at the .05 level of significance.  While Hair, 
Anderson, Tatham, and Black (1998) recommend transforming variables that do not meet 
the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality they also state: “Canonical correlation analysis can 
accommodate any metric variable without the strict assumption of normality” (p. 448).  
Moreover, Tabachnick and Fidell (1996) instruct against the transformation of data for 
the reasons that “…an analysis is interpreted from the variables that are in it and 
transformed variables are sometimes harder to interpret” (p. 80).  Therefore, those 
variables not meeting the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality were left unchanged.  Finally, 
systematic error in measurement was assumed not to be problematic due to the fact that 
all instruments employed possessed coefficient alphas above .80 (OSS = .96; RRFS = 
.94; SSFS = .89; GIS = .92; [GIS by subscale: Acceptance = .81; Presence = .96; 
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Challenge = .85]; s-EMBU = .82 [s-EMBU by subscale: Rejection = .91; Emotional 
Warmth = .94; OverProtection =  .87]; PIOS = .94; BDI- 2 = .80; TOSCA- 3 = .82).  











Canonical correlation analysis (CCA) was employed because it allows this 
researcher to simultaneously test the relationship between the criterion variables (i.e., 
scrupulosity, depression, and shame) and predictor variables (i.e., original sin, religious 
fundamentalism, self-forgiveness, parental rearing perceived as rejecting, emotionally 
warm, and overprotective, as well as accepting, presence, and challenging God-
representations) of interest (Sherry & Henson, 2005).  In addition, CCA  
…may best honor the reality of psychological research.  Most human behavior 
research typically investigates variables that possibly have multiple causes and 
multiple effects.  Determining outcomes based on research that separately 
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examines singular causes and effects may distort the complex reality of human 
behavior and cognition (Ibid., p. 38).  
Therefore, a CCA was conducted employing the 9 psycho-spiritual belief variables (i.e., 
religious fundamentalism, original sin, self-forgiveness, accepting, present, and 
challenging God-representations, as well as perceived parental rejection, emotional 
warmth, and overprotection) as predictors of the 3 psychological well-being variables 
(i.e., scrupulosity, depression, and shame) to evaluate the multivariate shared relationship 
between the two variable sets in SPSS Graduate Pack 16.0 for Mac. The analysis yielded 




2) effect sizes of 46.89% and 37.63%.  The third function 
explained only 5.79% of the variance between the predictor and criterion variables.  
Consequently, it was not interpreted.  Table 4 presents the results for the first two 
functions, including the standardized canonical function coefficients and structure 
coefficients.  
Collectively, the full model across all functions was statistically significant 
employing the Wilk’s ∧= .314 criterion, F(27, 646.08) = 11.632, p < .001.  Since Wilk’s  
∧ represents the variance unexplained by the model, 1- ∧ yields the full model effect 
size in an r2 metric.  Therefore, for the set of three canonical functions, the r2 type effect 
size was .686, which indicates that the full model explained a substantial portion, 
approximately 69%, of the variance shared between the variable sets. 
The dimension reduction analysis allows the researcher to test the hierarchical 
arrangement of functions for statistical significance.  As noted, the full model (Functions 
1 to 3) was statistically significant; however, Function 2 to 3 was also statistically 
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significant, F(16, 444) = 8.45, p < .001.  Function 3 did not explain a statistically 
significant amount of shared variance between the variable sets, F(7, 223) = 1.96, p = 
.062. 
Table 4 presents the standardized canonical function coefficients and structure 
coefficients for Functions 1 and 2.  The squared structure coefficients are also given as 
well as the communalities (h2) across the two functions for each variable.  Looking at the 
Function 1 coefficients, one sees that scrupulosity, depression, and shame were all 
relevant, primary criterion variables making contributions to the synthetic criterion 
variable.  This conclusion was supported by the squared structure coefficients.  These 
measures of psychological well-being also had large canonical function coefficients.  
Additionally, all of these variables’ structure coefficients had the same sign, indicating 
that they were all positively related (i.e., correlated). These results suggest that there may 






































Regarding the predictor variable set in Function 1, self-forgiveness was the 
primary contributor to the predictor synthetic variable, with secondary contributions by 
God image acceptance and perceived parental rearing overprotective.  Since the structure 
coefficient for self-forgiveness was negative, it was negatively related to all of the 
measures of psychological well-being (i.e., scrupulosity, depression, and shame).  In 
other words, the more parishioners were able to self-forgive the less scrupulosity, 
depression, and shame they experienced.  On the other hand, God image acceptance and 
perceived parental rearing overprotective were both positively related to the measures of 
psychological well-being.   
Moving to Function 2, the coefficients in Table 4 suggest that scrupulosity was 
the primary relevant criterion variable, with shame making a secondary contribution to 
the synthetic criterion variable.  This conclusion was supported by the squared structure 
coefficients.  These measures of psychological well-being also tended to have the larger 
canonical function coefficients.  Moreover, since the variables’ structure coefficients did 
not have the same sign these psychiatric conditions were inversely related on this 
function.  Regarding psycho-spiritual beliefs, religious fundamentalism and original sin 
were the dominant predictors with God image presence making a secondary contribution.  
These religious beliefs were positively related with the exception of God image presence 
which was inversely related to religious fundamentalism and original sin.  Looking at the 
structure coefficients for the entire function, we see that: (1) religious fundamentalism 
was positively associated with scrupulosity and inversely related to shame; (2) original 
sin was positively associated with scrupulosity and inversely related to shame; and (3) 
God image presence was inversely associated with scrupulosity and positively associated 
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with shame.  In concert, these results were generally supportive of the theoretically 



























Addressing Questions and Hypotheses 
 
This researcher hypothesized that parishioner scrupulosity, depression, and shame 
are associated with degree of belief in original sin (Hypotheses 1-3), with greater belief 
fostering more obsessions concerning fear of sin and God’s punishment as well as 
neutralizing compulsions (Hypothesis 1).  In addition, greater belief in original sin was 
also hypothesized to be positively associated with depressive symptomatology 
(Hypothesis 2) and feelings of shame (Hypothesis 3).  Results partially support these 
hypotheses as degree of belief in the theological doctrine of original sin is positively 
associated with scrupulosity disorder and negatively associated with shame, but showed 
no relationship to depression.  
The finding that greater degrees of belief in original sin is positively associated 
with heightened scrupulous symptomatology (Hypothesis 1) is not surprising in light of 
relevant theory and research.  At the heart of scrupulous obsessions are fears of sin and 
God’s punishment (Abramowitz, 2008; Abramowitz et al., 2002; Hood, Hill, & Spilka, 
2009; Miller & Hedges, 2008).  It seems plausible, then, that parental, clerical, and 
institutional messages that stress humanity’s characterological ineptness to fully enter 
into a loving relationship with God might hinder mental health; especially, when this 
perpetual “falling short of the glory of God” (Romans 3:23, NRSV) requires constant 
score-keeping of one’s transgressions, lest God’s judgment beset the believer.  
Abramowitz and colleagues (2004) speculate about the relationship between sin-as-state 
and obsessive-compulsive disorder by stating that certain Christian doctrines encourage 
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parishioners “to view themselves as inherently sinful and to pray for forgiveness of their 
sins, including sinful thoughts” (p. 75).  Due to the fact that scrupulosity disorder is a 
disorder of one hundred percentness (Osborn, 2008) the stringent morality of thought 
emphasized by many Christian faiths may facilitate scrupulous obsessions (Abramowitz 
et al., 2002).  Such one hundred percentness is underscored in the parishioner’s 
confession of sins.   
Epidemiological research by Osborn (2008) shows that prior to the Renaissance 
scrupulosity disorder was relatively rare; however, with the Catholic church’s re-
evaluation of moral theology and new emphasis on the personal confession of all possible 
sins the Christian was left to wonder if s/he had adequately confessed all wrongdoings: 
“By the end of the Renaissance…scrupulosity had become a virtual epidemic; mild cases 
were considered normal, and large numbers of guilt-ridden Christians suffered 
desperately.  The advent of scrupulosity mirrored new developments in the Catholic rite 
of confession” (Ibid., p. 36).  Foucault (2000a, b, c) makes a similar point in his analysis 
on pastorship noting that ceaseless self-examination and awareness of one’s conscience 
are the tools clergy employ to exert power over their parishioners.  In this case, proper 
confession requires pastoral knowledge of all the parishioner’s public and private (i.e., 
cognitive or private) sins.  Sica et al. (2002) purport that religious teachings that highlight 
high moral standards, rigid cognitive processes, prohibitions, and purity “are linked to 
OC phenomena” (p. 821).   
The Christian tradition has a lengthy history of fostering one-sided solutions.  As 
discussed earlier, a one-sided solution is an aspect of negative religious coping that 
involves negative religious framing (Pargament, 1997).  In an attempt to maintain the 
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benevolence of God religious persons may impute wrongdoing to the self by highlighting 
their sinful state and sinful acts.  This is consistent with findings that religious individuals 
tend to consider positive self-attitudes incongruous with true piety (Branden, 1994; 
Watson et al., 1985).  Consequently, parishioners may experience religious strain (Exline, 
2002; Exline et al., 2000) around the “fact” that they are “worthless sinners incapable of 
pleasing God on their own,” yet are expected to meet stringent moral standards composed 
of a myriad of prohibitions regarding acceptable thoughts and behaviors.  The dissonance 
inherent in this religious strain may facilitate a torturous cycle in which the parishioner 
feels morally impotent to adequately fulfill God’s laws, yet feels a Divine responsibility 
to enact them as commanded.  Failure to accomplish these imperatives reinforces his/her 
impotence engendering anxiety and fear regarding his/her perceived failure.  In turn, the 
parishioner may develop the impetus to “try harder” while engaging in anxiety reducing 
behaviors— such as repeatedly mumbling, “Please forgive me Lord for my sins,”— in 
order not be punished or be found in a state of sin.   
The idea that human beings are inherently inept is a fundamental tenet of Western 
Christianity.  It may not be expressed as such, but most clergy would be quick to point 
out that without such a presupposition the soteriological role of Jesus would not be 
necessary.  While the theological merits of arguments such as these are outside the scope 
of this document the belief itself is at the core of this analysis.  Sacred text and religious 
tradition are at the epicenter of understanding the negative relationship between belief in 
the doctrine of original sin and shame (Hypothesis 3) as well as the negative relationship 
between religious fundamentalism and shame (Hypothesis 6).  While these results did not 
support the hypothesized direction of the relationship between original sin and shame, 
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and religious fundamentalism and shame their negative relationship may be revealing 
shared psychological processes that are equally important.  For this reason these 
outcomes will be addressed simultaneously.    
Cox (2009), Hood and colleagues (2005), Mardsen (2006), Pagels (1988), and 
Sandeen (1970) unanimously highlight the fundamental role the biblical text plays in 
informing the fundamentalist Christian’s worldview.  As such, the interpreted text has 
much to say about oneself, the world, and others. While interpretations may differ across 
Christian faiths, for parishioners of more conservative traditions these interpretations tend 
to be quite literal (Cox, 2009).  Because Western Christianity understands the Christian 
Scriptures (i.e., the “New” Testament) to be a Hegelian progression or realization of the 
Hebrew Scriptures (i.e., the “Old” Testament), the biblical myth of Adam and Eve 
contains the anthropological germ by which humanity can understand its relationship to 
God and self.  From the earliest centuries of Christian apologetics this relationship has 
focused on the rebellious and usurpious nature of humanity vis-à-vis a holy God who in 
“his” infinite justice cursed humanity according to their original trespass.  This “original 
sin,” described spatially as “the fall,” underscores the concomitant inadequacies 
possessed by all subsequent children of humanity.  Niebuhr (1996) quotes St. Augustine:   
Man’s [sic] nature was indeed at first created faultless and without sin; but nature 
as man [sic] has it into which everyone who is born from Adam, wants the 
Physician, being no longer in a healthy state.  All good qualities which it still 
possesses…it has from the most High God, its Creator and Maker.  But the flaw 
which darkens and weakens all these natural goods, it has not contracted from its 
blameless Creator…but from that original sin [emphasis in original] which it 
 
  124 
committed of its own free will [emphasis in original] (pp. 2421-242).  
The Swiss reformer John Calvin (1536/1845) states more forcefully: 
Adam was made the depository of the endowments which God was pleased to 
bestow on human nature, and that, therefore, when he lost what he had received, 
he lost not only for himself but for us all… Thus from a corrupt root corrupt 
branches proceeding, transmit their corruption to the saplings which spring from 
them.  The children being vitiated in their parents, conveyed the taint to the 
grandchildren; in other words, corruption commencing in Adam, is, by perpetual 
descent, conveyed from those proceedings to those coming after them… Children 
come not by spiritual regeneration but carnal descent.  Accordingly, as Augustine 
says, “Both the condemned unbeliever and the acquitted believer beget offspring 
not acquitted but condemned, because the nature which begets is 
corrupt.”…Original sin, then, may be defined a hereditary corruption and 
depravity of our nature, extending to all parts of the soul, which first makes us 
obnoxious to the wrath of God, and then produces in us works which in Scripture 
are termed works of the flesh… Hence even infants bringing their condemnation 
with them from their mother’s womb, suffer not for another’s, but for their own 
defect.  For although they have not yet produced the fruits of their own 
unrighteousness, they have the seed implanted in them.  Nay, their whole nature 
is, as it were, a seed-bed of sin, and therefore cannot but be odious and 
abominable to God (Bk. 2, Ch. 1, Sec. 7-8).  
The emerging portrait of humanity is one of global deficiency.  Even in Christian 
faiths where the theological concept of grace is presupposed to mitigate unhealthy 
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psychiatric outcomes (Watson et al., 1998c) most forms of grace require the believer to 
resign all personal volition and efficacy in receiving and enacting or “living in” such 
grace.  The impetus behind these rules of thumb are based in the assumptions of original 
sin and belief in original sin is a staple of fundamental Christian religion.  In other words, 
human beings as human beings are incapable of receiving and living in God’s grace 
because they are inept sinners and true believers must accept this tenet as gospel if they 
are to consider themselves part of the elect.  Consequently, only God can draw humanity 
to accept this grace and then empower the believer to live in such grace.  In either case, 
subscription to the belief that human beings are wholly deficient is inextricably bound up 
with religious fundamentalism because it is perceived to be a literal, biblical teaching.    
 These fundamental tenets of Western Christianity are not vague concepts.  Indeed, 
they are the lenses through which many parishioners are instructed to view themselves, 
the world, and others.  This is supported by research which suggests that Christian dogma 
highlights the shortcomings, failures, and trespasses of the self (Berecz & Helm, 1998; 
Pattison, 2000).  Therefore, these religious beliefs become part and parcel of the 
parishioner’s worldview.  Since shame requires the evaluation of the self by the self in 
response to subjective feelings of being seen (Kaufman, 1996, M. Lewis, 1995, Pattison, 
2000) it is not difficult to envisage how years of Christian indoctrination in a core belief 
by a religious system that stresses the ineptness of the self would result in shame-prone 
parishioners; however, results suggest that this core belief and religious system are 
negatively associated with shame.   
A possible explanation for these outcomes is that the fundamentalist religious 
system itself, along with its a priori beliefs, may insulate its parishioners from shame by 
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limiting their involvement in-the-world.  In order for a person to experience the 
subjective feelings of shame s/he must engage his/her world in such a manner that 
exposes his/her worldview to possible change and in some instances scrutiny.  In other 
words, to fully engage the world means that one must be open to other systems of thought 
and ways of Being that may be novel and even discomforting.  Research suggests that 
parishioners who engage society in a limited fashion usually hold more religious 
fundamentalist beliefs (Altmeyer & Hunsberger, 2004), which is consistent with the 
composition of this sample.  In addition, religious fundamentalists have also been found 
not to value freedom of scientific inquiry, tolerance, and newspaper reading—activities 
that require significant engagement with ideas that may be diametrically opposed to their 
religious values (Rigney & Hoffman, 1993).  Poland’s findings that Church of Christ 
parishioners, a denomination that is typically more conservative than mainline churches, 
score significantly higher on other-directed shoulds and tough-mindedness than Church 
of Religious Science attendees, echo these sentiments of rigidity and close-mindedness 
among the religious conservative.  Hence, it is conceivable that such parishioners 
experience less shame due to the fact that shameful affect requires that a person feel seen 
and/or exposed before others (Pattison, 2000) yet their religious communities limit such 
interactions by emphasizing communion with the ecclesial community where core beliefs 
tend to be shared.  Therefore, the more parishioners retreat into their insular church 
worlds they limit the situations in which they may experience shame.     
While symptom reduction is usually encouraging, this does not seem to be the 
case here.  What these results suggest is that religious fundamentalist systems that 
espouse an inept view of the self do not furnish the parishioner with sufficient internal 
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resources to engage the world in a healthier manner.  Additionally, they also suggest that 
parishioners who hold such inept views of the self may belong to religiously rigid faith 
communities that restrict psychological growth.   
Although this reality may provide comfort, solace, and happiness, it may also lock 
the believer in and prevent effective living.  To decide whether it does, we must 
assess the effects of this reality on the individual’s life; we must consider not only 
whether it is experienced [emphasis in original] as liberating or enslaving but also 
whether it functions [emphasis in original] to liberate or to enslave (Batson, 
Schoenrade, & Ventis, 1993, p. 198).        
These results may be indicators that such psycho-religious beliefs may function in 
psychologically enslaving ways. 
It was also hypothesized that parishioner scrupulosity, depression, and shame are 
positively associated with parishioner degree of religious strictness (i.e., fundamentalism) 
(Hypotheses 4-6), with greater degrees of fundamentalism associated with more 
scrupulosity (Hypothesis 4), depression (Hypothesis 5), and shame (Hypothesis 6—
discussed above).  These hypotheses were partially supported in that greater degrees of 
religious fundamentalism were positively associated with scrupulosity, negatively 
associated with shame, but showed no relationship with depression.     
CCA results suggest that parishioners who hold more religious fundamentalist 
views experience increased obsessions and fears regarding sin and God’s punishment as 
well as compulsively engage in more neutralizing behavior(s) (Hypothesis 4). These 
results are consistent with theory and research which suggest that fundamentalist 
parishioners are at greater risk for developing scrupulosity disorder because of the 
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premium their religious traditions place on thought control (Abramowitz et al., 2004; 
Cohen & Rozin, 2001; Rassin & Koster, 2003, Sica et al., 2002).  In fact, the over 
importance of thoughts and the excessive concern about the importance of controlling 
one’s thoughts are two of the six prominent obsessive-compulsive belief domains 
considered to foster scrupulosity disorder (The Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions 
Working Group, 1997).  In addition, it stands to reason that the essential fundamental of 
biblical inerrancy (Cox, 2009) plays a significant role in perpetuating perhaps the most 
pernicious cognitive catastrophic misinterpretation associated with scrupulosity, 
perfectionism (Ibid., Osborn, 2008).   
For religious fundamentalists Scripture is to be interpreted literally wherever it 
lends itself to literal interpretation (Mardsen, 2006).  Therefore, biblical admonitions to 
holiness are understood to be Divine mandates.  For example, Ephesians 5:27 (NRSV) 
states that the church (i.e., the corporate body of believers) should be “without spot or 
wrinkle… holy and without blemish.”  Hebrews 12:14 (NRSV) encourages the 
parishioner to pursue “holiness without which no one [italics added] will see the Lord,” 
and 1 Peter 1:15-16 (NRSV) instructs the believer to be holy “in all your conduct [italics 
added]; for it is written, ‘You shall be [italics added] holy, for I am holy.”  Parishioners 
of more orthodox Christian faiths are typically taught that failure to comply with such 
imperatives renders them liable to God’s wrath and punishment both terrestrially and in 
the after life.  Consequently, parishioners with stronger fundamentalist beliefs may be 
more likely to engage in TAF, which takes the primary forms of “magical” and “as-if” 
thinking (Rachman, 1997).   
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Due to the fact that in as-if thinking thoughts are synonymous with actions (Ibid., 
Muris et al., 2001), the scrupulous person lives under the ever-present stress of attaining 
God-like perfection in the cognitive and performance domains of life.  Consequently, the 
anxiety that ensues from the fear of possibly transgressing against such stringent demands 
is understandably crippling.  Therefore, these results, which indicate that parishioners 
with greater fundamentalist beliefs concomitantly engage in more neutralizing 
compulsions, make sense.  It should also be noted that scrupulous persons whose 
obsessions are of the repugnant taxonomy engage in self-affirming rituals such as 
checking by proxy and developing cognitions of goodness and safety (Abramowitz et al., 
2002; Hood et al., 2009; Miller & Hedges, 2008; Purdon, 2008; Sica et al., 2002; 
Steketee et al., 1991).  The fact that parishioners with higher fundamentalist scores seek 
self-affirmation from religious leaders, friends, and loved ones as a means to placate their 
obsessive fears of sin and God’s punishment suggests that the self has suffered significant 
insult.            
 Additional hypotheses stated that parishioner scrupulosity, depression and shame 
are associated with parishioner God-representations (Hypotheses 7-15).  These 
hypotheses were partially supported in that non-accepting God-representations were 
positively associated with scrupulosity (Hypothesis 7), depression (Hypothesis 8), and 
shame (Hypothesis 9) and non-present God-representations were negatively associated 
with scrupulosity (Hypothesis 10) as well as positively associated with shame 
(Hypothesis 12); hypotheses 11, 13, 14, and 15 were not supported.   
Non-accepting God-representations were positively associated with obsessions 
and fears of sin and God’s punishment with concomitant neutralizing compulsions among 
 
  130 
parishioners (Hypothesis 7). Given that the acceptance subscale of the GIS is a measure 
of rudimentary goodness (Lawrence, 1997) and answers the questions, “Am I good 
enough to be loved;” and “Am I good enough for God to love;” these findings are 
sensible.  For the committed Christian, being near to God signifies spiritual health and 
growth in holiness or sanctity.  In essence, such feelings of communion with the Divine 
are indicators that the believer is “fighting the good fight” (1 Timothy 1:18c, NRSV) in 
his/her spiritual journey.  In other words, under such circumstances the person feels that 
s/he is “good enough” for God to love.  As previously elucidated, the verb to sanctify 
denotes a positive separation in that it signifies that the parishioner has been separated for 
God.  This separation or consecration is a product of holiness—the Greek word hagios, 
which means “holy” is also translated as “sanctity;” therefore, the state of holiness and 
the act of sanctification are inextricably bound-up together.  Notwithstanding, to grow in 
holiness necessarily means that the believer must remain sinless due to the theological 
tenet that God is holy and cannot dwell where sin exists:  
Abide in me as I abide in you.  Just as the branches cannot bear fruit by itself 
unless it abides in the vine, neither can you unless you abide in me.  I am the vine, 
you are the branches… Whoever does not abide in me is thrown away like a 
branch and withers; such branches are gathered, thrown into the fire, and 
burned… If you keep my commandments [italics added], you will abide in my 
love… (John 15:4-5a, 6, 10a, NRSV).  
Sin too separates, but in an expulsing manner away from God.  Hence, when a 
believer transgresses against God, self, or neighbor s/he may become acutely aware of the 
cognition that s/he has been separated from God; or better said, that God has separated 
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God’s self from him/her.  In such instances the believer may feel that s/he is “not good 
enough” for God to love.  When Divine love, care, presence, and ministrations are 
perceived to be contingent on the parishioner’s “goodness” and/or “badness” the 
attachment between the believer-child and God-parent may be likened to the anxious-
ambivalent attachment where the fear of separation engenders anticipatory anxiety and 
results in a deeply emotional, all-consuming, and obsessive relationship to the love-object 
(Granqvist & Kirkpatrick, 2008; Papalia, Wendkos Olds, & Duskin Feldman, 2002).  
Hence, it is not difficult to imagine why parishioners with greater non-accepting God-
representations experience increased scrupulosity.  The obsessive quality of the 
relationship may heighten the parishioner’s sense of responsibility and perfectionism, two 
of the six catastrophic misinterpretations associated with obsessive-compulsive disorder 
and scrupulosity (The Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group, 1997).  Due to 
the fact that the most common religious obsessions include committing sins, blasphemy, 
hell, God’s punishment, sex, and aggression (Abramowitz, 2008; Abramowitz et al., 
2002; Miller & Hedges, 2008; Steketee et al., 1991) scrupulous symtomatology itself 
reinforces the believer’s perceptions: (1) “God is not present”; (2) “God cannot be 
present because of my sinful thoughts and behavior;” (3) “I am unacceptable to God and 
it’s my fault”; and (4) “The fact that I am unacceptable to God means that I am not good 
enough for God to love.”             
CCA results suggest non-accepting God-representations are positively associated 
with depressive symptomatology (Hypothesis 8).  Such finding is not surprising given 
previous research which suggests that feeling alienated from God is a strong predictor of 
depression (Exline, 2002; Exline et al., 2000).  Such research suggests that negative self-
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appraisals play an important role in these feelings of estrangement.  The current findings, 
however, deepen our understanding of how these feelings of disunion may operate.   
As previously noted, the acceptance subscale of the GIS is a measure of 
rudimentary goodness (Lawrence, 1997).  As such, it answers two basic yet related 
questions: “Am I good enough to be loved;” “Am I good enough for God to love?”  
Research shows that children whose primary caregivers are neglectful, inconsistent, 
untrustworthy, as well as verbally, physically, and sexually abusive tend to possess non-
accepting God-representations in later life (Balthazar, 2007; Goodman & Manierre, 2008; 
Reinert & Edwards, 2009).  Sound psychological theory allows us to reason that the 
parent-child relationship, which anchors and informs all other relationships in life, 
teaches such children that they are “not good enough” to receive the most essential, life-
validating and human inclusive affect of all, love.  In turn, the child develops a primitive 
intrapsychic God-representation that either corresponds to their wounded experience of 
the primary objects or creates a compensated representation of the divine in an attempt to 
rectify the parental objects’ shortcomings (Granqvist & Kirkpatrick, 2008).  In either 
case, the child turned parishioner is likely to be left with nagging adverse self-attributions 
regarding issues of primitive goodness and acceptance.  Consequently, the perfectionistic 
nature of higher levels of religious fundamentalist demands and the central soteriological 
Christian tenet that human beings are in essence sinful, inept, and depraved beings may 
promote or exacerbate depressive symptomatology for those parishioners who feel that 
God’s acceptance is conditional. 
Non-accepting God-representations were positively associated with shame 
(Hypothesis 9).  As previously stated, the acceptance subscale of the GIS asks the 
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fundamental question, “Am I good enough for God to love” (Lawrence, 1997).  The 
“simple” answer usually provided by more conservative Christian faith groups to this 
question is, “No!  No one is good enough for God to love.”  This staunch response is 
based in the anthropological tenet that human beings possess a base nature that requires 
transcendence (Mardsen, 2006).  Transcendence, however, is not a product of human will 
or desire, but of God’s grace.  A grace that cannot be resisted— Augustine refers to it as 
prevenient and Calvin as irresistible— and which purports to ontologically alter the 
believer.  Therefore, this transcendence is often spoken of in terms of re-birth (e.g., being 
“born again”).  This spiritual re-birth notwithstanding, the believer does not enjoy nor 
partake of the Adamic nature.  On the contrary, sin continues to be an integral experience 
of the re-born condition.  What changes is the parishioner’s painful awareness (i.e., s/he 
becomes wary) of each cognitive and/or enacted sin and the concomitant consequences 
for such transgressions.  Due to the theological assertion that “God the Father’s” holy 
nature does not permit “him” to abide in the presence of the slightest hint of imperfection 
or taint it is incumbent upon the re-born son or daughter to transcend even this spiritual 
state.  The new plane of spiritual existence is that of holiness.   
Traditional Christian language makes it very clear that even in a state of re-birth 
there exists a true absence of God in the life of the believer.  Indeed, the believer is 
literally not good enough to be accepted by God before or after his/her conversion.  The 
theological language of justification explicates this.  The doctrine of justification is 
modeled after the legal system in which a criminal stands before a judge for sentencing.  
In this case, the prosecutor may be described as the Divine Law, which convicts all those 
who have transgressed against it, or as Satan, whose role in the Divine Council (see Job 
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chapter 1) is to accuse or instigate.  The defense attorney is Jesus the Christ (i.e., the 
Messiah) who satisfies the judge’s demand for justice with his very blood—the 
understanding is that the accused sinner is ontologically incapable of paying his/her own 
debt and that only God “himself” can satisfy humanity’s sin debt.  Therefore, the 
theological construct of justification teaches that the judge’s (i.e. God’s) wrath is satisfied 
by Jesus’ death on the cross.  Therefore, when the sinful believer stands before God for 
judgment the only reason God can stand the presence of the believer is because God is 
gazing at the blood of Jesus (i.e., Jesus) in the re-birthed person.  In other words, God is 
looking at the justice of Christ and not at that of the believers’.  Hence, God’s gaze is not 
fixed upon the person as such, but essentially upon “himself” because the believer is not 
good enough to be contemplated by his/her “Heavenly Father.” 
Most conservative Christian faiths are imbued with the message that humanity is 
“not good enough.”  In fact, “If humanity were good enough,” they would argue, “it 
would be able to save itself.”  These salient messages of inadequacy may injure the self 
in various ways.  It may very well be that the feelings of exposure that the shame-prone 
parishioner experiences proceed most directly from the institutional church and her 
leaders (i.e., clergy, Sunday school teachers, etc.) who mediate in very real ways the 
adjudicating presence of God.  In this sense they are God’s proxies present for the 
moment of judgment.  These proxies may also activate the parishioner’s private God-
representation who in more conservative religious circles is likely to possess subtle to 
blatant characteristics of non-acceptance. Research by Shariff and Norenzayan (2007) 
suggests that even slight activation of these mechanisms, by which parishioners feel that 
they are being watched by God, increases pro-social behavior.  Such findings further 
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suggest that parishioners may feel that their current behavior, when exposed before God, 
is not good enough therefore requiring reparative works of social good.  There exists an 
uncanny resemblance between the god-like figures of childhood that are employed as 
pedagogical instruments in educating our children that they must be good enough to 
receive an end reward and the Christian God whom we have created in our own image 
(Freud, n.d.).  The god-like qualities of Santa Clause, who “sees you when you’re 
sleeping,” who “knows when you’re awake,” and who “knows if you’ve been bad or 
good…” are the same qualities possessed by the parishioner’s private God.  A God who 
constantly sees, always knows, and scrupulously keeps a twice-checked list of the inept 
parishioner’s trespasses cannot be experienced as anything other than “a shame-
generating monster” (Pattison, 2000, p. 241) even by those who have been justified.    
Another finding related to the relationship between God-representations and 
psychological well-being is that God-representations imbued with components of divine 
absence are negatively associated with scrupulous symtomatology (Hypothesis 10). 
Though this particular result may appear to contradict the findings of hypothesis 7, it is in 
fact completely harmonious with the research literature regarding religious strain (Exline, 
2002; Exline et al., 2000) that suggests religious strains and comforts operate 
independently of each other (Harris et al., 2008).  The presence subscale of the GIS is 
primarily a measure of belonging (Lawrence, 1997).  Therefore it asks and seeks to 
answer two separate yet related questions, “Do I belong;” and “Is God there for me?”  At 
first glance it may seem counterintuitive to endorse a statement along the following lines: 
“For every one-unit increment in the perception ‘I do not belong, therefore God is not 
there for me,’ there is approximately a three quarters of a symptom decrease in 
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scrupulosity.”  However, for parishioners struggling with obsessions concerning fear of 
sin and God’s punishment the further removed God is perceived to be from the believer 
the more psychic relief s/he enjoys.  It seems reasonable that this would be the case since 
the scrupulous parishioner’s obsessions of moral perfection, uncertainty about committed 
and forgiven sins, along with all sorts of doubts and disagreeable thoughts would escape 
the direct scrutiny of the Panopticon (Foucault, 2000a); or in Nietzschean (trans. 1969) 
terms, the parishioner would attain some respite from the maddening eyes of God: 
“…eyes that saw everything—he [God] saw the depths and abysses of man [sic], all 
man’s [sic] hidden disgrace and ugliness “ (p. 278).   
These results indicate that God’s perceived presence or lack thereof can be both 
comforting and distressing.  For parishioner’s with salient scrupulous obsessions and 
compulsions, feeling that s/he is not in a symbiotic relationship with God, therefore 
experiencing greater degrees of God’s perceived absence, serves to mitigate scrupulous 
symptomatology.  On the other hand, for parishioners whose private God is less 
accepting, greater distance may be equated with internal attributions that foster 
scrupulosity.                      
Non-present God-representations are positively associated with greater shame 
(Hypothesis 12).  This finding is sensible in light of M. Lewis’ (1995) cognitive 
attribution theory.  According to M. Lewis, the affective experience of shame requires: 
(1) pre-established norms and standards; (2) personal evaluation of the transgressed 
standards; and (3) an intropunitive attribution of the self.  Research consistently shows 
that parishioners reared in more fundamentalist homes are at greater risk for developing 
shame-prone selves, especially when religious beliefs are introspective, punitive, and 
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harsh (Ibid., Pattison, 2000).  Though this study did not collect demographic data 
regarding whether participants were born into religious homes, given that approximately 
53% of the sample belonged to their respective faith traditions more than 20 years and 
that approximately 33% were between the ages of 18 to 34, it stands to reason that a 
substantial number of participating parishioners were reared in a religious environment.  
Further, the majority of the sample espoused above average fundamentalist views (the 
theoretical mean of the RRFS is 65 and the actual sample M = 69.4, SD  = 30.21).  
Therefore, it may be conservatively argued that a fair number of participants were reared 
in religious environments that traditionally emphasize adherence to stringent moral norms 
and religious behaviors.  These familial and institutional codes function as “internalized 
judges” (H. B. Lewis, 1987, p. 15; M. Lewis, 1995).  Therefore, when the parishioner 
transgresses s/he may experience acute feelings of filth, defilement, deficiency, and being 
put on display (Kaufman, 1996; M. Lewis, 1995; Pattison, 2000), accompanied by desires 
to hide, shrink, disappear and even die (Tangney & Dearing, 2002).   
Such shame responses arise from the super-ego’s judgment of the self.  The 
representational world of parental, institutional, and god-objects, which reside in the 
depths of the super-ego, adjudicate without impunity.  Suddenly the piercing gaze of 
these objects shines a bright light upon the darkest recesses of the human soul.  For 
highly devout parishioners the complex relationship between parental, institutional, and 
god-objects may be more salient in the parishioner’s God-representation.  Subsequently, 
all mediated and non-mediated forms of God’s perceived gaze may produce the following 
global self attribution—actually experienced by this researcher the first time he entered a 
movie theatre at age 22: (1) “The church teaches that it is a sin to go to the movie theatre.  
 
  138 
They (i.e., authority figures that mediate God) also say that if Jesus returns while you 
happen to be at the theatre you will be ‘left behind;” (2) “Well now that I’m here, ‘I pray 
Lord, that you’ll forgive me of my sin and help me not to feel so anxious;” (3) “My acute 
anxiety and feelings of guilt serve to confirm that I am seriously sinning against God.  
How can I call myself a true Christian?”  The global attribution made in that particular 
instance was that I was deficient, a defector, and a horrible sinner.  While God’s gaze was 
searing there was a concomitant experience of God as “not there for me.”  The dilemma 
the fervent believer faces when s/he transgresses can be summed, “How can God be there 
for me when I am not there for God?”  For parishioners who experience greater degrees 
of God’s absence the self-attributions that are likely to predominate are those of disgust, 
inadequacy, lack of goodness, and failure (Baldwin et al., 2006; M. Lewis, 1995).  These 
attributions tend to increase phenomenological experiences of shame and contribute to 
more global, stable, negative self-attributions (M. Lewis, 1995; Tangney & Dearing, 
2002).  Therefore it appears that non-present God-representation that are positively 
associated with shame are injurious to the self.    
It was also hypothesized that parishioner scrupulosity, depression, and shame are 
impacted by the parishioner’s ability to self-forgive with psychiatric symptoms adversely 
increasing with an inability to self-forgive and psychiatric symptoms decreasing with 
increased ability to self-forgive (Hypotheses 16-18).  These hypotheses were fully 
supported as self-forgiveness was negatively associated with scrupulosity (Hypothesis 
16), depression (Hypothesis 17), and shame (Hypothesis 18) respectively.  In fact, it was 
the primary contributor to the predictor synthetic variable in Function 1.  These results 
were expected given that research shows consistent negative relationships between self-
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forgiveness and depression, anxiety, shame, and neuroticism (Fisher & Exline, 2006; Hall 
& Fincham, 2005; Mauger et al., 1992; Mullet et al., 2005; Ross et al., 2004).  Moreover, 
the covariance between non-accepting God-representations and self-forgiveness as well 
the covariance of parental rearing practices perceived as rejecting and self-forgiveness 
suggest that parishioners whose God-representation are more accepting and for whom 
parental rearing practices are not overprotective are better able to self-forgive (see Table 
4).  These findings are consistent with research that links neuroticism with difficulty 
engaging in intrapersonal forgiveness (Mullet et al., 2005; Ross et al., 2004, 2007).  Since 
overprotective parenting styles are predictive of neuroticism (Arrindell et al., 1999; 
Magnussen, 1991) it stands to reason that parishioners with overprotective perceptions of 
parental rearing would have difficulty self-forgiving.  In addition, since the accepting 
subscale of the GIS is a measure of rudimentary goodness and answers the basic 
question, “Am I good enough,” (Lawrence, 1997) it is also sensible that parishioners who 
have difficulty accepting their intrinsic goodness would also struggle to self-forgive.            
Additional hypotheses posited that: (a) parishioner parental rearing practices 
perceived as overprotective would be positively associated with obsessions concerning 
fear of sin and God’s punishment as well as neutralizing compulsions (Hypothesis 19);  
(b) greater perception of overprotective parenting would be positively associated with 
depression (Hypothesis 20); and that parental rearing perceived as overprotective would 
be positively associated with feelings of shame (Hypothesis 21).  These hypotheses were 
fully supported as perceived parental over-protectiveness was positively associated with 
scrupulosity, depression, and shame among parishioners. 
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The positive association between greater levels of perceived parental 
overprotection and scrupulosity disorder (Hypothesis 19) is consistent with research in 
the symptom formation of obsessive-compulsive disorder (Lennertz, Grabe, Ruhrmann, 
Rampacher, Vogeley, Schilze-Rauschenbach, Ettelt, Meyer, Kraft, Reck, Pukrop, John, 
Freyberger, Klosterkotter, Maier, Fallcai, & Wagner, 2010; Wilcox, Grados, Samuels, 
Riddle, Bienvenu, Pinto, Cullen, Wang, Shugart, Liang, & Nestadt, 2008).  While this 
investigator is not aware of any research that tests this relationship directly, due to the 
fact that scrupulosity disorder is a subtype of OCD it stands to reason that both disorders 
may share some of the same etiological factors (Abramowitz, 2008).   Based on prior 
research one may surmise that maternal over-protectiveness is predictive of scrupulosity 
disorder and that paternal care serves as a protective factor (Wilcox et al., 2008).  It may 
also be deduced that parental OCD is not predictive of scrupulosity disorder (Ibid; 
Lennertz et al., 2010).  Therefore, one of the factors that seems to matter most in the 
development of obsessive-compulsive type disorders is the restricting nature present in 
the parent-child relationship; a relationship which may have similar dynamics as rigid 
forms of religiosity.  While these results may not neatly map onto the pathological course 
of scrupulosity disorder they may serve as a heuristic for understanding the complex 
relationship between familial upbringing and scrupulosity. 
 Indeed, it appears that parenting perceived as rigid and restricting (i.e., 
overprotective) also shares a positive relationship with depression (Hypothesis 20).  
Research with religiously fundamentalist families suggests that they are characterized by 
rigidity and higher levels of enmeshment (Denton & Denton, 1992; Whipple, 19987).  
These findings help qualify the small effect size found in the significant, positive 
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correlation between religious fundamentalism and overprotective parental rearing noted 
in Table 2.  Research consistently shows that when parental overprotection is elevated 
persons tend to engage in coping styles, such as self-blame, rumination, day-dreaming, 
and miracle-seeking, that inhibits their effectiveness in metabolizing stressors, thus 
contributing to depressive symptomatology (Uehara, Sakado, Sato, & Someya, 1999).  
Moreover, Magnussen (1991) has concluded that children of overinvolved (i.e., 
overprotective) parents tend to express depressive symptomatology at clinical levels.  
Such results have been consistently reported in the literature by Dugen, Sham, Mime, 
Lee, and Murray (1998), MacKinnon, Henderson, and Andrews (1993), Plantes, Prusoff, 
Breman, and Parker (1988) as well as by Shah & Waller (2000).  As discussed above in 
hypothesis 12, due to the fact that it may be conservatively argued that a fair number of 
participants were reared in religiously conservative environments it seems plausible that 
shared religious and familial rigidity may be the mechanism by which parishioners in this 
sample deleteriously experience depression.  
The finding that parental overprotection is positively associated with shame 
among parishioners (Hypothesis 21) was also expected.  Research suggests that 
overprotective parents set and enforce boundaries rigidly, engage in controlling and 
restrictive parenting behavior, require detailed accounting of their children’s 
whereabouts, plans, and activities, and are generally described as anxious worriers 
(Arrindell et al., 1999).  Since shame concerns the global self’s perception that it is 
inadequate, incompetent, and defective (Kaufman, 1996l Pattison, 2000; Tangney & 
Dearing, 2002) it is not difficult to imagine how an overprotective parenting style may 
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create shame-prone individuals.  In an attempt to assuage their own anxieties, 
overprotective parents put their children’s sense of self  “on display.”   
It was further hypothesized that parishioner parental rearing practices perceived as 
rejecting would be positively associated with depression (Hypothesis 22) and shame 
(Hypothesis 23).  These hypotheses were not supported.  
Finally, this researcher hypothesized that parental rearing practices perceived as 
emotionally warm by the parishioner would be negatively associated with scrupulosity 
(Hypothesis 24), depression (Hypothesis 25), and shame (Hypothesis 26) respectively.  
Counter to these hypotheses, support was found wanting in the CCA.  Therefore, 
perceived parental rearing as emotionally warm was not negatively associated with 
scrupulosity, depression or shame among parishioners (Hypotheses 24-26). 
Additional findings of interest that are predictive in nature and not hypothesized 
about in this analysis may be consulted in Appendix L.  
Evaluating the Cylindrical Model of Psycho-Spiritual Abuse 
The goal of this study is to contribute to the current body of research literature as 
it pertains to religiosity and psychological well-being in a meaningful manner.  
Specifically, this study has tested nuanced aspects of religious beliefs and their 
relationship to the psychological maladies of scrupulosity, depression, and shame.  
Additionally, this author believes that to test these relationships independent of familial 
upbringing is misguided and myopic as both theory and research suggest that the 
beginnings of religion are familial.  Therefore, based on theory and available research, a 
model of psycho-spiritual abuse encapsulating specific domains of religious beliefs and 
familial upbringing was developed and submitted to statistical scrutiny.  The analyses 
undertaken are consistent with admonitions in the field to explore those aspects organic 
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to religiosity that may be associated with specific psychological disturbances (Bergin, 
1992; Exline, 2002; Exline et al., 2000; Flannelly et al., 2009; Harris et al., 2008; Heise 
& Steitz, 1991; Smith et al., 2003; Miller & Hedges, 2008; Pargament, 2002; Patrick & 
Kinney, 2003).   
Results reveal that greater degrees of belief in the theological doctrine of original 
sin as well as greater adherence to religious fundamentalist ideologies are directly and 
indirectly associated with scrupulous and depressive symptomatology as well as with 
shame-prone feelings and actions in unhealthy ways.  Results also indicate that God-
representations, intrapsychic representations of early child-hood experiences, later 
tailored by parental surrogates such as clergy and institutionalized religion, also play an 
essential role in scrupulosity, depression, and shame in hypothesized ways.  Hence, such 
results further implicate the centrality of religious ideologies in the expression of 
psychopathology.  Additionally, results seem to suggest that the direct familial 
contribution to the expression of psychopathology among parishioners appears to be 
weaker (i.e., secondary) than that of religious beliefs; this statement is based on the fact 
that perceived parental rearing practices were secondary contributors to the synthetic 
variable of psycho-spiritual beliefs in both Function 1 and 2.   
Finally, these results are consistent with theory and research which suggest that 
the primary mechanism through which (non-statistically speaking) religious beliefs as 
well as familial upbringing impact parishioner psychological well-being is the resulting 
view of the self they engender (Beck, 1967; Ellis, 1960a, b, 1976, 1980, 1992, 2000; 
Freud, 1923; Hansen, 1998; M. Lewis, 1995; Markus, 1977; Pattison, 2000; Tangney & 
Dearing, 2002).  Therefore, given all of these data this researcher is cautiously confident 
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that the proposed model of psycho-spiritual abuse is sound.  As such, it provides an initial 
heuristic for aiding clinicians working with patients of varying Christian faiths whom 
may be struggling with scrupulous, depressive, and shame symptoms as well as well as 
provides researchers in the field with valuable information regarding the reality of 
psycho-spiritual abuse, its phenomenology, and developmental course.               
Therapeutic Considerations 
These results suggest that victims of psycho-spiritual abuse may not seek 
psychological treatment for a variety of reasons.  First, while parishioners may 
experience nagging obsessions, fears of sin and punishment, as well as depressive and 
shame symptoms, they may attribute these phenomena to spiritual matters.  
Consequently, they may feel that their symptoms are physical indicators of spiritual 
maladies that require additional faith, prayer, confession, and/or alternate forms of 
mortification.  Additionally, research suggests that scrupulous persons tend to be more 
high functioning due to the fact that obsessions are typically more common than 
compulsive behavior, thus masking the need for professional help in many instances 
(Abramowitz et al., 2002; Van Ornum, 1997); current results lend additional support to 
such findings.  Moreover, symptom expression may be predominately minimal to 
moderate rather than severe.  While additional research is needed to verify this 
possibility, it is a reasonable assumption given that religious institutions, such as 
churches, are not filled with identifiably psychologically ill persons.   
However, in the event that victims of psycho-spiritual abuse are seen in therapy 
their abusive experience(s) may go unexplored, unnoticed, and/or invalidated.  A 
potential reason for this is that psychotherapeutic orientations differ in their therapeutic 
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goals.  Therefore, for those practitioners who view symptom reduction as the sine qua 
non of successful therapy, sole emphasis may be placed on dismantling irrational 
thoughts, etc. without ever discovering the experience behind the dysfunctional or 
maladaptive cognition(s).  Another roadblock is the literature, primarily present in the 
psychology of religion, that dismisses even the slightest possibility that psycho-spiritual 
abuse may exist (e.g., see Koenig et al., 2001).  Moreover, most clinicians have been 
trained to think of trauma and abuse in a very narrow manner.  Thusly, clinicians may 
only consider combat situations, rape, spousal abuse, or any other assault that results in 
near death experience as the only valid forms of trauma and abuse.  This is 
understandable given the severe and disorganizing behavior that accompanies post-
traumatic stress disorder and other trauma related diagnoses.  However, psycho-spiritual 
abuse requires a different conceptualization of abuse and symptom presentation.  Just as 
life experiences and psychological distress exist along a continuum, so too does abuse 
and its symptomatic expression.  Therefore, on the more extreme end of the continuum 
may lie dissociative identity disorder due to chronic childhood sexual abuse; further 
down on the continuum may lie the war veteran and his/her struggle with nightmares, 
flashbacks, dissociative episodes, explosive anger, and avoidant behavior; somewhere 
below that may lie the chronically depressed patient who was raped a decade prior; and 
perhaps somewhere below that lies the person who endured years of psycho-spiritual 
abuse and is now struggling with scrupulosity or depressed mood.  Another difficulty 
clinicians may experience in recognizing the validity as well as verity of psycho-spiritual 




In an attempt to empirically answer the question, “Is religion freeing or 
enslaving,” Batson and colleagues (1993) conclude that even if one agrees with the 
research which suggests that an internal religious orientation (i.e., a mature religious 
sentiment) (Allport, 1950; Allport & Ross, 1967) is associated with psychological health 
or “freedom,” “…the believer becomes less capable of free, critical reflection…  In this 
way devout, intrinsic religion seems to offer freedom with bondage, bondage to the belief 
system itself [italics added]” (p. 198).  Therefore regardless of whether a parishioner’s 
religious orientation is intrinsic or extrinsic, it stands to reason that the “abuser,” in the 
complex dynamic of psycho-spiritual abuse, is the religious system that fosters bondage 
to its religious tenets itself.  In other words, the polemic of psycho-spiritual abuse is a 
systemic religious malady.  Therefore, psycho-spiritual abuse differs from other types of 
abuse in the sense that perpetrators are diffuse and not readily identifiable to themselves 
or to their victims.  In fact, this author speculates that the purblind nature of psycho-
spiritual abuse in part exists because: (1) perpetrators are persons/institutions of good 
will; (2) perpetrators aid persons in spiritual, physical, and psychological distress; (3) as 
persons and institutions of good will, perpetrators provide their consumers with systems 
of belief that provide meaning; and (4) generally speaking, perpetrators are entrusted by 
society with the authority and responsibility of legislating ethical and moral behavior—
what I am not saying is that all persons and institutions who adhere to religious belief 
systems are perpetrators or victims of psycho-spiritual abuse.  This raises the thorny issue 
of ethical treatment.   
Malony (1994) suggests five therapeutic treatment options available to the 
clinician upon assessment of the impact religiosity bears on psychiatric symptoms; three 
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of them seem applicable in the treatment of psycho-spiritual abuse.  When religious 
beliefs are deemed to be unrelated or ineffectual to the presenting problem(s) the 
clinician may choose to disregard them.  The counter possibility is to annihilate such 
religious beliefs: “To take the annihilate [emphasis in original] option,” says Malony, 
“would assume that the person’s functional religion was completely destructive and 
needed obliterating…” (p. 22).  The third option available to the clinician is to correct 
those aspects of the parishioner’s religious world-view that may be erroneous and 
detrimental to his/her mental health. However, this option assumes that there exist 
healthy aspects of religious functioning already in place for the believer to draw upon.   
To disregard a patient’s religious beliefs even when deemed “non-problematic” 
does a disservice to both the patient and the clinician.  Choosing to disregard such 
valuable information regarding the patient’s world-view is to disregard possible 
strengths, weaknesses, and sources of intervention.  On the other hand, even in the case 
of psycho-spiritual abuse it seems potentially harmful to annihilate the parishioner’s 
religious propensities.  This statement is based on research suggesting that many other 
aspects of religiosity, such as social support, foster mental health (Ellison & Levin, 1998; 
Ellison et al., 2001, 2009; George et al., 2002; Vandervoort, 1999).  Ideally, clinicians 
would desire to “correct” the pernicious beliefs that aid in perpetuating psycho-spiritual 
abuse in order to restore psychological well-being; however, even this possibility poses 
some difficulties.   
First, the patient would need to identify the abuse as the presenting therapeutic 
concern.  In other words, the patient would need to be conscious that s/he is seeking 
psychological treatment for issues regarding abusive spirituality.  Under such 
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circumstances the Axis I diagnosis of Religious or Spiritual Problems under “other 
conditions that may be a focus in clinical attention” of the DSM-IV (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000) may be employed and the clinician may deal directly with 
the patient’s concerns.  However, it seems more plausible that the parishioner may seek 
treatment for his/her depressive or scrupulous symptomatology rather than identifying as 
a victim of spiritual abuse.  In such cases, it is not recommendable that the clinician 
outright challenge the patient’s religious beliefs that may be contributing to his/her 
psychiatric difficulties as this may be experienced as invalidating, threatening, and anti-
religious by the patient.  Rather, the clinician should listen for and explore the meaning 
and function of God-representations, right-religion, view(s) of human nature, attribution 
styles, church attendance/non-attendance, and familial upbringing with the patient.  In 
addition, the clinician should study the patient’s body language for hints of disavowed 
shame.  Though additional research is required in order to devise and test useful clinical 
interventions for victims of psycho-spiritual abuse, clinicians can glean from this and 
previous research in order to work toward fostering a sense of healthy-minded 
religiousness in affected parishioners (James 1902/2002).  This can be achieved in part 
through helping the patient become more accepting of him/herself, more self-forgiving 
(Fisher & Exline, 2006; Hall & Fincham, 2005; Mauger et al., 1992; Mullet et al., 2005; 
Romero et al., 2006; Ross et al., 2004; Tangney et al., 2005), and more self-
compassionate (Neff, 2004).  
Limitations and Future Research 
This study contains several limitations that warrant commentary. One such 
limitation regards the sample’s predominant European American ethnic composition.  
While this is typical of online research it is certainly not ideal or representative of the 
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population at large (Gosling et el., 2004).  In addition, the sample was composed of 
parishioners whom had been reared primarily in the Southern and Southwestern regions 
of the U.S..  In addition, snowball sampling is non-probabilistic in nature; therefore, 
generalizing the findings should be done with caution (Kalton & Anderson, 1986; Kline, 
2005).  Moreover, due to the nature of online research, a factor that may have influenced 
the manner in which some participants responded was the “uncontrolled” administration 
of the measures.  That is, parishioners completed the measures separately, at different 
times of the day, under different environmental conditions, etc. (Buchanan & Smith, 
1999).  While these possibilities are beyond the control of the investigator, research 
suggests that the anonymity afforded by the distance between the subject and researcher 
increases honesty (Buchanan & Smith, 1999; Gosling et al., 2004; Nosek et al., 2002).    
Another possible limitation concerns the retrospective nature of measuring 
parental rearing and the possibility of recall bias (Wilcox et al., 2008).  However, 
research suggests that perceived parental rearing is more relevant to mental health than 
actual rearing (Lennertz et al., 2010; Parker, 1983).  Furthermore, the study’s cross-
sectional design does not allow us to determine the direction of causality.  In other words, 
it is not possible to say with absolute certainty whether parishioner held religious beliefs 
and parental rearing affects mental health or whether parishioner mental health affects 
religious beliefs.  Finally, due to the fact that CCA is a correlation design it is not 
possible to prove causality.  However, Batson and colleagues (1993) note: 
“…observation of an empirical relationship (i.e., a correlation) can serve as a stepping-
stone to explanation and understanding.  And, under certain circumstances, such an 
observation can even make a contribution to theory testing” (p. 384).  In spite of the 
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aforementioned limitations, due to the fact that this study tests a specific theory based on 
research stemming from varied fields of study this researcher believes that these data 
yield confirmation for an initial model of psycho-spiritual abuse. 
In order to deepen, extend, and validate the expounded model of psycho-spiritual 
abuse replication studies need to be conducted.  In addition, research should include 
greater representation of ethnic minority parishioners as well as parishioners from 
underrepresented regional areas in order to probe differences in the association between 
religious beliefs and mental health by ethnicity and region.  Finally, additional research 
among clergy would also be useful in order to test mental health differences between 






























Title: Religious Beliefs and Developmental Factors in the Psychological Well-Being of Differing Protestant 
Faith Groups     IRB PROTOCOL # 2009-12-0008 
Conducted By: Daniel Garcia, M.T.S., M.A. 
Of The University of Texas at Austin:   Department / Office; Educational Psychology, Counseling  
Psychology   Telephone: (210) 884-8064 
   daniel.garcia@mail.utexas.edu 
Faculty Sponsor: Ricardo Ainslie, Ph.D. 
Of The University of Texas at Austin:   Department / Office; Educational Psychology, Counseling  
Psychology   Telephone: (512) 471-0364 
You are being asked to participate in a research study.  This form provides you with information about the 
study.  The person in charge of this research will also describe this study to you and answer all of your 
questions. Please read the information below and ask any questions you might have before deciding 
whether or not to take part. Your participation is entirely voluntary.  You can refuse to participate without 
penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.  You can stop your participation at any time 
and your refusal will not impact current or future relationships with UT Austin or participating sites.  To do 
so simply tell the researcher you wish to stop participation.  The researcher will provide you with a copy of 
this consent for your records. 
The purpose of this study is to better understand the relationship between religiosity and psychological 
well-being.  Approximately 100 participants will participate in this study.  
If you agree to be in this study, we will ask you to do the following things: 
• Visit a secure website and consent to the study; 
• Complete a survey that includes questions about demographics, religion, and psychological well-
being. 
Total estimated time to participate in study is approximately 20-30 minutes.  
Risks of being in the study: 
• The risk associated with this study is no greater than everyday life.  This means you may 
experience some discomfort as you respond to some religious question(s), but remember that you 
are not required to answer any question you that do not wish to answer and that you may 
discontinue this study at any point.  In the event that you become distressed and wish to speak to a 
mental health professional please contact 311 for information on contacting a mental health 
professional or call 911 if you experience an emergency. 
 
Benefits of being in the study: 
• There is no direct benefit to participating in this study, however, your contribution to this research 
is impacting a new field of inquiry in the study of the psychology of religion. 
 
Compensation: 
• There is no cost or monetary compensation for participating in this project.  By participating in 
this study you will be made aware of the general findings of the study once all statistical analyses 






Confidentiality and Privacy Protections: 
• You may complete this study at the time and location of your choosing; 
• You will not be asked to reveal any identifying information such as your name, social security 
number, address, etc.; 
• In order to ensure the integrity of the data as well as your anonymity, secure server line (SSL) 
technology will protect the web site link and data pages during transmission;  
• You may refuse to answer any question; 
• You may quit the study at any time by clicking on the “leave study now” icon located at the 
bottom of each Internet page; 
•  All data will be stored in a password secure, external hard drive that will be kept under lock and 
key in the primary investigator’s off campus office; 
• The data resulting from your participation may be made available to other researchers in the future 
for research purposes not detailed within this consent form. In these cases, the data will contain no 
identifying information that could associate you with it, or with your participation in any study. 
 
The records of this study will be stored securely and kept confidential. Authorized persons from The 
University of Texas at Austin and members of the Institutional Review Board have the legal right to review 
your research records and will protect the confidentiality of those records to the extent permitted by law.  All 
publications will exclude any information that will make it possible to identify you as a subject. Throughout 
the study, the researchers will notify you of new information that may become available and that might affect 
your decision to remain in the study. 
Contacts and Questions: 
If you have any questions about the study please ask now.  If you have questions later, want 
additional information, or wish to withdraw your participation call the researchers conducting the study.  
Their names, phone numbers, and e-mail addresses are at the top of this page.  If you have questions about 
your rights as a research participant, complaints, concerns, or questions about the research please contact 
Jody Jensen, Ph.D., Chair, The University of Texas at Austin Institutional Review Board for the Protection 
of Human Subjects at (512) 232-2685 or the Office of Research Support at (512) 471-8871 or email: 
orsc@uts.cc.utexas.edu. 





















Dear Participant,  
 
Thank you for participating in this study. We understand that you may want to take extra 
precautions to ensure no one else can access your responses to the survey.  Below are two 
methods that will help keep anyone else from accessing your survey answers. 
Suggestions on how to further PROTECT YOUR CONFIDENTIALITY: 
1. After completing the survey, be sure to close the browser window.  This will ensure 
that other individuals will not have access to your survey responses by pressing the 
“back” button.  
2. Be sure to delete temporary Internet files.  This will ensure that other individuals will 
not be able to access your survey responses if subsequent participants were to open the 
webpage (using the same computer) to complete the survey. 
 
The purpose of this study is to better understand how a person’s religious beliefs affect 
their mental health in three distinct areas: (1) depression; (2) anxiety; and (3) shame.  In 
particular, this study seeks to understand how religious beliefs that speak about how one 
should view themselves is related to the aforementioned mental health categories.  The 
religious beliefs that are specifically being studied are the theological construct of 
Original Sin, forgiveness of self, and one’s perception of God.  Understanding that our 
life experiences shape us, particularly those of early childhood via the relationship we 
have with early caregivers, this study also seeks to understand just how much of our 
mental health outcomes (i.e., depression, anxiety, and shame) are accounted for by these 
developmental factors and how much is accounted for by our religious beliefs.  In the 
informed consent you were provided before beginning the study you were told: “The 
purpose of this study is to better understand the relationship between religiosity and 
psychological well-being.”  The exact nature of the study could not be disclosed to you at 
that time due to the possibility that knowledge of the study’s aim may have influenced 
your responses either positively or negatively thus skewing the data.  If you have any 
questions or concerns you may contact the Primary Investigator: 
 
Daniel Garcia, M.T.S., M.A. 
Of The University of Texas at Austin 
Educational Psychology/Counseling Psychology 
Telephone: (210) 884-8064 
E-mail: daniel.garcia@mail.utexas.edu 
 
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, complaints, concerns, or 
questions about the research please contact Jody Jensen, Ph.D., Chair, The University of 
Texas at Austin Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects at (512) 




You will be given a copy of this information to keep for your records.  Finally, if you 
would like to edit your data click on the icon below labeled “Redact Data.” 
 














































Initial Development of the Original Sin Scale Items 
 Beginning with personal experience in the field of theological studies this 
researcher constructed a pool bank of 10 items that were felt to encapsulate the core 
features typically associated with the orthodox teaching of the doctrine of Original Sin—
i.e., the Christian anthropological stance that due to Adam and Eve’s spiritual 
transgression against God all humanity necessarily possesses a universal and hereditary 
sinful essence (Taylor, 1983).  Through additional research, consultation with 
theologians, psychologists in the field of the psychology of religion, and peer feedback 
this researcher narrowed the scale to include the 5 items these experts deemed most clear, 
straightforward, and essential to original sin.  However, at the time of statistical analysis, 
this researcher decided to include the original 10 items.  
Overview of the Present Study 
 The purpose of this study was to examine the psychometric properties of the 
Original Sin Scale (OSS) items and to pursue scale formation via factor analysis.  It was 
hypothesized that the OSS items would load on a single factor thus confirming the 
homogeneity of the items.  In addition, it was expected that the OSS items would strongly 
correlate with other measures of Christian orthodox belief as well as show no relationship 
with an unrelated measure, thus providing evidence of convergent and discriminant 
validity (Cohen & Swerdlik, 2002). 
 
 





The sample was composed of 178 subjects (100 females, 78 males) from the 
Educational Psychology Subject Pool at The University of Texas at Austin during the 
2009 fall semester.  The subjects received class credit for their participation and were 
approximately ethnically equally represented- 24.7% Asian American, 24.2% 
Latino/Hispanic American, 23% European American, and 21.9% African American with 
the remaining participants self-identifying as Bi-Ethnic (4.5%) and Middle Eastern 
(1.7%).   Participants ranged in age from 18 to 44, however the sample consisted 
predominately of those between the ages of 18 and 24 (96.1%) followed by those 25-34 
(3.4 %) and 35-44 (.6%) respectively.  Participants were mainly Christian Protestant 
(38.2%) and Christian Catholic (33.7%) with the remaining participants indicating 
Agnostic (14%), Atheist (6.7%), Buddhist (3.4%), Hindu (2.8%), and Muslim (.6%) as 
their religious affiliation.  Finally, participants indicated that they attended religious 
services: never (28.1%), weekly (27.5%), occasionally (22.5%), on special occasions 
(12.9%), and monthly (9%).   
Procedures 
 Subjects were told that they would be participating in a study that looked at 
differing religious belief systems.  They were then directed to an online site hosted by 
SurveyMonkey where they completed an electronic informed consent form, demographic 
questionnaire, the 10 items from the OSS item bank, Altmeyer and Hunsberger’s (2004) 
Revised Religious Fundamentalism Scale (RRFS), Hunsberger’s (1989) Short Christian 
Orthodoxy Scale (SCO), and Rosenvinge and colleague’s (2001) Eating Disturbance 
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Scale (EDS-5).  Upon completion of the questionnaires participants were fully debriefed 
regarding the purpose of the study. 
Instruments 
  The following instruments were employed in the current study in addition to the 
10 items from the OSS item bank. 
 Revised religious fundamental scale.     The Revised Religious Fundamentalism 
Scale (RRFS) (Altmeyer and Hunsberger, 2004) is a 12-item self-report instrument that 
measures the degree to which a person believes that his/her religious outlook contains the 
most “fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth” (p. 50).  Subjects are 
instructed to respond to each item on a 9-point Likert scale anchored at -4 (very strongly 
disagree) and +4 (very strongly agree) with 0 being an exact and precise neutral.  Sample 
statements include: “God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness 
and salvation, which must be totally followed;” The basic cause of evil in the world is 
Satan, who is still constantly and ferociously fighting against God;” and “When you get 
right down to it, there are basically only two kinds of people in the world: the Righteous, 
who will be rewarded by God; and the rest, who will not.”    
One of the strengths of the RRFS is that it allows the participant to deal with what 
may be conflicting feelings about a statement by allowing him/her to weigh differing 
parts of it independently.  In turn the participant may numerically rate these troublesome 
ideas independently of each other and sum each part to obtain their score for that 
particular statement.  In order to avoid negative scores the subject’s total score is 
obtained by summing all 12 items on a converted 1 to 9 scale and adding a constant of 5 
to the summed score.  This yields a minimum score of 17 and a maximum score of 113 
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with a theoretical mid-point of 65.  Higher scores indicate greater levels of 
fundamentalism and vice-versa.  The RRFS is reported to possess an alpha reliability 
coefficient of .91, which is equal to or greater than its parent scale (Altmeyer and 
Hunsberger, 2004).  Finally, the RRFS is appropriate for use with persons of differing 
religious faiths.        
Short christian orthodoxy scale.     The Short Christian Orthodoxy Scale (SCO) 
(Hunsberger, 1989) is a 6-item self-report instrument that measures Christian orthodoxy.  
Subjects are instructed to respond to each item employing a 7-point Likert scale anchored 
at -3 (strongly disagree) and +3 (strongly agree) with 0 being an exact and precise 
neutral.  Sample statements include: “Jesus Christ was the divine Son of God;” “The 
concept of God is an old superstition that is no longer needed to explain things in the 
modern era;” and “Through the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus, God provided a way 
for the forgiveness of people’s sins.”  In order to avoid negative scores the subject’s total 
score is obtained by summing all 6 items on a converted 1 to 7 scale.  This yields a 
minimum score of 6 and a maximum score of 42 with a theoretical midpoint of 28.  
Higher scores indicate greater adherence to Christian orthodoxy and vice-versa.  The 
SCO is reported to possess alpha reliability coefficients of .93 to .95 across differing 
samples.  
Eating disturbance scale.  The Eating Disturbance Scale (EDS-5) (Rosenvinge, 
Perry, Bjorgum, Bergersen, Silvera, & Holte, 2001) is 5-item instrument that screens for 
problematic eating disorders in non-clinical populations.  Subjects are instructed to 
respond to each item on a 7-point Likert scale anchored at 1 (very satisfied) and 7 (very 
unsatisfied) regarding their experiences over the past 30 days.  Sample questions include: 
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“Have you felt guilty about eating;” “Are you satisfied with your eating habits;” and 
“Have you eaten to comfort yourself because you were unhappy?”  A total score is 
obtained by summing the subject’s response to all 5 items producing a minimum score 5 
of and a maximum score of 35.  Higher scores indicate the presence of a problematic 
eating disorder.  The EDS-5 reports alpha reliability coefficients of .83 and .86 across 
samples. 
Results 
 An exploratory factor analysis with principal –factors extraction was performed 
on the proposed OSS 10-item bank.  This analysis found that all 10 components had 
eigenvalues greater than 1.  A two-factor solution emerged with items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 
and 10 loading on factor 1, item 6 loading on factor 2, and item 7 loading on both factors 
1 and 2.  Table 1 shows the factor loading for the two-factor solution.  After removing 
items 6 and 7 the factor analysis revealed a unidimensional solution for items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
8, 9, and 10.  Component 1 was the strongest accounting for approximately 66% of the 
variance.  A reliability analysis employing these 8 items was conducted yielding a 




The 8-items were submitted to a confirmatory factor analysis in order to further 
investigate the stability of the exploratory factor structure and to confirm its 
unidimensionality.  This analysis demonstrated that all 8 items load on a common factor.  
However, further study of the standardized regression weights indicated that item 4, the 
con-trait of item 1, had the weakest impact on belief in original sin explaining 
approximately 35% of the variance.  Due to the fact that it contributes the least to the 
measurement of belief in original sin and because it is a con-trait of an already existing 
item that accounts for approximately 48% of the variance item 4 was dropped (see Table 















Confirmatory factor analysis results indicate that a significant difference between 
the hypothesized model and the lack of a model exists (χ2 = 66.635 [df = 14; p = < .001]).  
In addition, the comparative fit index (CFI) suggests that the hypothesized model 
represents an adequate fit to the data (CFI = .939).  The incremental fit index (IFI = .939) 
as well as the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI = .908) also suggest a well fitting model.  
However, the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) suggest that the model 
fits the data rather poorly (RMSEA = .150 with a 90% interval of .115 and .187).  A 
potential reason for this outcome may be that the items are redundant.  Therefore, 
checking the modification indices and removing such items would potentially make the 
model more parsimonious (Byrne, 2010).     
The remaining 7 items were resubmitted to principal component analysis.  Table 3 
shows a one-factor solution reemerged with all 7 components obtaining eigenvalues 
greater than 1.  Component 1 was the strongest accounting for approximately 69% of the 
variance.  A reliability analysis employing the 7 items was conducted yielding a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .93.   
 Convergent as well as discriminant validity were explored employing Pearson 
correlations between the 7 items of the OSS, the RRFS (Altmeyer and Hunsberger, 
2004), the SCO (Hunsberger, 1989), and the EDS-5 (Rosenvinge at al., 2001).  Table 4 
indicates that the OSS correlated strongly with the RRFS (.75) and SCO (.70) alike 
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establishing convergent validity.  However the OSS showed no relationship with the 








 Given the lack of an employable instrument in psychological research to measure 
the degree of belief in the theological construct of original sin the OSS satisfies this need.  
While in its nascent stages, the OSS demonstrates acceptable psychometric properties in 
a brief and straightforward measure.  It demonstrates convergent validity with some of 
the most widely empirically validated measures in the psychology of religion, possesses 
discriminant validity, and enjoys a reliability coefficient of .926.  Further studies are 
needed to replicate the properties of this unidimensional measure and further 
confirmatory factor analytic studies are necessary to explore at greater length the fit of 















Demographic Data: Please check the choice that best describes you in each of the categories. 
 
Age: 
_____ 18 – 24 _____ 25 – 34 _____ 35 – 44 _____ 45 – 54 _____ 55 – 64 
 
Race (check 1 or more that best describes your race): 
_____ White _____ Black _____ American Indian or Alaska Native _____ Asian, Asian American, or  
                                                                                                                         Other Pacific Islander 
_____ Other (write in): ________________________________________ 
 
How do you identify ethnically? 
_____ Asian American- Specify: ________________ _____ African American- Specify: ______________ 
_____ Hispanic or Latino- Specify: ______________ _____ European American- Specify: ____________ 
_____ Middle Eastern- Specify: _________________ _____ Bi-ethnic; parents are from two different  
                                                                                                  groups-                Specify: ________________ 
_____ Other (write in): ______________________________________ 
 
Region where you have spent most of your life: 
_____ Northeast _____ Midwest _____ South _____ Southwest _____ West _____ West Coast 
_____ Outside the U.S.A. (write in): ____________________________________ 
 
Sex: 
_____ Male _____ Female  
 
Relationship Status: 




_____ Less than high school _____ High school graduate or G.E.D., no college _____ Some college, no        
                                                                                                                                           degree 
_____ Associate degree _____ Bachelor’s degree _____ Master’s degree _____ Doctoral degree 
 
Occupation: (write in): _______________________________________ 
 
Household Size (Including self): ____________ 
 
Income: 
_____ Less than $ 10,000 _____ $10,000 to $24,999 _____ $25,000 to $44,999 _____ $45,000 to $74,999 
_____ $75,000 to $99,999 _____ $100,000 or more 
 
Denomination Affiliation (e.g., Lutheran, Methodist, Nazarene, Baptist, etc.): 
___________________________________Write in 
 
How long have you been a practicing your current religious affiliation? 
 _____ Less than 1 year _____ 1 – 5 years _____ 6 – 10 years _____11 – 15 years  _____16 – 20 years 
 _____ More than 20 years 
 
Did you attend another place of worship before you started attending your current church? 




How long did you attend your previous place of worship? 
_____ Less than 1 year _____ 1 – 5 years _____ 6 – 10 years _____11 – 15 years  _____16 – 20 years 
_____ More than 20 years 
 
Why did you leave your previous place of worship? 
_____ Moved cities _____ Disagreed with church teaching(s) _____ Interpersonal conflict _____ 
_____Other; Please write in: _______________________________________________________ 
  
How long have you attended your current place of worship? 
_____ Less than 1 year _____ 1 – 5 years _____ 6 – 10 years _____11 – 15 years  _____16 – 20 years 
_____ More than 20 years 
 
How often do you attend religious services? 
_____ Weekly _____ Monthly _____ Occasionally _____ On special occasions 
 
Have you been diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder (e.g. Depression, Anxiety, Bipolar, etc.)? 
_____ Yes (If “Yes” please answer the remaining questions on this page) 
_____ No (If “No” you may omit the remaining questions on this page) 
 
How long ago were you diagnosed? 
_____ Less than 1 year _____ 1 – 5 years _____ 6 – 10 years _____11 – 15 years  _____16 – 20 years  
_____More than 20 years 
 
Are you currently taking medication for your psychiatric symptoms? 
_____ Yes _____ No 
 
How long have you been taking psychiatric medication(s)? 
_____ Less than 1 year _____ 1 – 5 years _____ 6 – 10 years _____11 – 15 years  _____16 – 20 years  


























The Revised 12-Item Religious Fundamentalism Scale 
This survey is part of an investigation of general public opinion concerning a variety of 
social issues.  You will probably find that you agree with some of the statements, 
disagree with others, to varying extents.  Please indicate your reaction to each statement 
by marking your opinion on the line to left of each statement, according to the following 
scale: 
 
-4 if you very strongly disagree with the statement. 
-3 if you strongly disagree with the statement. 
-2 if you moderately disagree with the statement. 
-1 if you slightly disagree with the statement. 
+1 if you slightly agree with the statement. 
+2 if you moderately agree with the statement. 
+3 if you strongly agree with the statement. 
+4 if you very strongly agree with the statement. 
If you feel exactly and precisely neutral about an item, mark “0.” 
 
 
You may find that you sometimes have different reactions to different parts of a 
statement.  For example, you might very strongly disagree (“-4”) with one idea in a 
statement, but slightly agree (“+1”) with another idea in the same item.  When this 
happens, please combine your reactions, and write down how you feel on a balance (a “-
3” in this case). 
 
_____ 1.  God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and  
                salvation, which must be totally followed. 
 
_____ 2.  No single book of religious teachings contains all the intrinsic, fundamental  
                truths about life. 
 
_____ 3.  The basic cause of evil in this world is Satan, who is still constantly and  
                ferociously fighting against God. 
 
_____ 4.  It is more important to be a good person than to believe in God and the right  
                religion. 
 
_____ 5.  There is a particular set of religious teachings in this world that are so true, you  
                 can’t go any “deeper” because they are the basic, bedrock message that God  
                 has given humanity.  
 
_____6.  When you get right down to it, there are basically only two kinds of people in  
                the world: the Righteous, who will be rewarded by God; and the rest, who will  





_____ 7.  Scripture may contain general truths, but they should NOT be considered  
                completely, literally true from beginning to end. 
 
_____ 8.  To lead the best, most meaningful life, one must belong to the one,  
                fundamentally true religion. 
 
_____ 9.  “Satan” is just the name people give their own bad impulses.  There really is   
                no such thing as a diabolical “Prince of Darkness” who tempts us. 
 
_____10.  Whenever science and sacred scripture conflict, science is probably right. 
 
_____11.  The fundamentals of God’s religion should never be tampered with, or  
                 compromised with others’ beliefs. 
 
_____12.  All of the religions in the world have flaws and wrong teachings.  There is no  


































The State Self-Forgiveness Scale 
 
Think of something you have done that you consider to be wrong or to have contributed to a 
conflict in a relationship.  The questions on this form should be answered according to your 
current attitudes about yourself in relation to your role in the wrongdoing or conflict.  
 
When answering the following set of questions, place each word in the blank in the sentence 
given.  Then mark the circle that best describes how you feel about yourself right now regarding 
the wrongful event. 
 














... compassionate toward myself. O O O O O O 
... rejecting of myself. O O O O O O 
... accepting of myself. O O O O O O 
... dislike toward myself. O O O O O O 
 
When answering the following set of questions, please each word in the blank.  Then mark the 
circle that best describes how you act toward yourself right now regarding the wrongful event. 
 














... show myself acceptance. O O O O O O 
... show myself compassion. O O O O O O 
... punish myself. O O O O O O 
... put myself down. O O O O O O 
 
When answering the following set of questions, please each word in the blank.  Then mark the 































... acceptable. O O O O O O 
... okay. O O O O O O 
... awful. O O O O O O 
... terrible. O O O O O O 
... decent. O O O O O O 
... rotten. O O O O O O 
... worthy of love. O O O O O O 
... a bad person. O O O O O O 
... horrible. O O O O O O 
 
 
“As I consider what I did that was wrong, I have forgiven myself _______.” 
 
not at all a little mostly completely 




















































































































Penn Inventory of Scrupulosity 
 
Instructions:  The following statements refer to experiences that people sometimes have.  
Please indicate how often you have these experiences using the following key:  0=never; 
1= almost never; 2=sometimes; 3=often; 4=constantly.  
 
1.  I worry that I might have dishonest thoughts.  
 
    0            1                     2      3                          4 
Never  Almost Never  Sometimes   Often  Constantly 
 
2.  I fear that I might be an evil person.  
 
    0           1           2      3         4 
Never  Almost Never  Sometimes   Often  Constantly 
 
3.  I fear I will act immorally.  
 
    0           1           2      3                    4 
Never  Almost Never  Sometimes   Often  Constantly 
 
4.  I feel urges to confess sins over and over again.  
 
    0           1           2      3                     4 
Never  Almost Never  Sometimes   Often  Constantly 
 
5.  I worry about heaven and hell. 
 
    0           1           2      3          4 
Never  Almost Never  Sometimes   Often  Constantly 
 
6.  I worry I must act morally at all times or I will be punished.  
 
    0                      1           2      3         4 
Never  Almost Never  Sometimes   Often  Constantly 
 
7.  Feeling guilty interferes with my ability to enjoy things I would like to enjoy.  
 
    0           1           2      3         4 







8.  Immoral thoughts come into my head and I can’t get rid of them. 
 
    0           1           2      3         4 
Never  Almost Never  Sometimes   Often  Constantly 
 
9.  I am afraid my behavior is unacceptable to God.  
        
    0           1           2      3                    4 
Never  Almost Never  Sometimes   Often  Constantly 
 
10.  I fear I have acted inappropriately without realizing it.  
 
    0           1           2      3         4 
Never  Almost Never  Sometimes   Often  Constantly 
 
11.  I must try hard to avoid having certain immoral thoughts.  
 
    0           1           2      3                    4 
Never  Almost Never  Sometimes   Often  Constantly 
 
12.  I am very worried that things I did may have been dishonest.  
 
    0                      1           2      3         4 
Never  Almost Never  Sometimes   Often  Constantly 
 
13.  I am afraid I will disobey God’s rules/laws.  
 
    0                      1           2      3                    4 
Never  Almost Never  Sometimes   Often  Constantly 
 
14.  I am afraid of having sexual thoughts.  
 
    0           1           2      3         4 
Never  Almost Never  Sometimes   Often  Constantly 
 
15.  I worry I will never have a good relationship with God.  
 
    0           1           2      3                    4 
Never  Almost Never  Sometimes   Often  Constantly 
 
 
16.  I feel guilty about immoral thoughts I have had.  
 
    0           1           2      3         4 




17.  I worry that God is upset with me.  
 
    0           1           2      3                    4 
Never  Almost Never  Sometimes   Often  Constantly 
 
18.  I am afraid of having immoral thoughts.  
 
    0           1           2      3                    4 
Never  Almost Never  Sometimes   Often  Constantly 
 
19.  I am afraid my thoughts are unacceptable to God.  
 
    0           1           2      3         4 




































































































































Test of Self-Conscious Affect – 3 
 
Below are situations that people are likely to encounter in day‐to‐day life, followed by 
several common reactions to those situations.  As you read each scenario, try to imagine 
yourself in that situation. Then indicate how likely you would be to react in each of the 
ways described. We ask you to rate all responses because people may feel or react more 
than one way to the same situation, or they may react different ways at different times. 
 
Please do not skip any items ‐‐  


































































































































Beck Depression Inventory – 2 
 
This questionnaire consists of 21 groups of statements.  Please read each group of statements 
carefully, and then pick out the ONE STATEMENT in each group that best describes how you 
have been feeling during the PAST TWO weeks, INCLUDING TODAY.   
 
If several statements in the group seem to apply equally well, choose the highest number for that 
group.  Be sure that you do not choose more than one statement for any group, including Item 16 
(Changes in Sleeping Pattern) or Item 18 (Changes in Appetite). 
 
1. Sadness 
_____ 0 I do not feel sad. 
_____ 1 I feel sad. 
_____ 2 I am sad all the time and I can't snap out of it. 
_____ 3 I am so sad and unhappy that I can't stand it. 
 
2. Pessimism 
_____ 0 I am not particularly discouraged about the future. 
_____ 1 I feel discouraged about the future. 
_____ 2 I feel I have nothing to look forward to. 
_____ 3 I feel the future is hopeless and that things cannot improve. 
 
3. Past Failure 
_____ 0 I do not feel like a failure. 
_____ 1 I feel I have failed more than the average person. 
_____ 2 As I look back on my life, all I can see is a lot of failures. 
_____ 3 I feel I am a complete failure as a person. 
 
4. Loss of Pleasure 
_____ 0 I get as much satisfaction out of things as I used to. 
_____ 1 I don't enjoy things the way I used to. 
_____ 2 I don't get real satisfaction out of anything anymore. 
_____ 3 I am dissatisfied or bored with everything. 
 
5. Guilty Feelings 
_____ 0 I don't feel particularly guilty 
_____ 1 I feel guilty a good part of the time. 
_____ 2 I feel quite guilty most of the time. 
_____ 3 I feel guilty all of the time. 
 
6. Punishment Feelings 
_____ 0 I don't feel I am being punished. 
_____ 1 I feel I may be punished. 
_____ 2 I expect to be punished. 







_____ 0 I don't feel disappointed in myself. 
_____ 1 I am disappointed in myself. 
_____ 2 I am disgusted with myself. 
_____ 3 I hate myself. 
 
8. Self-Criticalness 
_____ 0 I don't feel I am any worse than anybody else. 
_____ 1 I am critical of myself for my weaknesses or mistakes. 
_____ 2 I blame myself all the time for my faults. 
_____ 3 I blame myself for everything bad that happens. 
 
9. Suicidal Thoughts or Wishes 
_____ 0 I don't have any thoughts of killing myself. 
_____ 1 I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would not carry them out. 
_____ 2 I would like to kill myself. 
_____ 3 I would kill myself if I had the chance. 
 
10. Crying 
_____ 0 I don't cry any more than usual. 
_____ 1 I cry more now than I used to. 
_____ 2 I cry all the time now. 
_____ 3 I used to be able to cry, but now I can't cry even though I want to. 
 
11. Agitation 
_____ 0 I am no more irritated by things than I ever was. 
_____ 1 I am slightly more irritated now than usual. 
_____ 2 I am quite annoyed or irritated a good deal of the time. 
_____ 3 I feel irritated all the time. 
 
12. Loss of Interest 
_____ 0 I have not lost interest in other people. 
_____ 1 I am less interested in other people than I used to be. 
_____ 2 I have lost most of my interest in other people. 
_____ 3 I have lost all of my interest in other people. 
 
13. Indecisiveness 
_____ 0 I make decisions about as well as I ever could. 
_____ 1 I put off making decisions more than I used to. 
_____ 2 I have greater difficulty in making decisions more than I used to. 
_____ 3 I can't make decisions at all anymore. 
 
14. Worthlessness 
_____ 0 I don't feel that I look any worse than I used to. 
_____ 1 I am worried that I am looking old or unattractive. 
_____ 2 I feel that there are permanent changes in my appearance that make me look unattractive. 







15. Loss of Energy 
_____ 0 I can work about as well as before. 
_____ 1 It takes an extra effort to get started at doing something. 
_____ 2 I have to push myself very hard to do anything. 
_____ 3 I can't do any work at all. 
 
16. Changes in Sleep Pattern 
_____ 0 I can sleep as well as usual. 
_____ 1 I don't sleep as well as I used to. 
_____ 2 I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual and find it hard to get back to sleep. 
_____ 3 I wake up several hours earlier than I used to and cannot get back to sleep. 
 
17. Irritability 
_____ 0 I don't get more tired than usual. 
_____ 1 I get tired more easily than I used to. 
_____ 2 I get tired from doing almost anything. 
_____ 3 I am too tired to do anything. 
 
18. Changes in Appetite 
_____ 0 My appetite is no worse than usual. 
_____ 1 My appetite is not as good as it used to be. 
_____ 2 My appetite is much worse now. 
_____ 3 I have no appetite at all anymore. 
 
19. Concentration Difficulty 
_____ 0 I haven't lost much weight, if any, lately. 
_____ 1 I have lost more than five pounds. 
_____ 2 I have lost more than ten pounds. 
_____ 3 I have lost more than fifteen pounds. 
 
20. Tiredness or Fatigue 
_____ 0 I am no more worried about my health than usual. 
_____ 1 I am worried about physical problems such as aches and pains, or upset stomach, or    
              constipation. 
_____ 2 I am very worried about physical problems and it's hard to think of much else. 
_____ 3 I am so worried about my physical problems that I cannot think about anything else. 
 
21. Loss of Interest in Sex 
_____ 0 I have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex. 
_____ 1 I am less interested in sex than I used to be. 
_____ 2 I have almost no interest in sex. 

















 The following sections present two multiple regression analyses employing the 
same data set used in the canonical correlation analysis presented above.  Each regression 
analysis contains 3 outcome variables and therefore requires a dedicated multiple 
regression for each respective model.  The first reported results (i.e., Results A) are 
products of an exploratory phase of research and therefore were conducted employing 
stepwise moderated multiple regression.  The second set of results reported (i.e., Results 
B) were conducted in order to test the soundness of the models yielded by the stepwise 
regression analyses because stepwise regression has been criticized for: (1) producing 
idiosyncratic results that are difficult to reproduce in other samples; and (2) increasing 
Type I error (Draper, Guttman, & Lapczak, 1979; Menard, 2002).    
Questions and Hypotheses 
Table 1 contains the predictor and outcome variables employed in Results A and 








Based on theory and previous research covered in the literature review, the following 
questions and hypotheses were tested employing Moderated Multiple Regression—Result 
Section B tests these same questions and hypotheses with the exception of questions 9-14 
(i.e., moderation of variables was not tested for in Results B): 
1. To what degree is a parishioner’s psychological well-being (i.e., scrupulosity, 
depression, and shame) predicted by his/her degree of belief in the theological 
construct of original sin?  
• Hypothesis 1:  Greater degrees of parishioner belief in the theological 
doctrine of original sin positively predict obsessions of sin and fear of 
God’s punishment along with neutralizing compulsive behavior (i.e., 
scrupulosity disorder). 
• Hypothesis 2:  Greater degrees of parishioner belief in original sin 
positively predict depression. 
• Hypothesis 3:  Greater degrees of parishioner belief in original sin 
positively predicts shame. 
2. To what degree is a parishioner’s psychological well-being predicted by 
his/her religious rigidity (i.e., fundamentalism)? 
• Hypothesis 4:  Greater degrees of parishioner religious 
fundamentalism positively predict scrupulosity. 
• Hypothesis 5:  Greater degrees of parishioner religious 
fundamentalism positively predict depression. 
• Hypothesis 6:  Greater degrees of parishioner religious 
fundamentalism positively predict shame. 
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3. To what degree is a parishioner’s psychological well-being predicted by 
his/her God-representation?  
• Hypothesis 7:  Non-accepting God-representations positively predict 
scrupulosity. 
• Hypothesis 8:  Non-accepting God-representations positively predict 
depression. 
• Hypothesis 9: Non-accepting God-representations positively predict 
shame. 
• Hypothesis 10:  Non-present God-representations negatively predict 
scrupulosity. 
• Hypothesis 11:  Non-present God-representations positively predict 
depression. 
• Hypothesis 12: Non-present God-representations positively predict 
shame. 
• Hypothesis 13:  Non-challenging God-representations negatively 
predict scrupulosity. 
• Hypothesis 14:  Non-challenging God-representations positively 
predict depression. 
• Hypothesis 15:  Non-challenging God-representations negatively 
predict shame. 
4. To what degree is a parishioner’s psychological well-being predicted by 
his/her ability to self-forgive?  
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• Hypothesis 16:  Greater degrees of parishioner self-forgiveness 
negatively predict scrupulosity. 
• Hypothesis 17:  Greater degrees of parishioner self-forgiveness 
negatively predict depression. 
• Hypothesis 18:  Greater degrees of parishioner self-forgiveness 
negatively predict shame. 
5. To what degree is a parishioner’s psychological well-being predicted by 
his/her familial upbringing (i.e., perceived parental rearing)?  
• Hypothesis 19:  Parishioner parental rearing practices perceived as 
overprotective positively predict scrupulosity. 
• Hypothesis 20:  Parishioner parental rearing practices perceived as 
overprotective positively predict depression. 
• Hypothesis 21: Parishioner parental rearing practices perceived as 
overprotective positively predict shame. 
• Hypothesis 22:  Parishioner parental rearing practices perceived as 
rejecting positively predict depression. 
• Hypothesis 23: Parishioner parental rearing practices perceived as 
rejecting positively predict shame. 
• Hypothesis 24:  Parishioner parental rearing practices perceived as 
emotionally warm negatively predict scrupulosity. 
• Hypothesis 25: Parishioner parental rearing practices perceived as 
emotionally warm negatively predict depression. 
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• Hypothesis 26: Parishioner parental rearing practices perceived as 
emotionally warm negatively predict shame. 
6. Do any of the demographic variables predict scrupulosity? 
7. Do any of the demographic variables predict depression? 
8. Do any of the demographic variables predict shame? 
9. Is the relationship between religious fundamentalism and scrupulosity 
moderated? 
10. Is the relationship between religious fundamentalism and depression 
moderated? 
11. Is the relationship between religious fundamentalism and shame moderated? 
12. Is the relationship between belief in original sin and scrupulosity moderated? 
13. Is the relationship between belief in original sin and depression moderated? 




Means, standard deviations, reliability coefficients, and correlations among 
predictor variables are presented in Table 2.  The following assumptions of multiple 
regression were tested and met.  Residual analyses for linearity indicated that each of the 
models described below represent a linear model between the outcome variables and 
composites of the predictor variables.  Since standardized residuals were not > 3 it may 
be assumed that heteroscedasticity is not a concern for any of the models.  In addition, 
absence of Cook’s Distance > 1 lends additional evidence that no influential outliers are 
present. Multicollinearity was assessed and deemed not to be a problem since VIF was 
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not > 4.0 and Tolerance was not < .20 for any of the predictors in their respective models.  
Independence of observations may also be assumed for each of the models as the Durbin-
Watson statistic is between 1.5 and 2.5 across models. Finally, systematic error in 
measurement was assumed not to be problematic due to the fact that all instruments 
employed possessed coefficient alphas above .80 (OSS = .96; RRFS = .94; SSFS = .89;    
GIS = .92; [GIS by subscale: Acceptance = .81; Presence = .96; Challenge = .85]; s-
EMBU = .82 [s-EMBU by subscale: Rejection = .91; Emotional Warmth = .94; 




 Three moderated multiple regressions were conducted in order to investigate the 
relationship between the parishioner held religious beliefs of original sin, right-religion 
(i.e., fundamentalism), God-representations, and self-forgiveness on scrupulosity 
disorder, depression, and shame respectively (Bickel, 2007; Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992); 
perceived parental rearing practices were also included into each of the models.  An 
additional reason for employing moderated multiple regressions was to inquire about the 
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possible moderating role degree of belief in original sin and fundamentalism have on the 
relationship between parishioner religious beliefs and parishioner mental health.   
 The first moderated multiple regression regressed measures of religious beliefs 
and perceived parental rearing on a single measure of scrupulosity disorder (all scores 
were centered).  These predictor variables along with interaction terms, products of OSS 
and RRFS with demographic variables, religious belief measures and perceived parental 
rearing, were entered into a stepwise multiple regression in SPSS Graduate Pack 16.0 for 
Mac.  Results revealed an overall model that accounts for approximately 51% of the 
variance (R2 = .505), F(9, 224) = 22.78, p < .001.  The adjusted R2, compensating for the 
positive bias in R2, was .483 reflecting a relatively high overall strength of relationship.  
The standard error of the estimate was 8.816.  Fundamentalism, degree of belief in 
original sin, self-forgiveness, God image Acceptance, God image Presence, perceived 
parental rearing Overprotective, sex (i.e., male), age 45-64, and the interaction of Latino 
American and original sin were significant predictors of scrupulosity disorder.  Table 3 













































































Figure 1 illustrates that on average Latino Americans report more obsessions regarding 
fears of sin and God’s punishment as well as compulsions, that aid in neutralizing the 
accompanying anxiety, than European Americans, African Americans, and other non- 
Latino Americans.  For Latino Americans, on average, greater belief in original sin 
exacerbates obsessions and compulsions related to fear of sin and God’s punishment.  
The slope for Latino Americans (β= .52) was significantly higher than the slope 
for non-Latino Americans (β= .18) t(223) = 2.04, p = .042.  Post hoc analysis (Aiken & 
West, 1991; Preacher, Curran & Bauer, 2006) indicate that while the simple slopes for 
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Latino Americans and non-Latino Americans were both significantly different from zero, 
the slope for Latino Americans changes at a much faster rate than the slope for non-
Latino Americans with increasing belief in original sin.  Therefore, though non-Latino 
Americans and Latino Americans alike experience increased scrupulosity symptoms with 
stronger belief in original sin, on average degree of belief in original sin adversely 
impacts Latino Americans’ mental health more so than non-Latino Americans. Therefore, 
it may be said that the regression of scrupulosity disorder on degree of belief in original 
sin varies as a function of ethnicity (Aiken & West, 1991) or that ethnicity moderates the 
effect of degree of belief in original sin on depression (Baron & Kenny, 1986).           
 Additional post hoc analyses provide supplemental evidence of the interpretability 
of the model.  Firstly, the model possesses a large effect size (f 2= 1.04).  Secondly, 
operating under the assumption that statistically significant main effects do not 
automatically render such effects practically important, tests of practical importance were 
conducted for all significant predictors in the model.  The unstandardized coefficients 
were all greater than the standard deviation of the outcome variable divided by the 
product of 10 times the standard deviation of each predictor variable, thus rendering each 
predictor variable in the model practically important. 
The second moderated multiple regression regressed measures of religious beliefs 
and perceived parental rearing on a single measure of depression (all scores were 
centered).  These predictor variables along with interaction terms, products of OSS and 
RRFS with demographic data, religious belief measures and perceived parental rearing, 
were entered into a stepwise multiple regression in SPSS Graduate Pack 16.0 for Mac.  
Results revealed an overall model that accounts for 33% of the variance, F(6, 226) = 
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18.54, p < .001.  The adjusted R2, compensating for the positive bias in R2, was .312 
reflecting a relatively high overall strength of relationship.  The standard error of the 
estimate was 4.324.  Self-forgiveness, God image Acceptance, perceived parental rearing 
Rejection, psychiatric diagnosis, and the interaction terms of perceived parental Rejection 
and original sin and God image Acceptance and religious fundamentalism were 
significant predictors of depression. 
















Figure 2 illustrates that parishioners’ relationship between degree of belief in original sin 
and depression is inconsistent (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Frazier, Tix, & Barron, 2004; 
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Keith, 2006).  Parishioners with higher levels of perceived parental rejection report less 
depressive symptoms while parishioners with lower levels of perceived parental rejection 
experience greater depressive symptomatology.  Parishioners who perceived their 
primary caregiver(s) as less rejecting reported greater depressive symptoms with greater 
degrees of belief in the sinfulness of humanity.  On the other hand, parishioners who 
perceived their primary caregiver(s) as more rejecting experienced decreased levels of 
depressive symptomatology with greater degrees of belief in original sin.  
The slope for low perceived parental Rejection (β= .05) was significantly higher 
than the slope for high perceived parental Rejection (β= -.05) t(224) = -2.11 , p = .036.  
Post hoc analysis (Aiken & West, 1991; Preacher et al., 2006) indicate that the simple 
slopes for high levels of perceived parental rejection and low levels of perceived parental 
rejection were both significantly different from zero changing at the same rate with 
increasing belief in original sin.  Belief in original sin adversely impacts the mental 
health of parishioners with low levels of perceived parental rejection more so than 
parishioners with high levels of perceived parental rejection.  Therefore, it may be said 
that the regression of depression on original sin varies as a function of perceived parental 
rejection (Aiken & West, 1991) or that levels of perceived parental rejection moderates 







Figure 3 shows the interaction plot of religious fundamentalism and non-




     
 









Figure 3 illustrates that parishioners’ relationship between religious fundamentalism and 
depression is inconsistent (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Frazier et al., 2004; Keith, 2006).  
Parishioners with higher levels of non-accepting God representation report more 
depressive symptoms while parishioners with lower levels of a non-accepting God 
representation experience less depressive symptomatology.  Parishioners high in non-
accepting God representations reported greater depressive symptoms with greater degrees 
of religious rigidity.  On the other hand, parishioners low in non-accepting God- 
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representations experienced decreased levels of depressive symptomatology with greater 
degree of religious fundamentalism.  
The slope for high non-accepting God-representation (β= .03) was significantly 
higher than the slope for low non-accepting God-representation (β= -.03) t(224) = 3.02, 
p = .003.  Post hoc analysis (Aiken & West, 1991; Preacher et al., 2006) indicate that the 
simple slopes for high and low levels of non-accepting God representation were both 
significantly different from zero changing at the same rate with increasing belief in 
religious fundamentalism.  Degree of religious fundamentalism adversely impacts the 
mental health of parishioners with higher levels of non-accepting God representations 
more so than parishioners with low levels of non-accepting God representations. 
Therefore, it may be said that the regression of depression on religious fundamentalism 
varies as a function of God-representation (Aiken & West, 1991) or that levels of non-
accepting God-representation moderates the effect of religious fundamentalism on 
depression (Baron & Kenny, 1986). 
Additional post hoc analyses provide supplemental evidence of the interpretability 
of the model.  Firstly, the model possesses a large effect size (f 2= .49).  Secondly, 
operating under the assumption that statistically significant main effects do not 
automatically render such effects practically important, tests of practical importance were 
conducted for all significant predictors in the model.  The unstandardized coefficients 
were all greater than the standard deviation of the outcome variable divided by the 
product of 10 times the standard deviation of each predictor variable, thus rendering each 
predictor variable in the model practically important. 
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The third moderated multiple regression regressed measures of religious beliefs 
and perceived parental rearing on a single measure of shame (all scores were centered).  
These predictor variables along with interaction terms, products of OSS and RRFS with 
demographic data, religious belief measures and perceived parental rearing, were entered 
into a stepwise multiple regression in SPSS Graduate Pack 16.0 for Mac.  Results 
revealed an overall model that accounts for 41% of the variance, F(7, 227) = 22.70, p < 
.001.  The adjusted R2, compensating for the positive bias in R2, was .394 reflecting a 
relatively high overall strength of relationship.  The standard error of the estimate was 
6.732.  God image Presence, God image Challenge, self-forgiveness, perceived parental 
rearing Overprotective, other ethnicity, male, and age 45-64 were significant predictors of 
shame. 
 Additional post hoc analyses provide supplemental evidence of the 
interpretability of the model.  Firstly, the model possesses a large effect size (f 2= .69).  
Secondly, operating under the assumption that statistically significant main effects do not 
automatically render such effects practically important, tests of practical importance were 
conducted for all significant predictors in the model.  The unstandardized coefficients 
were all greater than the standard deviation of the outcome variable divided by the 
product of 10 times the standard deviation of each predictor variable, thus rendering each 









Means, standard deviations, reliability coefficients, and correlations among 
predictor variables are presented in Table 4.  The following assumptions of multiple 
regression were tested and met.  Residual analyses for linearity indicated that each of the 
models described below represent a linear model between the outcome variables and 
composites of the predictor variables.  Since standardized residuals were not > 3 it may 
be assumed that heteroscedasticity is not a concern for any of the models.  In addition, 
absence of Cook’s Distance > 1 lends additional evidence that no influential outliers are 
present. Multicollinearity was assessed and deemed not to be a problem since VIF was 
not > 4.0 and Tolerance was not < .20 for any of the predictors in their respective models.  
Independence of observations may also be assumed for each of the models as the Durbin-
Watson statistic is between 1.5 and 2.5 across models. Finally, systematic error in 
measurement was assumed not to be problematic due to the fact that all instruments 
employed possessed coefficient alphas above .80 (OSS = .96; RRFS = .94; SSFS = .89;    
GIS = .92; [GIS by subscale: Acceptance = .81; Presence = .96; Challenge = .85]; s-
EMBU = .82 [s-EMBU by subscale: Rejection = .91; Emotional Warmth = .94; 



















 Three multiple regressions were conducted in order to investigate the relationship 
between the parishioner held religious beliefs of original sin, right-religion (i.e., 
fundamentalism), God-representations, and self-forgiveness on scrupulosity disorder, 
depression, and shame respectively (Bickel, 2007; Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992); perceived 
parental rearing practices were also included into each of the models.  
 The first multiple regression regressed measures of religious beliefs and perceived 
parental rearing on a single measure of scrupulosity disorder (all scores were centered).  
These predictor variables, along with demographic variables, were simultaneously 
entered into a multiple regression in SPSS Graduate Pack 16.0 for Mac.  Results revealed 
an overall model that accounts for approximately 52% of the variance (R2 = .517), F(16, 
217) = 14.508, p < .001.  The adjusted R2, compensating for the positive bias in R2, was 
.481 reflecting a relatively high overall strength of relationship.  The standard error of the 
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estimate was 8.832.  Fundamentalism, degree of belief in original sin, self-forgiveness, 
God image Acceptance, God image Presence, perceived parental rearing Overprotective, 
sex (i.e., male), and age 45-64 were significant predictors of scrupulosity disorder.  Table 
5 contains a summary of the three moderated multiple regression analyses.  
The second multiple regression regressed measures of religious beliefs and 
perceived parental rearing on a single measure of depression (all scores were centered).  
These predictor variables along with demographic variables were entered simultaneously 
into a multiple regression in SPSS Graduate Pack 16.0 for Mac.  Results revealed an 
overall model that accounts for approximately 34% (R2 = .342) of the variance, F(16, 
216) = 7.01, p < .001.  The adjusted R2, compensating for the positive bias in R2, was 
.293 reflecting a relatively high overall strength of relationship.  The standard error of the 
estimate was 4.383.  Self-forgiveness, God image Acceptance, God image Challenge, and 
psychiatric diagnosis were significant predictors of depression. 
The third multiple regression regressed measures of religious beliefs and 
perceived parental rearing on a single measure of shame (all scores were centered).  
These predictor variables along with demographic variables were simultaneously entered 
into a multiple regression in SPSS Graduate Pack 16.0 for Mac.  Results revealed an 
overall model that accounts for approximately 43% of the variance, F(16, 218) = 10.302, 
p < .001.  The adjusted R2, compensating for the positive bias in R2, was .390 reflecting a 
relatively high overall strength of relationship.  The standard error of the estimate was 
6.767.  God image Presence, God image Challenge, self-forgiveness, perceived parental 
rearing Overprotective, other ethnicity, sex (i.e., male), and age 45-64 were significant 





























It is important to note that results which were supported by and discussed in the 
discussion section of the canonical correlation analysis above are not further elaborated 
upon here.  Generally speaking, results from the CCA, stepwise moderated multiple 
regression, and simultaneous multiple regression are fairly consistent with each other, 
thus lending support to the robust nature of the model of psycho-spiritual abuse.  
Additionally, due to the fact that the statistically significant models for scrupulosity, 
depression, and shame are identical, with the exception of interaction terms and GIS 
Challenge in the depression model, for both the stepwise and simultaneously multiple 
regressions results will be discussed jointly.   
It was enquired whether the possible relationship between original sin and 
scrupulosity, depression, and/or shame was moderated (Questions 12-14).  Results 
suggest that for both scrupulosity (Question 12) and depressive disorder (Question 13) 
degree of belief in original sin is moderated.  To answer question 12, the regression of 
scrupulosity disorder on original sin varies as a function of ethnicity.  While post hoc 
analyses indicate that greater degrees of belief in original sin adversely affects the mental 
health of non-Latino American and Latino American parishioners, it his much more 
detrimental effects on the mental health of Latino American parishioners. 
The finding that on average greater degree of belief in original sin adversely 
affects the mental health of Latino Americans, as it relates to scrupulosity disorder, more 
so than non-Latino Americans is surprising as well as difficult to interpret given the 
paucity of research in the areas of Latino American religiosity (Ellison et al., 2009) and 
Latino Americans and obsessive-compulsive disorder (Williams et al., 2010).  
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Nonetheless, one plausible explanation for this outcome may have to do with familismo 
(Hurtado, 1995).  Familismo concerns the strong sense of loyalty, duty, and constraint 
Latino Americans typically possess toward their immediate and extended family.  Latino 
American families tend to place conservative emphases on issues of morality, ethics, 
religion, and values (McEachern & Kenny, 2002; Oquendo, Dragatsi, Harkavy-Friedmal, 
Dervic, Currier, Burke, Grunebaum, & Mann, 2005).  Consequently, demonstrating 
esteem for, regard for, and fidelity to authority figures such as parents and elders is a 
highly valued virtue and considered an act of respect not only toward the authority figure 
him/herself, but toward the “institution” s/he represent (i.e., the household).  Therefore, it 
stands to reason that Latino Americans may generalize their sense of loyalty, duty, and 
constraint towards other authority figures and institutions, such as clergy and the church, 
that play significant family type roles in their lives.  Since for many Latino Americans the 
church is viewed as an extended family, it is conceivable that calling into question her 
doctrines, teachings, and the veracity of her clergy’s statements is not only perceived as 
disrespectful, disloyal, and anti-familial, but sinful as well.  Consequently, the deleterious 
effects accompanied with greater degrees of belief in the doctrine of original sin may 
have more direct effects on Latino American parishioners than others.        
To answer Question 13, results suggest that the regression of depression on 
original sin varies as a function of perceived parental rejection.  Further, post hoc 
analyses reveal that degree of belief in original sin deleteriously affects parishioners with 
low levels of perceived parental rejection. These findings are in line with the general 
premise expounded throughout this study that greater belief in the theological doctrine of 
original sin fosters psychological difficulties via a diminished sense of self (see Ellis, 
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1960a, b, 1976, 1980, 1992, 2000; Branden, 1994; Schecterle, 1999; Strozier, 1994; 
Watters, 1992).  The fact that parishioners with high perceptions of parental rejection 
experienced decreased depressive symptomatlogy with increasing degree of belief in 
original sin may be due to a view of human nature that is ego syntonic.  In other words, 
the presence of parental rejection allows for the parishioner to employ an external 
attribution style to account for his/her unpleasant familial experience(s), thus mitigating 
possible depression.  Therefore, for parishioners who perceived their parents as more 
rejecting the doctrine of original sin may function as a meaning-making system that helps 
explain unhealthy, painful parental behavior.  Consequently the parishioner may reason, 
“Mom and dad were overly harsh, angry, and critical of me, not because they did not love 
me, but because they are broken sinners who did not know any better.”  This scenario is 
all the more likely considering that when degree of belief in original sin is removed from 
the regression equation depressive symptoms increase with greater levels of perceived 
parental rejection; a result consistent with the research literature (Margaro & Wersz, 
2006; Whitbeck, Hoyt, Simons, Logner, Elder, Lorenz, & Huck, 1992; Zenmore & 
Rinholm, 1989).   However, for parishioners whose rearing environment was not harsher, 
angrier and/or more critical than the average person’s, the psychological effects of greater 
degrees of belief in the ineptness of human nature are experienced by the self more 
directly.  Under such circumstances the parishioner’s attribution style may become 
internal fostering self-derogatory statements.  It stands to reason that such self-
attributions may facilitate depression.  This corresponds to research that suggests 
parishioners with a belief in original sin self-judge and self-punish more than others 
(Sexton & Maddock, 1984).  Research by Schaap-Jonker and colleagues (2002) as well 
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as Eurelings-Bontekoe et al. (2005) is also suggestive of the notion that theological 
doctrines that foster or facilitate self-reproach may create or exacerbate current 
psychiatric symptoms.  Finally, “With increased devotion and commitment to a religious 
system, people are likely to find more and more areas of their lives that are imperfect,” 
says Exline (2002).  “Depending on how such failures are attributed, they might prompt 
negative outcomes such as self-condemnation, hopelessness…” (Ibid., p. 188) and 
depression.  
It was also queried whether the possible relationship between religious 
fundamentalism and depression was moderated (Question 10).  In fact, results suggest 
that the regression of depression on religious fundamentalism varies as a function of the 
parishioner’s non-accepting God representation.  Therefore, greater religious 
fundamentalism is more detrimental to the mental health of parishioners whose God-
representation is imbued with greater undertones of non-acceptance. That non-accepting 
God-representations moderate the relationship between fundamentalist beliefs and 
depression is not surprising given previous research which suggests that feeling alienated 
from God is a strong predictor of depression (Exline, 2002; Exline et al., 2000).  Such 
research suggests that negative self-appraisals play an important role in these feelings of 
estrangement.  The current findings, however, deepen our understanding of how these 
feelings of disunion may operate.   
The acceptance subscale of the GIS is a measure of rudimentary goodness 
(Lawrence, 1997).  As such, it answers two basic yet related questions: “Am I good 
enough to be loved;” “Am I good enough for God to love?”  Research shows that 
children whose primary caregivers are neglectful, inconsistent, untrustworthy, as well as 
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verbally, physically, and sexually abusive tend to possess non-accepting God-
representations in later life (Balthazar, 2007; Goodman & Manierre, 2008; Reinert & 
Edwards, 2009).  Sound psychological theory allows us to reason that the parent-child 
relationship, which anchors and informs all other relationships in life, teaches such 
children that they are “not good enough” to receive the most essential, life-validating and 
human inclusive affect of all, love.  In turn, the child develops a primitive intrapsychic 
God-representation that either corresponds to their wounded experience of the primary 
objects or creates a compensated representation of the divine in an attempt to rectify the 
parental objects’ shortcomings (Granqvist & Kirkpatrick, 2008).  In either case, the child 
turned parishioner is likely to be left with nagging adverse self-attributions regarding 
issues of primitive goodness and acceptance.  Consequently, the perfectionistic nature of 
higher levels of religious fundamentalist demands appears to exacerbate depressive 
symptomatology for those parishioners whom already feel that God’s acceptance is 
conditional.        
Findings also suggest that as parishioners increasingly feel that God does not 
empower them they experience less shame (Hypothesis 15). At first glance these results 
may appear to be counterintuitive.  However, a closer look shows that they are consistent 
with the theory undergirding psycho-spiritual abuse.  The challenge subscale of the GIS 
measures perceived empowerment (Lawrence, 1997).  The latent question it answers is, 
“Does God want me to grow?”  In order for us to make better sense of what this signifies, 
the parishioner’s private God must be thought of as serving as either a secure haven or a 
secure base (Bowlby, 1969).  Borrowing language from attachment theory, the question 
of growth refers to the parishioner’s use, or lack thereof, of his/her God-representation as 
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an internal resource that: (1) empowers the believer to venture out and interact with the 
world (i.e., secure base); or (2) does the parishioner feel unsafe in engaging the world and 
therefore prefers to retreat into the comfort and solace of his/her private God (i.e., safe 
haven).  These results suggest that parishioners whose God-representation functions more 
so as a safe haven than a secure base experience less shame.   
Parishioner’s for whom their God-representation serves as a safe haven believe 
that thinking too much may endanger their faith, that God does not place a high premium 
on human achievements, and that a close relationship with God and being active in the 
world are incongruous (Lawrence, 1997).  While the following comments were 
previously made by this researcher in the CCA’s discussion regarding hypotheses 3 and 
6, he believes them to be equally relevant here.  Research suggests that parishioners who 
engage society in a limited fashion usually hold more religious fundamentalist beliefs 
(Altmeyer & Hunsberger, 2004) and as mentioned earlier this sample holds more 
fundamentalist views than average.  In addition, religious fundamentalists have also been 
found not to value freedom of scientific inquiry, tolerance, and newspaper reading—
activities that require significant engagement with ideas that may be diametrically 
opposed to their religious values (Rigney & Hoffman, 1993).  Poland’s findings that 
Church of Christ parishioners, a denomination that is typically more conservative than 
mainline churches, score significantly higher on other-directed shoulds and tough-
mindedness than Church of Religious Science attendees, echo these sentiments of rigidity 
and close-mindedness among the religious conservative.  Hence, it is conceivable that 
such parishioners experience less shame due to the fact that shameful affect requires that 
a person feel seen and/or exposed before others (Pattison, 2000).  Therefore, the more 
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parishioners retreat into their insular church worlds they limit the situations in which they 
may experience shame.  While symptom reduction is usually encouraging, this does not 
seem to be the case here.  What these results suggest is that God-representations that 
mainly serve as a safe haven represent a personal God who does not furnish the 
parishioner with sufficient internal resources to engage the world in a healthier manner.  
Additionally, they also suggest that parishioners who hold such non-empowering God-
representations may belong to religiously rigid faith communities that restrict 
psychological growth.   
Although this reality may provide comfort, solace, and happiness, it may also lock 
the believer in and prevent effective living.  To decide whether it does, we must 
assess the effects of this reality on the individual’s life; we must consider not only 
whether it is experienced [emphasis in original] as liberating or enslaving but also 
whether it functions [emphasis in original] to liberate or to enslave (Batson, 
Schoenrade, & Ventis, 1993, p. 198).        
In order to better understand the nature of self-forgiveness within this sample 
(Hypotheses 16-18), a post hoc moderated multiple regression was conducted taking into 
account parishioner held religious beliefs of original sin, right religion, and God-
representations as well as perceived parental rearing practices on self-forgiveness.  These 
predictor variables along with interaction terms, products of OSS and RRFS with 
demographic varibles, were entered into a stepwise multiple regression in SPSS Graduate 
Pack 16.0 for Mac; stepwise multiple regression was employed because of the 
exploratory nature of the analysis.  Results revealed an overall model that accounted for 
18% of the variance, F(4, 227) = 12.29, p < .001.  The adjusted R2, compensating for the 
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positive bias in R2, was .164 reflecting a relatively moderate strength of relationship.  The 
standard error of the estimate was 7.63.  Table 3 contains a summary of the regression 













God image Accepting, degree of belief in original sin, perceived parental rearing 
Rejecting, and 45-64 were significant negative predictors of self-forgiveness.   
 These results are sensible given theory and prior research.  Ross and colleagues 
(2004) assert that persons who view themselves as blemished and unworthy of 
acceptance have more difficulty self-forgiving.  Given that (1) the doctrine of original sin 
requires proponents to accept the ineptness of the self as an ontological certainty; and (2) 
that a parishioner’s God-representation is informed by parental surrogates, such as the 
institutional church, throughout development it is conceivable that greater degrees of 
belief in original sin as well as more non-accepting God-representations may foster an 
intropunitve style (Mauger et al., 1992).   
Research by Tangney et al. (2005), which suggests that intrapersonal forgiveness 
is highly associated with perfectionism and shame, may provide some aid in 
understanding why parishioners between the ages of 45 and 64 on average were less self-
 
  215 
forgiving than younger parishioners.  A review of Tables 3 and 5 indicate that this age 
group predicted scrupulosity and shame respectively.  While these findings are discussed 
later in the chapter, this author speculates that one plausible explanation for these 
relationships is that in regards to psycho-spiritual abuse they may require longer 
incubation before they register on clinical measures.  Therefore, this may also be the case 
with self-forgiveness.  In other words, prolonged exposure to derogatory self-statements 
via orthodox doctrines such as original sin may play a crucial role in inhibiting self-
forgiveness.  Research by Ingersoll-Dayton and Krause (2005) among religious elderly 
that suggests that belief in God’s forgiveness does not necessarily translate into self-
forgiveness may be a result of this phenomenon.  Finally, while no current research is 
available in the area of self-forgiveness regarding the effects of parental rearing on 
intrapersonal forgiveness, it is not difficult to imagine that a parenting style which is 
perceived as overly harsh, angry, and and/or critical (i.e., rejecting) may not be conducive 
to self-forgiving actions and beliefs.  Therefore, while these results are consistent with 
research by Tangney and colleagues’ (2005) assertion that self-forgiveness is not 
associated with any particular religious faith, it does provide a more nuanced and 
comprehensive portrait of the role religious beliefs and familial upbringing play in 
intrapersonal forgiveness.  Hence, it stands to reason that parishioners with low degrees 
of belief in original sin, more accepting God-representations, who are younger age, and 
who have experienced minimal levels of parental rejection are more self-forgiving and 
therefore may experience less scrupulosity, depression, and shame. 
Questions 6-8 inquire about the possible relationships between demographic 
variables and scrupulosity (Question 6), depression (Question 7), and shame (Question 8) 
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respectively.  Results suggest that on average, parishioners ages 45 to 64 reported more 
shame and scrupulosity than their younger counterparts (Questions 6 and 8).  While 
there is no clear explanation for the presence of these results, one plausible explanation is 
that in regards to psycho-spiritual abuse shame and scrupulosity may require longer 
incubation periods before producing clinical symptoms.  Therefore, these data may be 
telling the following story: parishioners between the ages of 45 and 64 may have 
belonged to their religious faith communities substantially longer than those younger.  
Consequently, such parishioners may have been exposed to religious beliefs that 
adversely affect mental health over a longer period of time, but it has taken this 
substantial period of time to measure these effects. 
Second, on average, parishioners with at least one psychiatric diagnosis report 
less depressive symptomatology than parishioners without psychiatric diagnoses 
(Question 7).  Again, there is no clear-cut explanation for this finding.  However, it may 
be that medication, psychotherapy, or a combination are responsible for curbing 
depressive symptoms among these parishioners.  On the other hand, it is also conceivable 
that within this sample there exist a substantial number of parishioners who meet the 
criteria for depressive disorder yet have not been diagnosed for a variety of reasons; one 
being that they have not sought treatment.  This finding alerts us to the possibility that 
religious persons may underutilize mental health services due to religious prohibitions 
and conflict with religious values. Indeed, these results may be indicative of Malony’s 
(1998) findings that persons who ascribe to fundamentalist and evangelical systems of 
religious belief look upon the mental health field with skepticism and wariness; such 
wariness may also extend to pastoral counselors out of fear that the “psychotherapeutic 
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gospel” will eclipse the individual’s religious values (Watts, 2002).  It is important to 
realize that in large part, the animosity that exists between psychology and religion 
concerns a conflict in values.  Such conflicts include God-centeredness vs. self-
involvement, responsibility for committed sins vs. exploration and explanation of 
transgressions, and the debate over self-esteem “with psychologists generally valuing it 
as a force for good adjustment, but some Christians being wary of it as promoting too 
much self-centeredness, or disguising the need for God” (Watts, 2002, p. 5; also see 
Bergin, 1980, 1992). 
Another finding of significant interest refers to the fact that on average, women 
parishioners reported significantly more shame than males (Question 8).  Such a result is 
consistent with centuries of Christian doctrine and popular teaching regarding women’s 
role in the moral perdition of the human race.  Beginning with rabbinical exegesis 
women, sex, and original sin have been inextricably bound together. The popular 
teaching has been: sex engendered original sin and women are to blame (Noddings, 1989; 
Pagels, 1988; Tennant, 1903).  Heise and Steitz (1991) assert that more conservative 
Christian faiths have a demonstrable history of employing the myth of Adam and Eve to 
cast women as second-class citizens.  Moreover, Scripture passages equating women with 
impurity and sin abound.  Given that biblical inerrancy is a pillar of most Christian faiths 
(Cox, 2009; Hood et al., 2005; Pagels, 1988) it would not be unusual for women in more 
conservative circles to be expected to follow biblical imperatives of keeping silent in 
church and learning in full submission from their husbands (1 Timothy 2:11-15).  In 
some Christian faith traditions, such as Catholicism, women are unable to serve as priests 
and are told that the example, par excellence, of a virtuous woman is that of the Virgin 
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Mary—meek and sexless.  Research suggests that rearing in such conservative 
communities and failure to measure up to such standards may be quite shame provoking 
leading to considerable clinical distress (Allport, 1950; H. B. Lewis, 1987; Johnson & 
Hayes, 2003). 
Finally, results suggest that on average, male parishioners report more obsessions 
and fears regarding sin and God’s punishment than women parishioners (Questions 6).  
Once more, this finding is enigmatic given that the prevalence rate for men and OCD is 
half of that of women, though some research indicates that men and women equally seek 
treatment for the disorder (Ciarrocchi, 1995).  Additional research is required to explore 
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